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FOREWORD 
The U.S.-Iranian relationship has perplexed and frustrated 
foreign policy decision makers, analysts, and academics for much of 
the last century. Saber rattling, allegations of oppressive and unfair 
sanctions, propaganda and covert action fill scholarly papers, 
newspaper articles and editorials, and academic gatherings on the 
dynamic between the two states.  
 
On September 28, 2013 U.S. President Barack Obama placed 
a telephone call to the newly elected President of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Hassan Rouhani. This was the first direct 
conversation between the leaders of the two countries since the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979. The call lasted less than 20 minutes, yet 
its impact may challenge the current narrative and alter the nature of 
the relationship between the two countries—and in the process, 
reshape the contours of international order.    
 
By focusing its symposium1 and related issue on Iran, the 
Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs seeks to reshape the 
public discussion on how the current U.S.-Iranian relationship will 
affect the international order in the future—and to do so in a way 
that challenges conventional debates over Iran’s nuclear capabilities 
and aspirations. While the relationship between the two states 
encompasses a multitude of components and facets, the nuclear lens 
provides a launch point for examining that debate and the larger 
structural forces it implicates.  
 
                                                 
1 The annual symposium of the Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 
was held on February 15, 2013 at Penn State’s Dickinson School of Law and 
School of International Affairs. Video of the symposium is available at 
http://law.psu.edu/academics/journals/law_and_international_affairs/lectures_an
d_symposia.  
 2012 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2:2 
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In the time since the February 2013 symposium, the public 
discussion has evolved and an opportunity now exists to re-consider 
the U.S.-Iranian relationship. The essays in this issue do so without 
succumbing to the usual political frames and offer pragmatic 
suggestions rooted in an understanding of history, international law, 
and the demands of those in office.   
 
In the opening essay, Flynt Leverett questions the 
sustainability of the U.S.’s current policy toward Iran, and its 
compatibility with the material and social realities facing many Middle 
Eastern publics. He urges U.S. officials to consider anew, and 
unencumbered by the axis of evil narrative, why Iran may want to 
pursue nuclear technology. In the conclusion of his essay, Leverett 
ponders whether recent rejections by the U.S. Congress and U.S. 
public of the use of force in Syria evince a more significant shift – 
and he calls on government officials to engage in a “substantial 
strategic revision” of the U.S.-Iranian relationship  
 
In the companion essays that follow, Daniel Joyner and 
Richard Butler explore how current—often competing— 
interpretations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) will 
impact its future viability. Joyner examines the history of Iran’s 
compliance (or noncompliance) with the NPT and the related 
safeguard agreements by adopting the lens of the Western arguments 
and then inverting the lens to show the Iranian response. This device 
demonstrates how competing interpretations affect the efficacy of 
the NPT enforcement regime. In his essay on interpretative impact, 
Butler exhorts policymakers to return their focus to the historical 
purpose for the NPT: to create a world without nuclear weapons.  
 
The companion essays from Mary Ellen O’Connell and 
Reyam El Molla and James Houck examine the appropriate role for 
the use of force doctrine in constraining state behavior, particularly 
with regard to the prospective use of force, by the United States or 
others, against Iranian nuclear targets. In his essay, Houck imagines a 
contemporary letter exchange between U.S. Secretary of State John 
Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, and 
explores the continuing influence of the Caroline doctrine on disputes 
over the justified use of force under international law. O’Connell and 
 2012 Foreword 2:2 
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El Molla challenge the assumption, implicit in many current 
discussions of Iran’s nuclear program, that states have a right to use 
military force to end that program. Their article defends the primacy 
of the U.N. Charter and explores why an attack on Iranian facilities 
would violate international law, and do irreparable damage to the 
global legal order. 
 
In the concluding essay, Hillary Mann Leverett posits that the 
U.S.’s greatest strategic challenge is to extricate its foreign policy 
from a quest for hegemonic dominance in the Middle East and other 
critical areas of the world. She argues that Iran represents an essential 
proof point for resetting American foreign policy on a more 
productive and realistic trajectory, and offers guidance on achieving 
such a reset. 
 
The mission of the Penn State Journal of Law & International 
Affairs is to provide a forum for engaged conversations between 
scholars and policymakers to examine the most pressing and complex 
international problems and trends. The U.S.-Iranian relationship has 
occupied this category for much of the last quarter century. There 
now exists an opportunity to reconsider this label, and reframe the 
relationship. In his presentation at the recent October 2013 
negotiations in Geneva, Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad 
Zarif called for “an end to an unnecessary crisis and a start for new 
horizons.”2 The essays in this issue reflect that call and provide the 
insights needed to transform the U.S.-Iranian relationship from one 
of distrust and hyperbole to one of mutual respect and engaged 
exchange. 
 
Amy C. Gaudion 
Executive Editor 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Michael Gordon and Thomas Erdbrink, Iran Presents Nuclear Plan to Big 
Powers, N.Y. TIMES, October 16, 2013, at A4, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/16/world/middleeast/in-new-nuclear-talks-
technological-gains-by-iran-pose-challenges-to-the-west.html?_r=0. 
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THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE,  
THE END OF THE AMERICAN 
CENTURY, AND THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
Flynt Leverett* 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay is grounded in two basic propositions. The first is 
that the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran have emerged 
as the leading antagonists in a new Middle Eastern “Cold War” —a 
struggle over American primacy in the Middle East that shapes its 
geopolitics, even as the region is going through dramatic changes on 
multiple levels. The second is that how the U.S.-Iranian competition 
for influence plays out will have profound consequences not just for 
the Middle East, but also for the legal frameworks, rules-based 
regimes, and mechanisms of global governance that shape 
international order in the 21st century. This is especially true with 
                                                 
* Flynt Leverett, Professor, School of International Affairs and Affiliate 
Faculty, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State University; also Visiting 
Scholar, School of International Studies, Peking University. With Hillary Mann 
Leverett, he is co-author of Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms 
with the Islamic Republic of Iran (2013). The Leveretts also write 
www.GoingToTehran.com. They are grateful to the other participants in a 
symposium sponsored by the Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs in 
February 2013 (David Andelman, Richard Butler, James Houck, Dan Joyner, 
Tiyanjana Maluwa, and Mary Ellen O’Connell) for contributing to this event and to 
Butler, Houck, Joyner, and O’Connell for articles flowing from it that appear in the 
present issue of the journal. 
 2013 Leverett 2:2 
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regard to U.S.-Iranian disagreements over the Islamic Republic’s 
nuclear activities. 
Strategic competition between America and Iran and its 
implications for international order play out against a backdrop of the 
progressive diminution of U.S. leadership in world affairs—the end 
of what Andrew Bacevich has called “the short American century.”1 
Since Henry Luce proclaimed the American century’s 
commencement in 1941, and especially since the Cold War’s end, 
America’s status as the preeminent power in the Middle East has 
been crucial to its global standing. At the same time, official 
American self-presentation and a considerable body of commentary 
and scholarship have linked U.S. primacy to the provision of global 
public goods; these include the transactional platforms and political 
and security arrangements needed to sustain economic openness and 
encourage continuing liberalization. The provision of such public 
goods has been bound up with the elaboration of rules-based regimes 
for key dimensions of international security (e.g., the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty) and global commerce. 
For decades, Washington has relied on perceptions of 
America as benevolent hegemon to legitimate first its post-World 
War II dominance over the non-communist world and then its post-
Cold War primacy, in the Middle East and globally. However, U.S. 
administrations have also sought to manage the provision of public 
goods to ensure and maximize American power and influence—often 
in ways that contravene the image of America as benevolent 
hegemon.2 
                                                 
1 Andrew Bacevich, Life at the Dawn of the American Century, in THE SHORT 
AMERICAN CENTURY: A POSTMORTEM 1-14 (Andrew Bacevich ed., 2012).   
2 See, e.g., DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERPRETING THE NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION TREATY 6-20 (2011) (discussing how, in its early advocacy for 
what would become the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States was 
only concerned with forestalling the proliferation of nuclear weapons to preserve 
its strategic advantages as one of two nuclear superpowers; it was only in response 
to pressure from non-nuclear weapons states that America reluctantly agreed to 
include in the Treaty a commitment by nuclear weapons states to nuclear 
disarmament and recognition of all states’ right to the peaceful use of nuclear 
technology). The relationship of these three core principles in the Treaty and the 
ramifications of this relationship for the Iranian nuclear issue is treated at greater 
 2013 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2:2 
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As the United States experiences relative decline, this 
approach becomes less and less sustainable.3 Its perpetuation is also 
                                                 
length below, and in other articles in this issue of the journal by Daniel Joyner, 
Iran’s Nuclear Program and International Law, 2 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 282 
(2013), and Richard Butler, NPT: A Pillar of Global Governance, 2 PENN. ST. J. L. & 
INT’L AFF. 272. See also ANDREW BACEVICH, AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE REALITIES 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DIPLOMACY 1-6, 32-54, 71-116 (2002) (discussing 
how American policymakers calculated that the promotion of economic 
globalization after the Cold War ended would ensure America’s global primacy well 
into the 21st century); Robert Gilpin, The Rise of American Hegemony, in TWO 
HEGEMONIES: BRITAIN 1846-1914 AND THE UNITED STATES 1946-2001, 165-82 
(Patrick Karl O’Brien & Armand Clesse eds., 2002), 
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ipe/gilpin.htm (discussing how, in a Cold 
War context, Washington leveraged its hegemonic position in post-World War II 
regimes for international trade and monetary relations to lock Western Europe and 
Japan into security-dependent alliances with the United States); ROBERT GILPIN, 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 90 (1987) (discussing 
how the United States shifted from a more “benevolent” to a more “predatory” 
mode of economic hegemony in the 1960s and 1970s to manage its growing 
current account and fiscal deficits); ERIC HELLIENER, STATES AND THE 
REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL FINANCE: FROM BRETTON WOODS TO THE 1990S 
(1996) (discussing how the promotion of financial liberalization in the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s allowed the United States to leverage its unique structural 
advantages in international finance to ensure its continued leadership in 
international economic affairs even as its position in global manufacturing eroded); 
Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, The Balance of Power, Public Goods, and the 
Lost Art of Grand Strategy: American Policy toward the Persian Gulf and Rising Asia in the 
21st Century, 1 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 202, 210-11 (2012), 
http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&context=jlia 
(discussing how America’s commitment to secure the flow of Persian Gulf oil and 
gas to international markets has never had that much to do with America’s own 
energy demand, being motivated to a much greater extent by Washington’s interest 
in reinforcing its strategic influence in other important parts of the world where 
Persian Gulf hydrocarbons fill critical parts of the energy mix). Since September 11, 
2001, the compatibility of aspects of America’s “war on terror” with international 
law has been roundly challenged; likewise, the 2003 invasion and subsequent 
occupation of Iraq—justified by Washington as essential to Middle East and global 
security—is seen by most of the international community as illegal.  The 
application of use of force doctrine to the Iranian nuclear case is also treated at 
greater length below, and in other articles in this issue of the journal by Mary Ellen 
O’Connell & Reyam El Molla, The Prohibition on the Use of Force for Arms Control: The 
Case of Iran’s Nuclear Program, 2 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 315 (2013) and James 
Houck, Caroline Revisited: An Imagined Exchange Between John Kerry and Mohammad Javad 
Zarif, 2 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 293 (2013). 
3 See Michael Mastanduno, System Maker and Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and 
the International Political Economy, 61 WORLD POL. 121 (2009), for more on this point.   
 2013 Leverett 2:2 
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prospectively dangerous for U.S. interests. Because the structure of 
contemporary international relations is shaped by social as well as 
material factors, the perceived legitimacy of a great power’s actions 
matter greatly.4 As new powers rise, they can leverage Washington’s 
hegemonic abuses to marshal resistance to America’s strategic 
ambitions and delegitimize its primacy, thereby weakening its 
international position.5 
Today, the U.S. posture toward the Islamic Republic is the 
most potent driver of hegemonic unilateralism in American foreign 
policy. Washington’s determination to preserve its ambitions for 
dominance in the Middle East puts it on a collision course with the 
Islamic Republic, with its strong commitment to foreign policy 
independence. With a coterie of European hangers-on, the United 
States is focused on forcing the Islamic Republic to abandon its 
nuclear program, accept open-ended U.S. and Israeli military 
dominance in the Middle East, and acquiesce in its (Western-
sponsored) transformation into a secular liberal state. On a regional 
level, this makes negotiating plausible solutions with Tehran, on the 
nuclear issue and other challenges, virtually impossible. It also puts 
America’s Iran policy at odds with material and social reality in the 
                                                 
4 See Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 2, at 220-21, for a discussion 
of the importance of legitimacy for American primacy in the Middle East. 
5 This is an underappreciated but increasingly salient aspect of what 
Robert Pape generically describes as “soft balancing”—the use of “nonmilitary 
tools” to “delay, complicate, or increase the costs” of a unipolar leader’s hegemonic 
assertions that threaten other states’ interests. In Pape’s presentation, leveraging 
“the rules and procedures of important international organizations” and advancing 
“strict interpretations of neutrality”—and, I would add, of other aspects of 
international law—figure among the nonmilitary tools that can be deployed to 
constrain a unipole’s initiatives. See Robert Pape, Soft Balancing Against the United 
States, 30 INT’L SEC. 7, 17, 36 (2005), 
 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/1019-is-30-1_final_02-pape.pdf. See also 
Martha Finnemore, Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why 
Being a Unipole Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be, 61 WORLD POL. 58 (2009), 
http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/Uploads/Documents/IRC/Finnemore%20(2009).pd
f (discussing how institutions, laws, and rules—even those originally championed 
by a unipolar power—have internal logics of their own that are hard for unipoles to 
control, and how “unrestrained hypocrisy” by a unipole undermines the legitimacy 
of its primacy); Shirley Scott, International Law As Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship 
between International Law and International Politics, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (1994), 
http://207.57.19.226/journal/Vol5/No3/art1.pdf.   
 2013 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2:2 
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Middle East, contributing to the accelerating erosion of U.S. standing 
in one of the world’s most vital areas. 
On a global level, determination to compel Iran’s surrender 
prompts ever more assiduous efforts by America and its partners to 
coerce other states into pressing Tehran. In the process, the United 
States violates basic principles of rules-based regimes for nuclear 
nonproliferation, trade, and other vital issues. Similarly, the lurking 
threat that Washington will launch yet another Middle Eastern war to 
cut Iran down to size—reflected in U.S. officials’ regular reminders 
that “all options are on the table” —breaks international law 
regarding the use of force. This, too, is detached from strategic 
reality—as the Obama administration’s self-inflicted debacle over its 
declared intention to use military force against the Syrian government 
following the use of chemical weapons in Syria on August 21, 2013 
vividly demonstrated. The United Nations Security Council was not 
about to authorize such a venture—and, in the end, neither the Arab 
League, NATO, the British parliament, nor even the U.S. Congress 
was prepared to endorse it. This episode suggests that, as America’s 
relative decline proceeds, the credibility of its threats to use force for 
blatantly hegemonic purposes is eroding as well—which means that 
continued resort to such threats is not just illegal, but self-damaging 
in strategic terms. 
Relative decline challenges the United States to share the 
prerogatives of global governance, especially with rising powers in 
the global South. Such collaboration would enhance prospects for 
more effective global governance by aligning responsibility and 
capacity more accurately; it would also help sustain America’s 
influence, even as its relative power declines. By contrast, abusively 
hegemonic assertions will provoke intensifying backlash from non-
Western powers that will damage America’s long-term position in 
international affairs. That is why the manner in which the U.S.-
Iranian competition for influence in the Middle East plays out over 
the next few years—and how the United States conducts itself in this 
competition—will decisively affect both America’s international 
standing and the dynamics of international order in the 21st century. 
This essay, organized in four sections, looks at the 
prospective impact of U.S.-Iranian tensions over Iran’s nuclear 
 2013 Leverett 2:2 
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activities on global governance. The first section examines the Iranian 
challenge to America’s hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East and, 
more particularly, how the Iranian nuclear program fits into Tehran’s 
counter-hegemonic strategy. The second section lays out how U.S.-
Iranian differences over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear activities 
reflect two very different conceptions of international order. The 
third and fourth sections then consider how these different 
conceptions of world order lead Washington, Tehran, and their 
respective supporters to different positions on what the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty means for the Iranian case, and on what 
international law says about the prospective use of force against 
Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. 
I.  IRAN, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE MIDDLE EAST’S  
SHIFTING BALANCE OF POWER 
Since World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold 
War, the United States’ status as the Middle East’s preeminent power 
has been, as noted, crucial to its global primacy. America’s unique 
capability to project conventional military power into the Middle East 
has enabled it to assume responsibility for the physical security of 
hydrocarbon flows from the Persian Gulf, on which the global 
economy depends, and to become the presumptive enforcer of order 
in the region. This muscle has given the United States extraordinary 
economic and political influence in the Middle East, which in turn 
has reinforced American dominance in other important parts of the 
world. 
Today, the biggest challenges to the highly militarized 
political and security order that Washington has worked for decades 
to consolidate in the Middle East are posed by, associated with, or 
potentially exploitable by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Hillary Mann 
Leverett and I have developed a particular take on the U.S.-Iranian 
competition for influence in the region, which we develop in our 
book, Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.6 Our take is captured in two related 
                                                 
6 FLYNT LEVERETT & HILLARY MANN LEVERETT, GOING TO TEHRAN: 
WHY THE UNITED STATES MUST COME TO TERMS WITH THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
OF IRAN (2013).  
 2013 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2:2 
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assessments: first, that the United States is, in relative terms, a 
declining power in the Middle East; and second, that the biggest 
beneficiary of America’s regional decline is the Islamic Republic of 
Iran.7 
Those unsure whether they agree with these assessments 
should compare the positions of the United States and the Islamic 
Republic in the Middle East on the eve of the 9/11 attacks, just over 
a decade ago, to their positions today. On the eve of 9/11, every 
Middle Eastern government was either reflexively pro-American (like 
Egypt and Turkey), in negotiation to become pro-American (like 
Qadhafi’s Libya and Bashar al-Assad’s Syria), or staunchly anti-
Iranian (like Saddam Husayn’s Iraq and Afghanistan under the 
Taliban). Today, because of elections, governments in Iraq, Lebanon, 
Libya, Palestine, Tunisia, and Turkey are no longer reflexively pro-
American or anti-Iranian. All are now pursuing more independent 
foreign policies—which means they are less enthusiastic about 
strategic cooperation with the United States and more open to the 
Islamic Republic. The same could have been said for post-Mubarak 
Egypt, too, at least until a July 2013 military coup deposed its first 
democratically elected (and Islamist) government. To the extent that 
any post-coup Egyptian government is interested in maintaining even 
a modicum of public support, it cannot afford to be seen as wholly 
subordinate to the United States (or Israel). This will surely correlate 
with the pursuit of at least some measure of foreign policy 
independence. In August 2013, for example, Egypt aligned with 
Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon to block an Arab League consensus to 
endorse U.S. military action against Syria over the Assad 
government’s alleged use of chemical weapons. 
As a result of these developments, the United States is in a 
profoundly weaker position and the Islamic Republic is in a 
significantly stronger position in the Middle East today than they 
were on the eve of 9/11. Going to Tehran argues that this shift in the 
Middle East’s balance of power is happening both because of serious 
U.S. mistakes in the region and because of an Iranian national 
security strategy that has enabled Tehran to leverage U.S. mistakes to 
its very considerable advantage. 
                                                 
7 Id. at 1-11.  
 2013 Leverett 2:2 
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A. America’s Counterproductive Quest for Middle Eastern 
Hegemony 
When we refer to U.S. policy mistakes—including but by no 
means limited to the Iraq War—we do not identify them as 
idiosyncratic products of the George W. Bush administration. Rather, 
they stem from a much deeper source that cuts across Democratic 
and Republican administrations. We describe it as the United States 
giving in to a post-Cold War temptation to act as an imperial power 
in the Middle East. For the past twenty years, America has not been 
content to maintain its military primacy in the Middle East, defend its 
interests there, and legitimize its presence by soberly and effectively 
managing the regional balance of power. Instead, it has tried to 
remake the Middle East in accordance with American preferences, 
working to coerce political outcomes there with the aim of 
consolidating a highly militarized, pro-American regional order. 
The United States did this by retaining military forces on the 
ground in Saudi Arabia and other Arab states after the first Gulf War 
(something it did not do, to any significant degree, during the Cold 
War, and which led directly to the emergence of Al-Qa’ida and the 
9/11 attacks). It did this by leveling sanctions against Saddam 
Husayn’s regime that led to the deaths of more than a million Iraqis, 
half of them children; by invading Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11 
and pursuing prolonged occupations in these countries that have 
killed hundreds of thousands of civilians; and by helping Israel 
consolidate a nearly absolute freedom of unilateral military initiative.8 
As it has pursued these policies, the United States has also worked to 
isolate the Islamic Republic of Iran diplomatically, to press it 
economically, and to foment its collapse.9 
Taken together, these policies constitute what Going to Tehran 
calls the imperial turn in U.S. Middle East policy. Pursued with little 
regard for on-the-ground realities, this imperial turn has proven not 
just quixotic but deeply damaging to American interests. Strategic 
failures in Afghanistan and Iraq have squandered human and material 
resources, while underscoring for the world, and especially for Middle 
                                                 
8 Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 2, at 216-20.  
9 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 279-84, 328-54. 
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Eastern publics, the limits of what American military can 
accomplish.10 More fundamentally, the imperial thrust of American 
policy has decimated the perceived legitimacy of American purposes 
in the Middle East for the vast majority of the people living there. 
Twenty years ago, perhaps even ten years ago, that fact might not 
have seemed so significant. But today, when Middle Eastern publics 
are becoming more politically engaged and when their opinions are 
mattering more than ever before, this is strategically devastating for 
the United States. 
When he first ran for president in 2008, Barack Obama 
professed to understand this challenge; he pledged to change what he 
called the “mindset” that had gotten America into the strategic 
mistake of invading Iraq and, more broadly, to recast America’s 
Middle East policies. Instead, he has pursued the same sorts of 
policies—including on Iran—as his predecessors, policies that did 
significant damage to America’s strategic position. As a result, the 
Middle East’s balance of power has shifted even further away from 
the United States and its allies on Obama’s watch than at the end of 
George W. Bush’s presidency.11 
B. Iran’s Counter-Hegemonic Strategy. 
On the other side of the U.S.-Iranian divide, the Islamic 
Republic has developed a counter-hegemonic national security 
strategy. This strategy has enabled the Islamic Republic not only to 
survive, but also to carve out enough strategic autonomy over the 
past 34 years to attain a high degree of political consolidation and to 
achieve a wide range of impressive developmental outcomes. By 
building a domestic order and pursuing a foreign policy that attracts 
Middle Eastern populations, it has also been able to take advantage 
of American mistakes to improve its own position in the Middle 
East.12 
                                                 
10 This point is also made in Stephen M. Walt, The End of the American 
Era, NAT’L INTEREST, Oct. 25, 2011, at 10-11.  
11 See Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 2, at 222-23. On Iran more 
specifically, also see LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 354-67.  
12 While many Western commentators argue that the Islamic Republic’s 
internal politics and illegitimacy will undermine it and “solve” America’s Iran 
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Going to Tehran draws on years of discussions with Iranian 
diplomats, national security officials, and politicians to explain how 
the world looks, strategically, from their point of view. Looking at a 
map, one sees that Iran shares land, littoral, and maritime borders 
with fifteen states.13 Virtually all have been hostile to the idea of an 
Islamic Republic in Iran. Several have been more than just hostile: 
the Islamic Republic’s eastern neighbor—Afghanistan, under the 
Taliban—stormed the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e Sharif, killing 
Iranian diplomats. Its western neighbor—Iraq, under Saddam 
Husayn, with help from other Arab neighbors and America—invaded 
it, killing 300,000 Iranians. Today, many of those same Arab 
neighbors host thousands of U.S. troops and billions of dollars of the 
deadliest U.S. weapons systems, all poised to attack the Islamic 
Republic.14 
To deal with these challenges, the Islamic Republic has 
worked to develop conventional and asymmetric defensive 
capabilities, but it has virtually no capacity to project military power 
offensively beyond its borders.15 The real key to Iran’s foreign policy 
gains in the region has been what Going to Tehran calls its “soft 
power” strategy.16 One of the remarkable things about the shift in the 
Middle East’s balance of power over the last decade or so, away from 
the United States and its allies and toward Iran and its allies, is that 
this shift has virtually nothing to do with the Islamic Republic’s use 
of military force or economic coercion. The Islamic Republic has not 
                                                 
problem, the Islamic Republic is, in fact, supported by a sizable majority of Iranians 
living there and is not about to implode—a topic treated at greater length in this 
issue of the journal by Hillary Mann Leverett, How Precipitous a Decline? U.S.-Iranian 
Relations and the Transition from American Primacy, 2 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 328 
(2013).   
13 They are Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, Kazakhstan, 
Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and 
the United Arab Emirates. 
14 See LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 45-59, for a 
discussion on Iranian threat perceptions.  
15 On the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities, see id. at ch. 2.  
16 Harvard’s Joseph Nye defines soft power as the ability to get others to 
“want what you want,” rather than coercing them to do what you want through 
hard military or economic power. See JOSEPH S. NYE, BOUND TO LEAD: THE 
FUTURE OF AMERICAN POWER 31 (1990). Also see LEVERETT & MANN 
LEVERETT, supra note 6, 90-101, for a discussion of Iran’s soft power strategy.  
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invaded any country or sanctioned any state; its rise is much more 
about the growth of its soft power. 
Recall my earlier point about the intensifying mobilization of 
Middle Eastern publics and the growing importance of those publics’ 
opinions and attitudes in determining on-the-ground political 
outcomes. The Middle East’s balance of power is progressively less 
defined by hard military capabilities, where the United States has clear 
advantages and the Islamic Republic is relatively deficient, and more 
and more defined in terms of who can appeal to regional publics, 
where the Islamic Republic has real advantages. In this context, Iran 
is pursuing a strategy that galvanizes regional publics’ grievances 
against the United States and Israel and against their own 
unrepresentative regimes that cooperate, in various ways, with the 
United States and Israel. The Islamic Republic, in effect, aligns itself 
with those publics, and with public opinion itself, to constrain hostile, 
unrepresentative, and pro-Western neighboring governments from 
working with the United States to attack it. Over the years, Tehran 
has reinforced these aspects of its soft power strategy by picking 
political winners as its allies in key regional arenas—e.g., Hizballah in 
Lebanon, Shi’a Islamist and Kurdish parties in Iraq, and HAMAS in 
Palestine.17 
Washington dismisses much of this as Iranian “support for 
terrorism.” But, with all due respect for the paramilitary capabilities 
of Iranian-supported groups resisting Israeli occupation, or resisting 
violent jihadi elements like Al-Qa’ida and the Taliban, the most 
interesting thing about these groups is that, when given the chance, 
they win elections. And they win for the right reasons—because they 
authentically represent unavoidable constituencies with real and 
legitimate grievances. When the United States refuses to deal with 
these groups by calling them terrorist organizations, it reduces even 
further its chances of constructively influencing regional 
developments, and opens up even more political space for Iran. 
The soft power logic of Iranian strategy applies even in the 
case of Syria and the ongoing conflict there. It has become 
conventional wisdom in Washington that whatever soft power gains 
                                                 
17 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 64-78.  
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the Islamic Republic had accrued in the Middle East over the past 
decade or so have been squandered as a result of the support that 
Tehran and its Hizballah allies have extended to Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad and his government. But Iran and Hizballah have a 
very different assessment. They evaluate the Syrian conflict as the 
product of a U.S.- and Saudi-instigated campaign for regime change 
in Damascus, motivated by American and Saudi interest in 
undermining the Islamic Republic’s security and weakening its 
regional position.18 Hizballah, for its part, identifies a “U.S.-Israeli-
takfeeri project” that has been unleashed in Syria, aimed at changing 
Syria’s strategic orientation in order to enfeeble Iran and Hizballah’s 
capacity to resist American and Israeli hegemonic aspirations in the 
region.19 Iranian and Hizballah officials recognize that backing the 
Assad government has cost the Islamic Republic and Hizballah some 
of the enormous standing that they have built up with Sunni Arab 
publics—especially as Saudi Arabia and others on the Arab side of 
the Persian Gulf work assiduously to cast the Syrian conflict in 
sectarian terms. But in their calculations, as regional appreciation 
grows that the Syrian conflict is, at its core, about resistance, the 
sectarian issue will fade.20 In the meantime, the Islamic Republic 
                                                 
18 See Kayhan Barzegar, Rouhani, Iran Key to Political Solution in Syria, AL-
MONITOR (June 17, 2013),  
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/iran-hassan-rouhani-
geneva-syria.html, for information about the Iranian policy toward Syria.   
19 Discussions with Hizballah representatives in Beirut, Lebanon. (June 
2013). See also Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah Secretary-General, Speech on 
Hizballah’s Resistance and Liberation Day (May 25, 2013) and Sayyid Hassan 
Nasrallah, Hizballah Secretary-General, Speech on Hizballah’s Injured Fighter Day 
(June 14, 2013), for discussions of the Syrian conflict. In a religious context, the 
Arabic word takfeer refers to the practice of declaring someone claiming to be 
Muslim as kāfir, pl, kuffār—an unbeliever masquerading as a pious person. It is a 
prominent aspect of the kind of salafi Islam championed by Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd 
al-Wahhab, the 18th century preacher whose religious ideas continue to ground the 
form of Islam officially promulgated by Saudi Arabia, both at home and abroad. 
Over the last thirty years, takfeeri ideology—which is, among other things, anti-Shi’a 
in orientation—has been a powerful motivator for Saudi-supported jihadi 
movements (e.g., Afghan mujahideen, parts of whom evolved into Al-Qa’ida and the 
Taliban, and, more recently, jihadi groups in Iraq, Libya, and Syria, some of which 
have publicly affiliated themselves with Al-Qa’ida).   
20 For further discussion, see Hal intahat julat Qusayr wa tudā’yāthā [Has the 
Qusayr round ended and what are its implications?] (Interview with Flynt Leverett), 
MIN AD-DAKHIL (Al-Mayadeen), July 7, 2013,  
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retains vastly higher favorability ratings with Arab and other regional 
publics than the United States.21 
C.  Understanding Iran’s Nuclear Program 
How does Iran’s nuclear program fit into its foreign policy 
and national security strategy? To answer this question, it is 
important to consider first what the program actually comprises. 
In terms of reactor infrastructure, Iran currently operates the 
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)22 that, among other things, produces 
medical isotopes for cancer patients, under international safeguards.23 
Additionally, Iran now operates a Russian-built power reactor at 
Bushehr, on the Persian Gulf, also under safeguards, and is building a 
heavy water reactor at Arak. Besides reactors, Iran is developing 
indigenous fuel cycle capabilities. In its main enrichment plant at 
Esfahan and in a newer site at Fordo, Iran is enriching uranium, again 
                                                 
http://www.almayadeen.net/ar/Programs/Episode/dmqS2FYuUkeiDqH3AP3_4
w/2013-07-07-له-تهت نا-ة لوج-ري ص ق لا-و-يعاد تاه تا. It is also notable that, while 
HAMAS declined to fight for the Assad government after the Syrian conflict broke 
out and relocated its external political leadership from Damascus, it has not called 
for Assad’s removal. In discussions in Doha, Qatar in May 2013, senior HAMAS 
officials said that they continue to hold that a negotiated settlement between the 
Syrian government and the opposition is the only way to end the conflict—
essentially the same position taken by Iran and Hizballah.   
21 See Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, Iran and the United States—
What Really Matters to Middle Eastern Publics?, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 6, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/flynt-and-hillary-mann-leverett/iran-and-the-
united-state_b_2821860.html, for information on this point. See also SHIBLEY 
TELHAMI, THE WORLD THROUGH ARAB EYES: ARAB PUBLIC OPINION AND THE 
RESHAPING OF THE MIDDLE EAST 129-30, 134-35, 137-43 (2013).   
22 America originally gave the TRR to the Shah—who openly stated his 
intention to develop nuclear weapons—in the 1960s. Initially, the TRR ran on 
uranium fuel enriched to weapons-grade levels. After the Iranian Revolution, the 
Islamic Republic reconfigured it to run on fuel enriched to just below 20 percent, 
greatly reducing the proliferation risks of its operation.  LEVERETT & MANN 
LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 86-87. 
23 The TRR is located on the fringes of the University of Tehran campus 
in the middle of the city; one can see it from the conference room of the 
university’s Faculty of World Studies, where Hillary Mann Leverett and I have 
given guest seminars.   
 2013 Leverett 2:2 
253 
under safeguards, to the 3-4 percent level needed to fuel power 
reactors and to the near-20 percent level required by the TRR.24 
Since the early 1990s, American and Israeli intelligence 
services have warned that Iran is three to five years away from 
acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet twenty years into this constantly 
resetting forecast, no intelligence agency has come remotely close to 
producing hard evidence that Iran is trying to fabricate nuclear 
weapons. Even at the near-20 percent level, Iran is below both the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) 20-percent threshold 
for highly enriched uranium and the 90-plus-percent level for bomb-
grade material. The IAEA has, for years, consistently affirmed that 
there has been no diversion of nuclear material from Iran’s nuclear 
facilities, and has never found evidence Iran is enriching anywhere 
close to weapons-grade levels. Indeed, American and Israeli 
intelligence services currently say that Iran is, at this point, not 
working to fabricate nuclear weapons.25 
Going to Tehran identifies two powerful reasons why the 
Islamic Republic is unlikely to build such weapons. First, there is 
strong consensus among Iranian political and policy elites that 
acquiring a relatively small nuclear arsenal would diminish, not 
enhance the Islamic Republic’s security.26 Second, beyond this 
strategic rationale, both Imam Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s 
“founding father” and its first Supreme Leader, and Ayatollah 
Khamenei, the current Leader, have declared that nuclear weapons 
violate Islamic law, that they are haraam—forbidden by God. 
One may discount this as mere talk, but there is an important 
precedent where the Islamic Republic also walked the walk on this 
issue. During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Iran was subjected for 
years to chemical attack—against civilian as well as military targets—
while the United States (which was backing Saddam Husayn’s war of 
aggression against the fledgling Islamic Republic) blocked the United 
Nations Security Council from taking any action on the matter. As 
the attacks continued, Iranian military commanders asked for 
                                                 
24 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 81-85.  
25 Id. at 85.  
26 Id. at 85-86.   
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Khomeini’s authorization to use the infrastructure inherited from the 
Shah to mass produce chemical weapons agents and fabricate 
chemical weapons, so as to be capable of retaliating in kind against 
Iraqi chemical attacks. Khomeini said no, holding that chemical 
weapons were haraam (forbidden by God) and that the Islamic 
Republic would not use them, even though it was being regularly 
subjected to chemical attack. 
Khomeini and Khamenei have both said that nuclear 
weapons, like chemical weapons, violate God’s law. In a system that 
legitimates itself in no small part on the basis of its perceived 
adherence to Islamic law, that is not a trivial thing.27 
So if the Iranian nuclear program is not a weapons program, 
what are its purposes? Three stand out. First, while a lot of Western 
commentary derides the suggestion that the program has an 
economic rationale, there are, in fact, real economic and 
technological benefits that Iran accrues from its nuclear activities. 
They allow Iranian scientists, engineers, and technicians to develop 
expertise (for example, in centrifuge technology) applicable beyond 
the nuclear arena and to establish new sectors (for example, 
producing medical isotopes) for the Iranian economy. Iran already 
exports electricity to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey, and 
wants to expand such exports in the future. Developing nuclear 
energy for the purpose of power generation directly supports this 
ambition. It also prospectively allows the Islamic Republic to devote 
more of its oil to export or to value-adding processes like oil-based 
petrochemicals. Likewise, nuclear energy frees up natural gas for 
injection into aging oil fields and for cultivating petrochemicals and 
other gas-based industries.28 
Second, from a security perspective, the way that the program 
has developed suggests that it is partly aimed at giving the Islamic 
Republic some measure of what is often called a nuclear option by 
allowing Iranian scientists and engineers to develop at least some of 
the core competencies for fabricating nuclear weapons, but without 
actually building them. Policy elites across the Iranian political 
                                                 
27 Id. at 87.  
28 Id. at 87-88.  
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spectrum acknowledge that perceptions the Islamic Republic is 
developing such a nuclear option have deterrent value even without 
overt weaponization. Furthermore, the nuclear program gives Tehran 
leverage to compel Washington to come to terms with it, making the 
nuclear issue an attractive point of entry for dealing with the United 
States and other major powers on larger strategic questions.29 
Third—and most importantly—the program’s main strategic 
purposes are political rather than military. The Islamic Republic is 
pursuing its nuclear rights in defiance of America and Israel—and 
that has powerful resonance not just at home but across the region. 
Some Arab leaders may not like the Iranian program, but polls of 
predominantly Sunni Arab populations show large majorities have 
been strongly supportive of Iran’s nuclear efforts. Some even show 
large majorities of Arabs thinking it would be a good thing if Iran 
acquired nuclear weapons.30 
And that brings us back to Iran’s soft power strategy. 
Through its narrative—not its drones or tanks or even its centrifuges, 
but its narrative—the Islamic Republic is using the political 
awakening of Middle Eastern publics to alter the very nature of 
power politics in the region. The Middle East’s balance of power is 
becoming, more and more, a balance of influence. The Islamic 
Republic is both encouraging and taking advantage of this transition 
to enhance its own regional standing. 
II.  ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
The resulting shift in the Middle East’s balance of power—
simultaneously distributional (affecting who has relative power) and 
essential (about the basis of power)—poses a high-stakes challenge 
for U.S. foreign policy. For its own interests, and on classic balance-
of-power grounds, America needs strategic rapprochement with the 
Islamic Republic. But Washington’s longstanding determination to 
suppress the emergence of independent power centers in the Middle 
East continues to warp U.S. policy choices toward the Islamic 
                                                 
29 Id. at 88, 90.  
30 Id. at 88-90. See also Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 21; 
TELHAMI, supra note 21, at 135-38. 
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Republic and the region more generally. It also warps the U.S. 
attitude toward global governance. 
U.S.-Iranian tensions over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear 
activities reflect two different ways of thinking about international 
order. One might be described as a positivistic, rules-focused 
approach. In this approach, substantive and procedural norms for 
international behavior are created by the consent of independent, 
sovereign states. Thus, international order is based very much on lex 
lata, what the law actually is, not lex ferenda, what the law (from one 
ideological view or another) should be. From a positivistic 
perspective, rules and norms, once created, are to be interpreted very 
narrowly, in terms of both how they are interpreted and who 
interprets them. 
The alternative is a more policy-oriented—one might say 
results-oriented—approach. From this perspective, what matters are 
the policy goals and values that motivate the creation of particular 
rules and norms—not the rules and norms themselves, but the goals 
and values underlying them. In further contrast to the positivistic 
approach, the policy-oriented approach ascribes a special role in 
interpreting rules and norms to the most powerful states in the 
system—those states with the resources and willingness to act in 
order to enforce the rules.31 
If one looks at who supports one of these approaches over 
the other, the positivistic approach is very much favored by non-
Western states. States in what we used to call the Third World have 
sharply criticized “colonial” international law for having warped the 
positivist principle of consent as the basis for international legal rules 
and obligations. But, with a universalized respect for national self-
determination, they have also embraced a positivist orientation to 
international law as an indispensable foundation for globalizing core 
legal principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in states’ 
                                                 
31 See the following sources for more on the contrasts between these 
approaches: ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY 67-86 (1999); Tai-Heng Cheng, Making International Law Without Agreeing 
What It Is, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1 (2011); and David Kleimann, 
Positivism, the New Haven School, and the Use of Force in International Law, 3 BSIS J. INT’L 
STUD. 26 (2006) (focusing on use of force questions).  
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internal affairs.32 From a non-Western perspective, it is only through 
this kind of positivism that international law, rules, and norms might 
actually constrain established powers as well as rising powers and the 
less powerful. 
Correspondingly, the policy-oriented approach tends to be 
favored by Western powers—above all, by the United States. Its 
modern intellectual roots go back to the 1950s and 1960s and the so-
called New Haven school of international law, forged by a network 
of scholars based largely at Yale Law School, the central figures in 
which were Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell. Whatever their 
scholarly ambitions to reconstruct international legal methodology, 
the main policy-oriented goals of McDougal, Lasswell, and their 
protégés (as opposed to mere students, some of whom took very 
different policy positions) was to justify U.S. foreign policy in the 
Cold War context, especially regarding nuclear weapons, Third World 
intervention, and use-of-force questions.33 Another prominent Yale 
                                                 
32 See Agreement (with exchange of notes) on trade and intercourse 
between Tibet Region of China and India (April 29, 1954), 299 United Nations 
Treaty Series 57 (1958); Scott, supra note 5, at 2-3; S. PRAKASH SINHA, NEW 
NATIONS AND THE LAW OF NATIONS (1967); RAM PRAKASH ANAND, NEW STATES 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972); RAM PRAKASH ANAND, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION (1987); 
Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law and 
Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 77, 79-82 (2003); 
Dai Bingguo, Asia, China and International Law, 11 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 1 (2012); 
Christopher Clapham, Sovereignty and the Third World State, 47 POL. STUD. 522, 522-
29 (1999); James Thuo Gathii, International Law and Eurocentricity, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
184 (1998); Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International 
Legal Discourse, 16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 353 (1998); M. Sornarajah, Power and Justice: Third 
World Resistance in International Law, 10 SINGAPORE Y.B. INT’L L. 19 (2006); Ram 
Prakash Anand, Attitude of the Asian-African States toward Certain Problems of 
International Law, 15 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 55 (1966); S. Prakash Sinha, Perspective of the 
Newly Independent States on the Binding Quality of International Law, 14 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 121 (1965); Steven Weber et al., A World Without the West, NAT’L INT., Summer 
2007, at 25-28; and Backgrounder: Five principles of peaceful coexistence, XINHUA, June 14, 
2004, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/08/content_2803638.htm. 
33 For representative presentations drawn from a sizable bibliography, see 
the following: Myres McDougal, Foreword to ROGER H. HULL & JOHN C. 
NOVOGROD, LAW AND VIETNAM at vii-ix (1968); Myres McDougal, Foreword to 
JOHN NORTON MOORE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR at vii, xi (1972); Myres 
S. McDougal & Norbert A. Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful 
Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1958), reprinted in MYRES MCDOUGAL ET AL., 
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law professor and dean, Eugene Rostow (who became a leading 
neoconservative foreign policy intellectual in the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s) also contributed to this agenda.34 In the post-9/11 period, the 
policy-oriented approach continues to have high-profile advocates in 
the legal academy, encompassing neoconservatives advocates of 
American unilateralism and preventive war on the right and liberal 
champions of humanitarian intervention and the “responsibility to 
protect” on the left.35 Certainly, over the last half century, its logic has 
                                                 
STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960); Myres McDougal & Harold Lasswell, 
The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 
(1959), reprinted in MCDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960); 
and W. Michael Reisman, Deterrence and International Law, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 339 (1983). For examples of contrary positions taken by international 
legal scholars trained at Yale during McDougal and Lasswell’s heyday, see the 
following: Richard Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of Law, 104 YALE L.J. 
1991 (1995) (reviewing HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 
(1992)); Richard Falk, Toward A Legal Regime For Nuclear Weapons, 28 MCGILL L.J. 
519 (1983); Richard Falk, Lee Meyrowitz, & Jack Sanderson, Nuclear Weapons and 
International Law, INDIAN J. INT’L L. 541 (1980); Richard A. Falk, International Law 
and the United States Role in the Vietnam War, 75 YALE L.J. 1122 (1966); Burns H. 
Weston, Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Prolegomenon to General Illegality, 4 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 227 (1983); and Burns H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons 
Versus International Law: A Contextual Reassessment, 28 MCGILL L.J. 542 (1983).  
34 See, e.g., Eugene Rostow, Is There a Legal Basis for Nuclear Deterrence Theory 
and Policy?, in LAWYERS AND THE NUCLEAR DEBATE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
CANADIAN CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW 175 (1988); EUGENE  
ROSTOW, TOWARD MANAGED PEACE: THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, 1759 TO THE PRESENT (1995).    
35 On the neoconservative side, see, for example, Robert J. Delahunty & 
John Yoo, Great Power Security, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 35 (2009); Jack Goldsmith, Fire 
When Ready, FOR. POL’Y (March 19, 2012), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/19/fire_when_ready; Eric 
Posner, Think Again: International Law, FOR. POL’Y (Sept. 17, 2009), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/17/think_again_international_la
w; and John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (2004). On the liberal side, 
see, for example, Allen Buchanan & Robert Keohane, The Preventive Use of Force: A 
Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal, 18 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 1 (2004); Lee Feinstein & 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, FOR. AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283 
(2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of 
UN Reform, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 619 (2005); Thomas Weiss, R2P After 9/11 and the 
World Summit, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 741 (2006); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Was the Libyan 
Intervention Really an Intervention?, ATLANTIC, Aug. 26, 2011, 
 2013 Leverett 2:2 
259 
been strongly reflected in the perspectives that U.S. administrations, 
Democratic and Republican, have brought to bear in legal analyses of 
foreign policy questions. 
III.  THE IRANIAN CASE AND THE NUCLEAR  
NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 
Tensions between these divergent conceptions of world order 
condition U.S.-Iranian disagreements over the status of the Islamic 
Republic’s nuclear activities under the international nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, which rests on the foundation of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT, which opened 
for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, is the 
international community’s main vehicle for regulating nuclear energy-
related technologies in both civil and military applications,36 It is 
appropriately understood as a set of three interrelated commitments 
by parties, which are divided into two categories, nuclear-weapon 
states [hereinafter “weapons states”] and non-nuclear-weapon states 
[hereinafter “non-weapons states”]. 
 In Article II and Article III, non-weapons states—like 
Iran—commit not to build or acquire nuclear weapons. 
 In Article VI, weapons states—the United States, Russia, 
Britain, France, and China—commit to good faith 
negotiations for nuclear disarmament. 
 In Article IV and Article V, all agree that parties have an 
“inalienable right” to use nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes “without discrimination”—and are obligated to 
                                                 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/was-the-libyan-
intervention-really-an-intervention/244175/; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Intervention, 
Libya, and the Future of Sovereignty, ATLANTIC, Sept. 4, 2011, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/intervention-libya-
and-the-future-of-sovereignty/244537/; and Ivo Daalder & James Steinberg, 
Preventive war, A useful tool, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, at M3, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/dec/04/opinion/op-preemptivewar4. 
36 JOYNER, supra note 2, at 3, 20. 
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facilitate the exercise of that right, especially by non-
weapon states.37 
There have long been strains between weapons states and 
non-weapons states over weapons states’ poor compliance with their 
commitment to disarm. Today, though, these tensions are particularly 
acute over perceived tensions between NPT signatories’ commitment 
to nonproliferation and their commitment to enabling the peaceful 
use of nuclear technology. 
A.  Reading (and Misreading) the NPT 
The two alternative conceptions of international order 
outlined above give rise to very different perspectives on interpreting 
the NPT regarding this issue. One perspective—grounded in the 
positivistic model of international law and global governance—gives 
the Treaty’s three core bargains equal standing. The other—grounded 
in the policy-oriented model—holds that non-weapons states’ 
commitment to nonproliferation trumps those by weapons states to 
nuclear disarmament and by all to the peaceful use of nuclear 
technology. Conflict between these perspectives is especially sharp 
over fuel cycle technology, the ultimate “dual use” capability (for the 
same material that fuels power and research reactors can, at higher 
levels of fissile isotope concentration, be used in nuclear bombs). 
For those holding that the NPT’s three core bargains have 
equal standing, the right of non-weapons states to safeguarded 
enrichment is clear—from the Treaty itself, from its negotiating 
history, and from subsequent practice, with at least a dozen non-
weapons states building fuel-cycle infrastructures potentially capable 
of supporting weapons programs. From a positivistic perspective, the 
denial of that right by a handful of powerful states amounts to an 
effort to rewrite the NPT unilaterally. Not surprisingly, the camp 
espousing this position includes the non-Western world, virtually in 
its entirety. By contrast, those claiming that nonproliferation trumps 
the NPT’s two other core bargains claim that there is no treaty-based 
                                                 
37 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for 
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“right” to enrich. From a policy-oriented perspective, the manner in 
which non-weapons states pursue the peaceful use of nuclear 
technology must necessarily be subordinated to the NPT’s overriding 
goal of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. This position is 
advocated primarily by Western powers, including the United States. 
Strikingly, Washington once held that the right to peaceful 
use includes the indigenous development of safeguarded fuel cycle 
capabilities. In 1968, as America and the Soviet Union, the NPT’s 
sponsors, prepared to open it for signature, U.S. officials told 
Congress that the Treaty permitted non-weapons states to pursue the 
fuel cycle.38 Since the Cold War’s end, though, the United States—
along with Britain, France, and Israel—has been determined to 
constrain the diffusion of fuel cycle capabilities to non-Western 
states. Their main motive has been to maximize America’s freedom 
of unilateral military initiative and, in the Middle East, that of Israel. 
Thus, the United States has come to hold that there is no 
treaty-based right for non-weapons states to pursue fuel cycle 
capabilities, and that weapons states and their allies with nuclear 
industries are entitled to decide which non-weapons states can 
possess fuel cycle technologies. From these premises, in the early 
2000s the Bush administration sought a worldwide ban on 
transferring fuel cycle technologies to countries not already 
possessing them.39 The Obama administration then pushed the 
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group to make such transfers conditional on 
recipients’ acceptance of the Additional Protocol to the NPT—an 
instrument devised at U.S. instigation in the 1990s to enable more 
intrusive and proactive inspections in non-weapons states.40 
Non-Western states see these efforts to constrain the 
diffusion of fuel cycle capabilities as a far greater threat to the NPT’s 
integrity than Iran’s nuclear activities. Among rising powers, Brazil 
and South Africa—both nonproliferation exemplars for joining the 
NPT as non-weapons states after forsaking weapons programs 
                                                 
38 Daniel Joyner, The Security Council as Legal Hegemon, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
225, 243 (2012). 
39 JOYNER, supra note 2, at 47-51, 55-60, 78-87.   
40 Id at 110-12. 
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during democratization (including, in South Africa’s case, dismantling 
six fully fabricated nuclear bombs that Israel helped the apartheid 
regime to assemble)—have been especially resolute in defending non-
weapons states’ right to the fuel cycle. With Argentina, they resisted 
U.S. efforts to make transfers of fuel cycle technology contingent on 
non-weapons states’ acceptance of the Additional Protocol (which 
Brazil has refused to sign), ultimately forcing Washington to 
compromise.41 
B.  The NPT and Iranian Enrichment 
Currently, the conflict over how to read the NPT with 
respect to non-weapons states’ fuel cycle activities is engaged most 
prominently over whether Iran, as a non-weapons party to the 
Treaty, has a right to enrich uranium under international safeguards. 
Disagreements over the issue are effectively blocking efforts to 
resolve the controversy over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program 
through diplomacy. 
In the Iranian case, just four countries—the United States, 
Britain, France, and Israel (which is not a signatory to the NPT)—
have led the charge to deny the Islamic Republic’s right to enrich. In 
these countries’ official view, Iran has forfeited whatever “right” to 
enrich that its representatives might assert because of problems in its 
compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement that cast doubt on 
the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. Western and Israeli 
intelligence services also claim that the Islamic Republic has done at 
least theoretical work on aspects of nuclear weapons design and 
fabrication, thereby raising further serious questions about the 
peaceful nature of its program. Since 2006, moreover, the United 
Nations Security Council has adopted seven resolutions calling on 
Iran to suspend its fuel cycle activities.42 The Islamic Republic has yet 
                                                 
41 David Jonas, John Carlson, Richard Goorevich, The NSG Decision on 
Sensitive Nuclear Transfers: ABACC and the Additional Protocol, ARMS CONTROL 
ASSOCIATION (Nov. 2012), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_11/The-NSG-
Decision-on-Sensitive-Nuclear-Transfers-ABACC-and-the-Additional-Protocol.  
42 S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006); S.C. Res. 1737, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 
(Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008); S.C. Res. 
1835, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1835 (Sept. 27, 2008); S.C. Res. 1887, U.N. Doc. 
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to comply with these resolutions, prompting Western criticism of its 
failure to meet its “international obligations.” For America and its 
British, French, and Israeli partners, any diplomatic solution to the 
Iranian nuclear issue will require Iran to terminate its fuel cycle 
activities—or, at least, to stop them on an open-ended and long-term 
basis (at least a decade, if not longer).43 
In contrast, the “BRICS” (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa) and the Non-Aligned Movement (with 120 countries 
representing nearly two-thirds of U.N. members) have unequivocally 
recognized Iran’s right—as well as that of other non-weapons 
states—to develop safeguarded indigenous fuel cycle capabilities.44 
Their position strongly reflects both a positivistic conception of 
international order and an interpretation of the NPT ascribing equal 
standing to its three core bargains. 
From a positivistic point of view, none of the claims by 
Western intelligence agencies about Iranian research on nuclear 
weapons design and fabrication has been substantiated by hard 
evidence, and none contradicts the IAEA’s continuing affirmation of 
Iran’s non-diversion of nuclear material. Through a positivistic prism, 
moreover, one cannot legitimately hold that the NPT prohibits the 
Islamic Republic from seeking the same standing, in terms of its 
nuclear infrastructure and capabilities, as Japan, Canada, and others 
                                                 
S/RES/1887 (Sept. 24, 2009); and S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 
2010).  
43 Discussions with American, British, and French officials. Western 
powers demand that Iran promptly stop enriching at the near-20 percent level; it 
must then comply with Security Council calls to cease all enrichment. U.S. officials 
say that Iran might be “allowed” a circumscribed enrichment program, after 
suspending for a decade or more; on this point, see also Robert Einhorn, Getting to 
‘Yes’ with Iran, FOR. POL’Y (July 10, 2013), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/07/10/getting_to_yes_with_iran. 
London and Paris insist that “zero enrichment” is the only acceptable long-term 
outcome. 
44 See BRICS Summit draws clear red lines on Syria, Iran, BRICS POST (Apr. 3, 
2013), http://thebricspost.com/brics-summit-draws-clear-red-lines-on-syria-
iran/#.Uewc_UrD-AI; Jason Ditz, Non-Aligned Movement Unanimously Backs Iran’s 
Civilian Nuclear Program, ANTIWAR.COM (Aug. 31, 2012), 
http://news.antiwar.com/2012/08/31/non-aligned-movement-unanimously-
backs-irans-civilian-nuclear-program/.  
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that joined the Treaty as non-weapons states but are widely seen as 
able to produce nuclear weapons in relatively short order, should they 
choose to do so. Mohamed ElBaradei, the Nobel laureate under 
whose leadership the IAEA correctly assessed Iraq’s lack of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) when every Western intelligence agency 
got it wrong, has said that developing nuclear weapons capability—
not weapons, but competencies needed to make them—is “kosher” 
under the NPT.45 
For many positivistically-inclined analysts, the Security 
Council resolutions calling on the Islamic Republic to suspend 
enrichment violate Iran’s rights as both a sovereign state and as a 
party to the NPT. By extension, they also violate United Nations 
Charter provisions directing that the Security Council act “in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations” 
and “with the present charter” and are, thus, invalid.46 Additionally, 
the first of these resolutions, from 2006—on which all of the 
subsequent resolutions are based—reflects an assessment of Tehran’s 
intent to build nuclear weapons that America’s own intelligence 
community repudiated in 2007. This repudiation arguably nullifies the 
legal basis for all seven resolutions calling on Iran to suspend 
enrichment.47 
For non-Western states and others holding that the NPT’s 
three core bargains have equal standing, the outlines of a diplomatic 
solution to the Iranian nuclear issue are as clear as Iran’s right to 
enrich: recognition of Iran’s nuclear rights in exchange for greater 
transparency in its nuclear activities. Working with Turkey, Brazil 
brokered the Tehran Declaration in May 2010, in which Iran 
accepted U.S. terms to swap most of its then stockpile of enriched 
                                                 
45 See Mohamed ElBaradei, A New Global Security System Towards a 
World Free From Nuclear Weapons  at John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University (Apr. 26, 2010), http://forum.iop.harvard.edu/content/new-
global-security-system-towards-world-free-nuclear-weapons-conversation-
mohamed-el.  
46 For a brilliant exposition of this argument, see Joyner, supra note 38.   
47 Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, America’s Iran Policy and the 
Undermining of International Order, WORLD FIN. REV., July-August 2013, at 40, 
http://law.psu.edu/_file/TWFR%20Jul-Aug%202013America%20Iran-v2.pdf.  
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uranium for fuel for its research reactor.48 The Declaration, though, 
also recognized Iran’s right to enrich; for this reason, the Obama 
administration rejected it.49 Through the Non-Aligned Movement 
and other fora, non-Western states regularly reiterate their view that a 
negotiated settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue will require 
Western acknowledgment of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear rights. 
From this premise, Security Council resolutions requiring Iran to 
suspend impede, rather than encourage, productive diplomacy.50 
Even Russia and China, the Security Council’s two non-Western 
members, who acquiesced in all seven resolutions telling Tehran to 
suspend, note regularly that there will be no diplomatic solution 
absent Western recognition of Iran’s nuclear rights.51 
The basic idea of recognizing Iran’s nuclear rights, as a 
sovereign state and as a signatory to the NPT (including the right to 
enrich uranium under international safeguards), in exchange for 
greater transparency surrounding Iran’s nuclear activities, has long 
been the core of the Islamic Republic’s approach to nuclear 
diplomacy with the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. 
Security Council plus Germany). Since Hassan Rohani’s election as 
Iran’s president in 2013, the Islamic Republic’s new foreign minister, 
Javad Zarif, has advanced a substantive proposal to the P5+1 for 
resolving the nuclear issue on this basis, within a finite period. But 
the Obama administration and its British and French partners 
continue to insist, effectively, that “transparency is not enough”—
                                                 
48 See Text of the Iran-Brazil-Turkey deal, Julian Borger’s Global Security Blog, 
GUARDIAN, May 17, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-
global-security-blog/2010/may/17/iran-brazil-turkey-nuclear.   
49 See Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, Flynt Leverett Debates 
Obama’s Iran Policy with Dennis Ross, RACE FOR IRAN (Jan. 12, 2012), 
http://www.raceforiran.com/flynt-leverett-debates-obama%E2%80%99s-iran-
policy-with-dennis-ross.   
50 On the unhelpful impact of the Security Council resolutions on nuclear 
diplomacy with Tehran, see, for example, Reza Nasri, To Nudge Iran Talks, New 
Resolution Needed, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 25, 2013), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/Commentary/Opinion/2013/0425/
To-nudge-Iran-talks-new-UN-resolution-needed.  
51 Conversations with Russian and Chinese officials suggest that Moscow 
and Beijing acquiesced to these resolutions partly to keep the United States in the 
Security Council on the Iranian nuclear issue, where they can exert ongoing 
influence—and restraint—over Washington. 
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that, if Iranian enrichment can be tolerated at all (and it remains 
unclear that Washington, London, and Paris are prepared to tolerate 
it), the Western powers must become, in essence, co-managers of the 
Iranian nuclear program, determining which Iranian nuclear facilities 
must be closed and which might be allowed to remain open, 
determining not how many additional centrifuges Iran might be 
allowed to install in the future but how many centrifuges it must 
dismantle to satisfy the United States (and Israel). 
How these differences over Iran’s nuclear activities are 
handled will profoundly affect the future of the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. In his contribution to this symposium, 
Daniel Joyner rigorously scrutinizes the NPT and the various legal 
sources for the IAEA’s dealings with Iran; from this analysis, he 
comes down on the side of an essentially positivistic reading of the 
Iranian nuclear case.52 Just as importantly, he and Richard Butler both 
warn that warped interpretations of the NPT, distorted readings of 
the IAEA’s legal sources, and biased application of the law by 
America and its European hangers-on will further undermine the 
functioning of the current nonproliferation regime, the credibility and 
legitimacy of which are already eroding for ever larger parts of the 
international community.53 
IV.  THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR CASE AND USE OF FORCE DOCTRINE 
Tensions between the two divergent conceptions of 
international order described above are also reflected in debates over 
the proper interpretation of use of force doctrine54 and its application 
to the Iranian nuclear case. To put the question in its simplest form, 
if some states judge, based on their particular (and almost certainly 
policy-oriented) readings of the NPT, that the Islamic Republic is in 
violation of its Treaty obligations, can they find legal justification for 
a preventive attack against it? 
                                                 
52 Joyner, supra note 2. 
53 Butler, supra note 2.  
54 See Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. 
REV. 699 (2005) (outlining four schools of thought, two of which, labeled “strict 
constructionist” and “imminent threat,” fall into what is described here as the 
positivist camp, and two of which, labeled “qualitative threat” and “charter-is-
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The perceived risk of a U.S. or Israeli attack on Iranian 
nuclear facilities (and, in the U.S. case, perhaps other targets) waxes 
and wanes. With Rohani’s election, the resumption of nuclear talks 
between the P5+1 and Iran, and the Obama administration’s failed 
plan to strike Syria, the likelihood of military action seems, at least for 
now, to have declined. But, if the United States and its British and 
French partners are not prepared to adopt a more positivistic reading 
of the NPT and to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue on such a basis, 
then the current diplomatic effort between Iran and the P5+1 will 
fail. And if diplomacy fails, the perceived risk of a U.S. or Israeli 
strike on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear infrastructure will rise once 
again, particularly as that infrastructure continues to develop and 
expand. What does international law have to say about this?  
Under a positivistic reading of international law, there are two 
circumstances under which a state may legitimately use force. One is 
when the United Nations Security Council has adopted a resolution 
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter authorizing the use 
of force in response to a specified threat to international peace and 
security. The other is under a narrow reading of the right of 
individual or collective self-defense as defined in Article 51 of the 
Charter. This requires evidence of either an actual armed attack or a 
threat of attack so imminent that a forceful response to it satisfies a 
strict construal of the legal principle of necessity and can be carried 
out in compliance with the legal principle of proportionality.55 In the 
absence of a Chapter VII resolution from the Security Council or a 
case meeting such a rigorous definition of self-defense, a state does 
not have the right to use force. 
It is highly unlikely that there will be a Security Council 
resolution authorizing the use of force against Iran over its nuclear 
activities, which eliminates one of the two potential legal justifications 
for attacking Iranian nuclear targets. In the Iranian case, Russia and 
China have learned from what they consider the bitter experience of 
the Council’s engagement on WMD issues prior to the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq, when Western powers justified the invasion in part by 
arguing that resolutions adopted more than a decade earlier in 
                                                 
55 See id. (expanding on the “strict constructionist” and “imminent threat’ 
schools); Kleimann, supra note 30; Mary Ellen O’Connell, supra note 2.  
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connection with the first Persian Gulf war also authorized the use of 
force against Iraq in 2003.56 As a result, Moscow and Beijing have 
made sure that Security Council resolutions dealing with the Iranian 
nuclear issue state explicitly that nothing in them can be construed as 
authorizing the use of force, and that such authorization would 
require separate action by the Council. 
But the lack of Security Council authorization does not 
definitively constrain policy-oriented analysts and American officials, 
who tend to downplay the centrality of the Council for contemporary 
decision-making about the use of force.57 Some argue that the threat 
of “WMD-seeking rogue states” has attenuated traditional readings of 
the United Nations Charter on the Council’s role in addressing 
threats to international peace and security.58 Others, like 
neoconservative John Yoo, go so far as to argue that the United 
States is entitled simply to ignore the Council on the grounds that it 
“lacks political legitimacy” and “is contrary to both American 
national interests and global welfare because it subjects any 
intervention, no matter how justified or beneficial, to the approval of 
authoritarian nations.”59 
With the Security Council deemed irrelevant, the policy-
oriented case for launching a war against the Islamic Republic over its 
nuclear activities relies on the notion of preventive self-defense.60 
Consider, in this regard, Matthew Kroenig’s widely noted brief for 
U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Kroenig begins his brief 
by asserting “the true danger that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose to 
U.S. interests in the Middle East and beyond” is so great as to 
                                                 
56 This point was especially salient in the arguments that the British and 
Australian governments offered; while some American officials, most notably 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, suggested that the United States shared the official 
British and Australian view, this argument was not a major part of the Bush 
administration’s formal case for war. See Alex Bellamy, International Law and the War 
With Iraq, 4 MELB. J. INT’L L. 497 (2003), for further discussion on this topic.  
57 Murphy, supra note 52, (discussing the “charter-is-dead” school).  
58 Matthew Waxman, The Use of Force Against States that Might Have 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2009).  
59 John Yoo, An Unavoidable Challenge, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 31, 2011), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/286953/unavoidable-challenge-john-yoo.  
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require, at least for Kroenig and other like-minded analysts, a 
heightened, post-9/11 formulation of imminent threat. As for 
proportionality, Kroenig posits that “a military strike intended to 
destroy Iran’s nuclear program, if managed carefully, could spare the 
region and the world a very real threat and dramatically improve the 
long-term national security of the United States.”61 
For this to work, though, the definition of “U.S. interests in 
the Middle East and beyond” and “the long-term national security of 
the United States” must be stretched to encompass not just physical 
security but what might more accurately be described as hegemonic 
preference. Consider what Kroenig himself writes regarding the real 
motive for a prospective U.S. attack on Iran: “a nuclear armed Iran 
would immediately limit U.S. freedom of action in the Middle 
East.”62 The reasoning underlying John Yoo’s advocacy of a 
preventive U.S. attack on Iran is even more expansively hegemonic: 
The United States has assumed the role, once held by 
Great Britain, of guaranteeing free trade and 
economic development, spreading liberal values, and 
maintaining international security. An attack on 
Iranian nuclear facilities, though it would impose 
costs in human lives and political turmoil, would 
serve these interests and forestall the spread of 
conflict and terror.63  
From a positivistic perspective, this amounts to a reading of 
the right of self-defense so tortured that virtually no other state 
besides the United States (or Israel) would accept it as justification 
for a preventive attack against the Islamic Republic. But this is 
precisely the argument that will be deployed, if and when the time 
comes, to validate U.S. strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. U.S. 
government lawyers are already drafting their briefs, should President 
Obama decide in the next three years that the development of the 
                                                 
61 Matthew Kroenig, Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike Is the Least Bad 
Option, FOR. AFF., Jan-Feb. 2012, at 77, 
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Islamic Republic’s fuel cycle capabilities has gone too far for his 
strategic or political comfort. 
How the debate over the prospective use of force by the 
United States against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure plays out will have 
hugely important implications for the future of world order. In her 
contribution to this symposium, Mary Ellen O’Connell presents a 
rich exposition and defense of the U.N. Charter regime regarding the 
use of force, along with an essentially positivistic application of this 
regime and other relevant law to the prospective use of force against 
Iranian nuclear targets. This leads her to a firm rejection of the 
unilateral resort, by the United States or others, to armed coercion 
against the Islamic Republic.64 James Houck, in his contribution, 
evinces sympathy for arguments that a strict reading of the U.N. 
Charter regime is not universally helpful to real-world decision-
makers in an era of WMD and demonstrated threats of terrorism. 
Nevertheless, he also notes that, at this point, he has seen no 
evidence or argument to date in the public domain leading him to 
judge that a predicate currently exists for an armed attack on Iran.65 
How this debate plays out will also have enormous 
implications for America’s position in the international community. 
As Americans engage in the debate, they would do well to consider 
James Houck’s observation that there is much in public discussions 
of these issues in the United States that is undermining and 
disrespectful of international law.66 Such a trend, if perpetuated, will 
prove corrosive not only of the prospects for genuinely rules-based 
international order in the 21st century, but also of America’s standing 
and role in world affairs.67 
Restoring America’s international standing and influence—
and boosting the prospects for rules-based international order in the 
21st century—will require very substantial strategic revision by the 
United States. Consider, once again, the Obama administration’s 
                                                 
64 O’Connell, supra note 53.  
65 See Presentation of James Houck at Symposium, video available at 
http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia.  
66 Id.  
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publicly announced plan to use force—without any legal justification 
under the U.N. Charter—in Syria. After August 21, 2013, much of 
America’s political class was initially still inclined to support President 
Obama’s call for military action. Much of the mainstream media 
comported themselves with the same lack of journalistic rigor that so 
many media outlets displayed in evaluating the Bush administration’s 
case for illegally invading and occupying Iraq in 2003. But, in 2013, 
the American public rejected a sitting president’s case for imperial 
war—and rejected it overwhelmingly, to a point where even many 
congressmen and senators who would otherwise have backed 
Obama’s initiative concluded that, this time, they could not do so. It 
is not yet possible to know if Americans’ rejection of Obama’s call 
for illegal and strategically dysfunctional U.S. military action against 
Syria represents the beginning of a true sea change in popular 
attitudes about American foreign policy. Perhaps it was simply the 
product of a contingent concatenation of circumstances—post-
Iraq/(not quite) post-Afghanistan/post-Libya “war weariness,” 
frustration with a slow economic recovery and an uncertain long-
term economic future, etc. But perhaps Americans are at least at the 
start of a true learning curve. Only time will tell. 
 
 
 Penn State 
Journal of Law & International Affairs 
2013 VOLUME 2 NO. 2 
 
272 
 
NPT: A PILLAR OF GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE

 
 
Richard Butler AC
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It is of basic importance to remember the negotiating history 
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) when policymakers 
and academics analyze the Iran nuclear issue. At the core of that 
history was a grand bargain between states with and without nuclear 
weapons. Since then, states have taken a number of steps away from 
that bargain, and some have even attempted to suggest there was no 
grand bargain at the outset. Each of these steps has led to serious 
problems. 
KEY ELEMENTS OF THE NPT 
The NPT has three components: preventing the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons;1 nuclear disarmament;2 and protecting the right 
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of all states to access nuclear science and technology.3 That was the 
deal then, in all of its parts, and, for the overwhelming number of 
states in the world today, it should remain the deal. 
It also is essential to note a second political point about this 
treaty. Almost from the beginning, the Treaty has been 
misrepresented and mis-described, principally by the nuclear-weapon 
states.4 I have sat in countless conferences with representatives from 
such states, in which they have attempted to tell the world that the 
Treaty is not about the three components listed above, but rather 
about only one—preventing others from getting the bomb. Over and 
over again, the nuclear-weapon states have sought to reinterpret NPT 
to what they consider their own advantage. 
There are many examples of this perspective. However, the 
example that sticks in my recent memory, which is highly relevant to 
the Iran issue, was when then-President of the United States, George 
W. Bush, told the world that the reason Iran must not be allowed to 
have nuclear weapons is, something to the effect of, because of the kind 
of people they are. I won’t dignify this viewpoint by commenting on the 
obviously racist, or, at the very least, culturally discriminatory aspect 
of the statement, but I simply point out that this is not what the 
Treaty says. What it states is that Treaty partners who do not have 
nuclear weapons—referred to as the non-nuclear-weapon state 
parties in the Treaty, of which Iran is one—should never get them. 
This is because the NPT is designed to stop the spread of nuclear 
weapons and to foster the elimination of those already in existence. 
Whether or not the nuclear-weapon states like this, these two 
objectives should be seen as inherently linked. 
                                                 
1 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. III, opened for 
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]. 
2 NPT, supra note 1, at art. VI. 
3 NPT, supra note 1, at art. IV. 
4 The “nuclear-weapon” states party to the NPT are the United States, 
the Soviet Union (replaced by Russia), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, France, and the People’s Republic of China. See U.S. 
DELEGATION TO THE 2010 NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW 
CONFERENCE, ORIGINS OF THE NPT 2 n.1 (2010), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141503.pdf.  
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There is another relevant anecdote I feel compelled to tell, as 
it has bearing on a mindset that has dogged the NPT. A number of 
years ago, I visited the head of the United States Arms Control 
Disarmament Agency, that is, before a subsequent U.S. 
Administration abolished it.5 Its head was Kenneth Adelman. I had 
sought an appointment with Ken in my capacity as the Australian 
Ambassador for Disarmament. I spoke with him about what we 
hoped to achieve in arms control and his responsibilities. I 
mentioned the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and safeguards 
inspections including those that were to take place in the United 
States. He became agitated, stopped me, and asked, “What did you 
just say? Inspections of the U.S.?” I said, “Well, inspections of your 
peaceful facilities, not your military facilities.” And he said, “You’re 
telling me that we have to accept inspections on our facilities?” I said, 
“Yes, I am.” He said, “No, no, those inspections are to be made of 
the Russians. They’re the ones who get inspected, not us.” This 
conversation illustrates the whole notion of good guys and bad guys. 
It brings to mind the old saying one hears a lot in the disarmament 
business: disarmament is a great idea, for the other guy. 
I am not simply seeking to make fun of this outlook. I am 
seeking to illustrate that, since the adoption of the NPT, there has 
been a pervasive view in nuclear-weapon states circles, as reflected in 
the stories I’ve told you, that the Treaty is essentially about 
nonproliferation, not nuclear disarmament. This view is factually 
incorrect. 
Embedded in such thinking is also the view that there are 
legitimately held nuclear weapons. At the present time, this view is 
consistent with the terms of the Treaty. More specifically, there exists 
the view that the legitimately held nuclear weapons are those held by 
our side—by the good guys. All other weapons held or aspired to, 
especially by adversaries or people of whom we do not approve, are 
illegitimate. 
There are several points to be made about this outlook. First, 
it is factually incorrect. The NPT is directed to the elimination of all 
                                                 
5 See Press Release, The White House, Reinventing State, ACDA, USIA 
and AID (Apr. 18, 1997), http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/aboutacd/gore.htm. 
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nuclear weapons. Second, it is deeply damaging to the Treaty because 
it has little or no relationship to the negotiating history of the Treaty. 
Finally, if pursued further, this outlook will destroy the Treaty. 
Let’s return to the first of these points. The Treaty envisages 
a world without nuclear weapons. That some people seek to dispute 
this historical fact borders on the mind-numbing. How else can one 
logically interpret a document about nuclear weapons, which 
establishes that those who do not have them must never get them 
and that those who do have them must get rid of them? The NPT’s 
objective is to create a world without nuclear weapons. That 
objective is not served by the sort of flagrant, self-serving 
misinterpretation of it described above. 
1995 REVIEW CONFERENCE ON THE NPT 
The NPT provides that after 25 years of its operation, a 
conference of all parties will be held to determine its future: 
“Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a 
conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall 
continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional 
fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of 
the Parties to the Treaty.”6 In 1995, the world gathered for the 
Review and Extension Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty to decide whether or not the NPT should continue to exist.7 
I led Australia’s delegation to that conference, and the final 
deal, done at five minutes to midnight on the last night, was done 
around my dining room table. I had been asked to convene a small 
group of the principal actors and to put an agreement together. 
Interestingly, that group of sixteen principals included the 
representative from Iran. And the deal was done. It was agreed to 
extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty indefinitely. So, the NPT 
is to exist in perpetuity. 
                                                 
6 NPT, supra note 1, at art. X, § 2. 
7 See 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 17 April to 12 May 1995 – New York, U.N., 
http://www.un.org/depts/ddar/nptconf/162.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2013).  
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That agreement should have been easy to reach. It was widely 
recognized that the NPT gave expression to an utterly desirable norm 
in civilized human life—that no one should have nuclear weapons. It 
is the sole international agreement that aspires to this end. 
Notwithstanding these values, indefinite extension was only 
narrowly achieved. The non-nuclear-weapon states who are party to 
the NPT were thoroughly sick of the fundamental inequality 
embedded in the NPT.8 The Treaty attempts to bridge the gap 
between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states by 
placing upon the former the obligation to progressively reduce their 
weapons. However, it has been widely noted that the nuclear-weapon 
states have implemented this obligation inadequately, if at all. In 
response, the nuclear-weapon states argued that the Treaty had been 
working well and that criticism of their tardiness in fulfilling their 
nuclear disarmament obligations was unjustified.9 
A group of states who were parties to the Treaty, including, 
very significantly, Egypt, gave serious thought to both leaving the 
NPT and refusing to agree to its extension.10 They were talked out of 
it, mainly through agreement being given to an Egyptian proposal 
that there be a future conference aimed at establishing the Middle 
East as a zone free of nuclear weapons.11 The call for a nuclear free 
zone in the Middle East, of course, brought to the forefront the 
                                                 
8 See Document on Substantive Issues Submitted by Indonesia on Behalf of the Group 
of Non-Aligned and Other States, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF. 1995/14 (Apr. 6, 1995), 
http://www.un.org/depts/ddar/nptconf/211a.htm. 
9 See Declaration dated 6 April 1995 by France, the Russian Federation, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America in 
connection with the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Doc. 
NPT/CONF.1995/20 (Apr. 19, 1995), 
 http://www.un.org/depts/ddar/nptconf/2102.htm.  
10 See Carol Giacomo, U.S. pessimistic on Egypt support for nuclear pact, 
REUTERS, Feb. 9, 1995. 
11  Resolution on the Middle East, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF. 1995/32 (Part I), 
Annex (Apr. 19, 1995), http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/1995-
NPT/pdf/Resolution_MiddleEast.pdf. See Arab resolution to call on Israel to join NPT, 
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE ENGLISH WIRE, May 9, 1995; Resolution on the Middle East, 
U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF. 1995/32 (Part I), Annex (Apr. 19, 1995), 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/1995-
NPT/pdf/Resolution_MiddleEast.pdf. 
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question of Israel’s nuclear weapons capability. To be blunt, Israel 
would have to be at that conference table.12 
The vision of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East has not 
been implemented even though it was renewed in the 2010 Review 
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As a result, Egypt has essentially walked 
out of the preparations for the 2015 review conference.13 
IRAN AND THE NPT 
Turning now specifically to Iran, under Article IV, Iran has 
the right to nuclear science and technology.14 Specifically, as a non-
nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, Iran has the right to develop, 
research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.15 
But, under Articles II and III of the Treaty and their derivatives, Iran 
has two key obligations: (1) its activities in nuclear science and 
technology must be conducted under full International Atomic 
Energy Agency safeguards, and (2) it must not make a nuclear 
explosive device. For some while now, the IAEA has reported to its 
board and to the U.N. Security Council that Iran is not fulfilling the 
first of these obligations.16 This has given rise to the suspicion that 
Iran is pursuing the development of a nuclear explosive capability. 
Neither the IAEA nor national intelligence agencies have yet 
                                                 
12 See Israel not likely to sign nuclear pact, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, available 
at 1995 WLNR 300991; Israel to Sign Treaty, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 24, 
1995, available at 1995 WLNR 2408249. 
13 Stephanie Nebehay, U.S. regrets Egypt walk-out at nuclear talks, REUTERS, 
Apr. 30, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/30/uk-nuclear-npt-egypt-
idUKBRE93T0KZ20130430. 
14 NPT, supra note 1, at art. IV. 
15 Id.  
16 Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Implementation of the NPT 
Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Rep. of the Dir. Gen., IAEA Doc. GOV/2012/55 (Nov. 16, 2012), 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2012/gov2012-55.pdf; 
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security 
Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Rep. of the Dir. Gen., IAEA Doc. 
GOV/2013/27 (May 22, 2013),  
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-27.pdf.  
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concluded, definitively, that Iran has made a prohibited device. Yet, 
suspicion that Iran is headed in that direction is deep and held in key 
capitals.17 
What would be the consequence of an “Iranian breakout,” to 
use the jargon of the nuclear nonproliferation business? Clearly, such 
action would wound the Treaty deeply. Many states that were reticent 
to agree to its indefinite extension would conclude that they had 
made a mistake. It is not clear that such events would bring the 
Treaty down entirely, but it is clear that if Iran did actually make a 
nuclear explosive device, a regional nuclear arms race would ensue. In 
that case, the NPT might become a dead letter. 
Further, a regional nuclear arms race would greatly elevate the 
prospect of regional war in the Middle East. This, in turn, could 
involve states outside the region. I’m referring, of course, to an Israeli 
or Israeli/U.S. attack upon Iran on the eve of Iran acquiring nuclear 
weapons capability—when a so-called red line18 set by Israel and/or 
the U.S. has been crossed. Where such events would lead is 
incalculable but assumed to be of a massive order of magnitude. 
I cannot resist pointing out to you the bitter irony, the 
grotesque nature, of what elementally would be involved in such a 
scenario: Israel, a non-party to the NPT but with clandestine nuclear 
arms capability,19 attacking another state, presumably with the 
                                                 
17 See IAEA, Communication dated 4 March 2008 from the Governor for the 
Russian Federation and the Resident Representatives of China, France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America concerning U.N. Security Council resolution 1803 
(2008), IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/723 (Mar. 5, 2008), 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2008/infcirc723.pdf; 
IAEA, Communication dated 12 March 2009 received from the Permanent Missions of China, 
France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America regarding a 
joint statement on Iran’s nuclear programme, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/749 (Apr. 1, 2009), 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2009/infcirc749.pdf.  
18 See Arshad Mohammed, Key portions of Israeli PM Netanyahu’s U.N. speech 
on Iran, REUTERS, Sept. 27, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/27/us-
un-assembly-israel-text-idUSBRE88Q1RR20120927; Michael Martinez, Netanyahu 
asks U.N. to draw ‘red line’ on Iran’s nuclear plans, CNN.COM, Sept. 28, 2012, 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/27/world/new-york-unga/index.html. 
19 See IAEA, Israeli nuclear capabilities, Rep. of the Dir. Gen., IAEA Doc. 
GOV/2010/49-GC(54)/14 (Sept. 3, 2010), 
 2013 Butler 2:2 
279 
support, if not the direct participation, of a state recognized by the 
NPT as a nuclear-weapon state, in order to prevent the state under 
attack from acquiring nuclear weapons—the very weapons the 
belligerent states insist are essential to their national security. As 
satirists sometimes remark when introducing an absurd or amazing 
piece of human behavior, “you can’t make this stuff up!” 
Flynt Leverett, in his most recent book and numerous other 
writings, has raised important questions about the nature and future 
of global governance—particularly in the context of the NPT and the 
case of Iran.20 In my opinion, if developments of the kind I have just 
described were to occur, and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
was to be seriously harmed, we would witness a significant 
breakdown in the current system of global governance. 
Why? Because the international community of states has said 
for over 40 years now that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is the 
“cornerstone” of nuclear arms control. The NPT has the most 
member states of any treaty in existence, after the U.N. Charter and 
Geneva Conventions.21 All but four states are parties to it, and this is 
                                                 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC54/GC54Documents/English/gc54-
14_en.pdf. See also James Conca, Israel Has Nuclear Weapons, But Only Iran Has 
Nuclear Power, FORBES, Oct. 21, 2012,  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2012/10/21/does-anyone-care-about-
irans-nuclear-energy-program/.  
20 See generally FLYNT LEVERETT & HILLARY MANN LEVERETT, GOING 
TO TEHRAN: WHY THE UNITED STATES MUST COME TO TERMS WITH THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN (2013). See also Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, 
America’s Iran Policy and the Undermining of International Order, WORLD FIN. REV., July-
Aug. 2013, at 38-42, http://law.psu.edu/_file/TWFR%20Jul-
Aug%202013America%20Iran-v2.pdf. 
21 See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Status of the 
Treaty, U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFF.,  
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (listing 190 
states party to the NPT); Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present, 
U.N., http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) 
(listing 193 U.N. member states); Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORM
StatesParties&xp_treatySelected=380 (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (listing 195 states 
party to the Geneva Convention). 
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testimony to the profound importance of the matters it covers. 22  
The NPT has within it a key element of global governance—a system 
of reporting by the IAEA Board of Governors and ultimate 
enforcement by the Security Council. If the Treaty’s protocol is 
discarded, a systemic breakdown in global governance will have 
occurred. 
Among the changes that such a breakdown could author is 
the disappearance of the notion of a commitment, held by both the 
nuclear haves and have-nots, to a world without nuclear weapons. 
Secondly, permanent membership of the Security Council 
would have to be reconsidered. I have discussed reform of the 
Security Council in another issue of this journal.23 Possibly a disaster 
centered on Iran might prove to be the train wreck that would 
produce this change in global governance that is so widely regarded 
as seriously overdue. But I think it would be a costly and highly 
dangerous way to bring about historical change. 
Finally, the reference made at this symposium to the realist 
school of thought needs a response.24 That school, led by many late 
and great scholars and today by scholars such as John Mearsheimer,25 
                                                 
22 At the time of publication, India, Pakistan, Israel, and the newly 
formed Republic of South Sudan were not parties to the NPT. 
23 See Richard Butler AC, Reform of the United Nations Security Council, 1 
PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 23 (2012),  
http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/vol1/iss1/2.  
24 This is referring to a response to a question from the audience at the 
February 15, 2013 symposium of the Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs, 
available at http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/. 
25 See JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, WHY LEADERS LIE: THE TRUTH ABOUT 
LYING IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (2011); JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER & STEPHEN 
M. WALT, THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2007); JOHN J. 
MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001); JOHN J. 
MEARSHEIMER, CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE (1983); John J. Mearsheimer, 
Structural Realism, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES: DISCIPLINE AND 
DIVERSITY 77 (Tim Dunne et al. eds., 3d ed. 2013); John J. Mearsheimer, The Future 
of Palestine: Righteous Jews vs. the New Afrikaners, in AFTER ZIONISM: ONE STATE FOR 
ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 135 (Antony Loewenstein & Ahmed Moor, eds., 2012), 
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/PalestineFuture.pdf; John J. Mearsheimer, 
Realists as Idealists, 20 SEC. STUD. 424 (2011),  
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claims to see the world with crystal clear eyes and to make utterly 
realistic, logical, scientific calculations. 
If I were a realist being asked for advice on Iran, the NPT, 
and future global governance, I think I would say to those in 
Washington: Would you please stop making statements on the 
alleged basis of realism that you cannot fulfill? Preventing Iran by 
whatever means necessary from becoming a nuclear-weapon state 
cannot be done. If Iran is determined to go nuclear, it will succeed. 
Stop making statements on which you cannot deliver. Making such 
statements, on a realist basis, is extremely dangerous. If you attempt 
to deliver your proclaimed objective by going to all-out war, you will 
impose costs on your nations and your people that are simply 
unbearable and far worse than the problem you’ve set out to solve. 
The true realist and realistic approach is to work to convince 
Iran that it should not proceed with a weapons program, but accept, 
as a matter of realism, that this will require concessions by you, and, 
in particular, you will need to demonstrate your earnestness with 
respect to the NPT as the cornerstone to a greater degree than ever 
before. 
Last year, a deeply apposite critique of the operation of the 
NPT was published. At its core, it alleged that the NPT had been 
characterized by: “selective nonproliferation and ineffectual 
abolition.”26 This is not what Treaty authors or subsequent partners 
had in mind. True and realistic leadership of global governance would 
work urgently to reverse this. 
 
                                                 
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/Realists-Idealists.pdf. 
26 See Campbell Craig & Jan Ruzicka, Who’s in, who’s out? Campbell Craig 
and Jan Ruzicka on the nonproliferation complex, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 23, 
2012, at 37, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n04/campbell-craig/whos-in-whos-out. 
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IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW* 
Daniel H. Joyner** 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay will provide a discussion and analysis of 
international legal questions relating to the dispute between Iran and 
Western states with regard to Iran’s nuclear program. In particular, it 
will consider the competing interpretations between the parties of the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements. It then will consider 
what this legal analysis means for the future of the international 
nuclear nonproliferation regime. 
The current international dispute over Iran’s nuclear program 
began in 2002 when Iranian dissident groups revealed to the IAEA 
that Iran had constructed two facilities, at Natanz and Arak, the 
existence of which Iran had not reported to the IAEA.1 This 
revelation was subsequently confirmed by Iran, though Iran 
                                                 
* This essay was adapted from the transcribed remarks of Professor 
Daniel Joyner delivered on February 15, 2013 at the annual symposium of the Penn 
State Journal of Law & International Affairs on The U.S.-Iranian Relationship and the 
Future of International Order. Video of the symposium is available at 
http://law.psu.edu/academics/journals/law_and_international_affairs/lectures_an
d_symposia. 
** Daniel H. Joyner, Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of 
Law. 
1 IRAN’S STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMMES: A NET ASSESSMENT 16 
(Gary Samore ed. 2005).  
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maintained that no fissile (nuclear) materials had been introduced 
into these facilities, and that they were purposed exclusively for 
peaceful, civilian use.2 
However, Iran’s failure to declare the existence of these 
facilities in what the IAEA considered a timely manner led to further 
investigations of Iran’s nuclear program3 and to the IAEA’s 
determination in November 2003 that, in a number of instances, Iran 
had been noncompliant with its legal obligations pursuant to its 
INFCIRC/153 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with 
the IAEA.4  
The CSA is a bilateral treaty between the IAEA and Iran that 
details the legal relationship between the IAEA and Iran and spells 
out both Iran’s obligations related to nuclear safeguards and the 
IAEA’s authority to conduct investigations and assessments of Iran’s 
nuclear facilities and material.5 Specifically, this determination of 
noncompliance was based upon the discovery of small amounts of 
undeclared uranium and upon Iran’s failure to report the further 
processing of this material and the facilities in which it had been 
stored.6 In addition, however, the Agency was also concerned about 
what it saw as Iran’s “hiding” of the facilities at Natanz and Arak.7 
The IAEA Board of Governors (BOG), through a number of 
resolutions over the next two years, imposed upon Iran a duty of 
                                                 
2 Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Statement by the Iranian Government 
and Visiting EU Foreign Ministers (Oct. 21, 2003), 
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/statement_iran21102003.shtml. 
3 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, Bd. of Gov., IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/75 (Nov. 10, 2003), 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf. 
4 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran: Resolution adopted by the Board on 26 November 2003, Bd. of Gov., IAEA Doc. 
GOV/2003/81 (Nov. 26, 2003),  
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-81.pdf.  
5 IAEA, The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the 
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/214 (Dec. 13, 1974), 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf.  
6 IAEA, supra note 4. 
7 See id. 
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cooperation with the Agency in order to address these issues of 
noncompliance and to satisfactorily answer the IAEA’s remaining 
questions regarding Iran’s nuclear program.8 These questions 
included whether there were yet further aspects to Iran’s nuclear 
program that had not been declared to the IAEA, including possible 
military dimensions to the program.9 Iran’s failure to meet this 
standard of cooperation to the satisfaction of the IAEA BOG, led to 
the Board’s decision in 2006 to refer Iran to the U.N. Security 
Council.10 
Later that year, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 
1696, in which it ordered Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and to 
suspend its uranium enrichment program.11 Iran’s refusal to comply 
with the demands of this and subsequent Resolutions adopted by the 
Security Council has led to several rounds of economic and financial 
sanctions imposed upon Iran by the Security Council.12 Further, both 
the United States and the European Union have imposed separate 
and additional unilateral economic and financial sanctions on Iran 
due to this impasse.13 
Since 2002, a number of Iranian civilian nuclear scientists 
have been assassinated inside Iran, in what Iran alleges to have been 
                                                 
8 See IAEA, supra note 5.  
9 See id. 
10 Press Release, IAEA, Report on Iran’s Nuclear Programme Sent to 
U.N. Security Council (Mar. 8, 2006), 
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2006/bog080306.html.  
11 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Demands Iran 
Suspend Uranium Enrichment by 31 August or Face Possible Economic, 
Diplomatic Sanctions, U.N. Press Release SC/8792 (July 31, 2006), 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm. 
12 See S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006); S.C. Res. 
1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1803 (Mar. 3, 
2008); S.C. Res. 1835, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1835 (Sept. 27, 2008); S.C. Res. 1929, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010). See also Orde F. Kittrie, Emboldened by 
Impunity: The History and Consequences of Failure to Enforce Iranian Violations of 
International Law, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 519, 533-48 (2007). 
13 See Kittrie, supra note 12.  
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targeted killings orchestrated by Israel.14 Further, Iran’s nuclear 
facilities have been damaged on multiple occasions by cyberattacks, 
including through the introduction of the sophisticated Stuxnet and 
Flame computer viruses/worms into these facilities, which Iran 
attributes to the United States and Israel.15 While not confirming their 
involvement in these events, officials in the United States and Israel 
have been variously quoted publicly as supporting potential military 
strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities if a diplomatic resolution to the 
crisis cannot be reached through negotiations between Iran and the 
P5+1 group of states (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, China, 
France, Germany).16 
This discussion analyzes the legal arguments on both sides—
meaning, on the one side, Iran; and on the other side, the U.S., 
Britain, France, Germany, and, to a lesser extent, Russia and China, 
whom I will collectively (although of course inaccurately) refer to as 
“the West” —regarding the relevant sources of international nuclear 
law, and regarding whether Iran has been in compliance with these 
sources of law. I hope in doing so to flesh out further the nuclear 
nonproliferation legal framework. 
                                                 
14 Karl Vick and Aaron J. Klein, Who Assassinated an Iranian Nuclear 
Scientist? Israel Isn’t Telling, TIME, Jan. 13, 2012, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2104372,00.html. 
15 David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-
of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html. See also DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND 
CONCEAL: OBAMA’S SECRET WARS AND SURPRISING USE OF AMERICAN POWER 
(2012). 
16 See Bush Won’t Rule Out Military Action Against Iran, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
14, 2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/14/world/fg-iran14; Jon Swaine, 
Barack Obama: I’m not bluffing on military action against Iran, TELEGRAPH, Mar. 2, 2012,  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/9119775/Barack-
Obama-Im-not-bluffing-on-military-action-against-Iran.html; Alistair Dawber, 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions: Israel will not wait until it’s too late, warns Benjamin Netanyahu, 
THE INDEPENDENT, July 15, 2013,  
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/irans-nuclear-ambitions-
israel-will-not-wait-until-its-too-late-warns-benjamin-netanyahu-8709097.html. 
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THE “WESTERN” ARGUMENTS 
The essential Western legal argument is that Iran has been in 
the past, and is to this day, in noncompliance with its obligations 
under its CSA with the IAEA.17 Again, through IAEA resolutions, 
the IAEA BOG has imposed on Iran specific requirements of 
cooperation.18 And the Western legal argument is that, because those 
levels of cooperation have not been met—meaning access by 
inspectors to facilities and Iran’s answering of questions that the 
IAEA has—the IAEA BOG continues to determine that Iran is in 
noncompliance with its safeguards agreement obligations.19 This in 
turn, has led to an argument by some Western officials that Iran is 
also in violation of Article III of the NPT, which, in paragraph four, 
requires Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS) parties to conclude a 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Thus, there is both the 
safeguards agreement compliance level, but also a link in this legal 
argument to compliance with Article III of the NPT.20 
One legal interpretation underpinning the Western legal 
argument regarding Iran’s CSA compliance is regarding the scope of 
the authority, or mandate of the IAEA, to investigate and to assess 
compliance with CSA. The Western legal argument—and this is the 
legal argument also maintained by the IAEA itself—is that the IAEA 
has the authority and mandate not only to confirm the correctness of 
Iran’s required declaration of its nuclear materials and facilities under 
the CSA and the non-diversion of this declared fissile material from 
peaceful to military uses, but also the authority and mandate to 
confirm the absence of any undeclared nuclear facilities and materials 
                                                 
17 See IAEA, supra note 4; IAEA, supra note 5; IAEA, Rep. of Dir. Gen., 
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council 
resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2013/27 (May 22, 2013), 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-27.pdf. 
18 Id.  
19 Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Implementation of the NPT 
Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Rep. of the Dir. Gen., at paras. 67-71, IAEA Doc. GOV/2013/27 
(May 22, 2012), 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-27.pdf.   
20 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for 
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]. 
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inside Iran, and any potential nuclear weapons-related activity (i.e., 
warhead development activity). 
In brief, the INFCIRC/153 CSA, which is the only 
safeguards agreement to which Iran is a party, requires a declaration 
by the NWWS of their fissile materials accounting and their facilities 
relating to those fissile materials.21 The argument of the West and of 
the IAEA is that the IAEA not only has the right to, and the 
mandate to, confirm the correctness of that declaration, but also its 
completeness. This means that the IAEA has the mandate to make 
sure that the state has declared everything it was supposed to declare. 
That argument has far-reaching implications for the standard of 
compliance with the CSA. If one considers that the IAEA’s mandate 
is to determine not only the correctness, but also the completeness of 
the declaration, the IAEA has the authority, nay, the obligation to 
conduct additional inspections to those called for under the 
INFCIRC/153 itself, in order to determine, with any confidence, that 
there are no undeclared fissile materials. This is the argument of the 
West and the IAEA, as to the IAEA’s mandate. And so the argument 
goes that, with this standard and the mandate of the IAEA, Iran has 
not provided enough cooperation to satisfy suspicions regarding past 
and possibly current nuclear weapons-related activity in Iran.22 
Under the tenure of Director General Yukiya Amano, the 
IAEA has accepted from national intelligence agencies, information 
regarding not only Iran’s use of fissile material itself, but also 
information concerning the other elements of building a nuclear 
weapon, essentially meaning the physical construction of a nuclear 
warhead. In November 2011, the Director General of the IAEA 
produced a report to the BOG laying out the evidence the IAEA had 
obtained from the national intelligence sources, that it argued raised 
the specter of Iran having engaged in a number of industrial and 
                                                 
21 See IAEA, The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and 
States Required in Connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Bd. 
of Gov., IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153 (June 1972), 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf. 
22 IAEA, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Interview with Albert Carnesale, 
IAEA Doc. CFR Interview 091110 (Nov. 9, 2010), 
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/transcripts/2010/cfr091110.html. 
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scientific experiments, the understanding from which could be used 
in the development of a nuclear warhead.23 
This adds yet another dimension to the legal arguments of the 
West and the IAEA regarding Iran’s compliance with international 
nuclear law—the possibility of an Article II breach of the NPT.24 
In summary, the West and the IAEA argue that Iran is in 
breach of its CSA obligations, which in turn links to Article III of the 
NPT. Second, the West and the IAEA argue that there is a possible 
military dimension of Iran’s nuclear program that raises the specter of 
an Article II violation of the NPT. 
The U.N. Security Council, as I noted, in Resolution 1696 
and subsequent resolutions, has commanded Iran to cease uranium 
enrichment.25 This then, becomes yet another dimension of 
international law relevant to this case—i.e. the legally binding force of 
Security Council resolutions under Articles 25 and 103 of the U.N. 
Charter.26 
IRAN’S RESPONSES AND AFFIRMATIVE ARGUMENTS 
Let’s switch now to Iran’s legal arguments, which are 
responsive in some respects to the West’s accusations, and in other 
respects, rest on independent assertions Iran’s legal arguments are 
essentially based in Article IV of the NPT—the inalienable right of 
all states to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.27 I wrote a book, 
published in 2011, probably half of which is devoted to interpretation 
of Article IV and Article III and this whole question of the 
inalienable right.28 I will only mention here that we need not think of 
                                                 
23 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions 
of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Rep. of Dir. Gen., IAEA 
Doc. GOV/2011/65 (Nov. 8, 2011),  
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-65.pdf. 
24 See NPT, supra note 20, at art. II.   
25 S.C. Res. 1696, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006). 
26 U.N. Charter arts. 25, 103.  
27 NPT, supra note 20, at art. IV.  
28 DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERPRETING THE NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION TREATY (2011). 
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the right to the full nuclear fuel cycle as residing only in the NPT. 
Under the Lotus principle of international law, according to which, 
essentially, that which is not prohibited by law is lawful, the real 
question is: are the activities related to the fuel nuclear cycle 
prohibited anywhere in international law?29 And the answer to this is 
no, except in very specific ways in the context of Article II of the 
NPT, and to some extent, Article III and the safeguards requirement 
of the IAEA. So that’s an important change of vision to look at it 
that way. A right need not exist under the NPT. Instead, the proper 
determination would be whether any activities are prohibited in 
international law, and if they are not, then they are lawful. Thus, Iran 
argues, its NPT Article IV right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
provides the essential starting point for legal analysis.30 
Iran specifically disputes the argument by the West and the 
IAEA that Iran is in noncompliance with its IAEA CSA on a number 
of bases. One is the question of the mandate of the IAEA. Iran, in 
viewing the INFCIRC/153 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, 
sees the mandate of the IAEA spelled out very clearly in Article II, 
and that is to detect the diversion of fissile materials from peaceful to 
military uses.31 It essentially argues that the framework provided by 
the CSA, is that detecting diversion of fissile material is to be 
accomplished through a declaration by the State Party of its fissile 
materials and facilities, and then the IAEA’s determination of the 
accuracy of that declaration.32 Iran argues that anything beyond that – 
including the imposition of a higher level of cooperation than that 
contained in the CSA; or the idea that the IAEA has a mandate not 
only to determine the accuracy but also the completeness of Iran’s 
declaration—is ultra vires the IAEA’s authority under the CSA.33 
                                                 
29 See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 
http://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/SS%20Lotus%20-
%20PCIJ%20-%201927.pdf. 
30 H.E. Ambassador A.A. Soltanieh, Statement to the Second Session of 
the Preparatory Committee of the 2015 NPT Review Conference (Apr. 23, 2013), 
at 4, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-
fora/npt/prepcom13/statements/23April_Iran.pdf. 
31 See id. at 4-5. 
32 See id. at 3. 
33 See id. 
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Essentially, Iran argues that if the IAEA is accorded the 
mandate of determining not only the accuracy but also the 
completeness of a declaration, then a NPT NNWS would be required 
to prove the negative—i.e. to prove that Iran does not have 
undeclared fissile materials; to prove that Iran has never engaged in 
possible military dimensions; and to prove that it is logically 
impossible for Iran to do so.34 How can one prove that one has not 
done something? It is a basic principle of logic - that you cannot 
prove the negative. It is a never-ending game that produces only time 
and argument. Based on this point, Iran argues that it is in 
compliance with its IAEA CSA. 
In response to the possible military dimensions legal angle, 
Iran argues that, again, under the CSA, there is no mandate for the 
IAEA to investigate or to assess potential nuclear weapons-related 
work not directly relating to diversion of fissile material from 
peaceful to military uses. Furthermore, with regard to NPT Article II, 
they argue that the NPT does not prohibit research, design, or 
industrial capabilities that could be used to make a nuclear warhead, 
but that could be used for other things as well. They point to Japan, 
in particular, as a state that has every industrial and technical 
capability to build a nuclear weapon, and thus has every capability 
outlined in the November 2011 IAEA report on Implementation of 
Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. And yet, there have been no arguments 
by the West or the IAEA that Japan is in noncompliance with its 
safeguards agreement or in violation of the NPT. In summary, Iran 
argues that it is in compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement. 
Even if it were not in compliance, there would be no NPT Article III 
breach. 
Iran further argues that there is certainly no Article II breach 
of the NPT. Iran has not manufactured or otherwise acquired nuclear 
weapons, and, in fact, the IAEA has no mandate to investigate or 
assess that question. 
Iran is essentially correct in its legal arguments regarding NPT 
interpretation and interpretation of the IAEA’s authority and 
mandate under its statute and its CSA with Iran. According to the 
                                                 
34 Id. 
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correct legal interpretation, Iran is in compliance both with the NPT 
and with its CSA with the IAEA. 
WHAT THE IRAN CASE MEANS FOR THE  
FUTURE OF THE NPT REGIME 
Finally, what does the Iran case mean for the future of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime? Iran’s case illustrates warped and 
incorrect legal interpretations of the NPT and of IAEA sources of 
law and a prejudicial and inconsistent application of the law to this 
case by the West and by the IAEA itself. 
From the macro view, the Iranian case is illustrative of the 
longstanding and varied policies and practices of the U.S. and its 
allies, which have fundamentally undermined the NPT legal regime. 
The NPT was and is a quid pro quo grand bargain between nuclear-
weapon states and developing NNWS. As the developing NNWS, 
including but not limited to Iran, feel that the powerful nuclear-
weapon states simply disregard their own obligations under the 
NPT,35 disregard the grand bargain with regard to non-NPT parties,36 
and, furthermore, prejudicially and incorrectly use NNWS obligations 
against them to their harm,37 the treaty regime will fade into further 
perceived illegitimacy and, ultimately, irrelevance. 
The future of the NPT as the normative cornerstone of 
international law’s regulation of nuclear energy is unfortunately bleak. 
The one most significant reason for this is the warped and prejudicial 
manner in which the West has generally interpreted and sought to 
apply the law of the NPT to non-nuclear-weapon states, including 
Iran. The time has come for a new grand bargain—one that 
                                                 
35 Here, I’m referring specifically to Article VI on disarmament.  
36 See Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 
Agreement), Council on Foreign Relations, Aug. 2007, 
http://www.cfr.org/india/agreement-cooperation-between-government-united-
states-america-government-india-concerning-peaceful-uses-nuclear-energy-123-
agreement/p15459 (discussing the nuclear sharing deal between the U.S. and 
India). 
37 Here is where I would locate the Iran case, such that its leaders no 
longer feel they are getting the benefit of the grand bargain. 
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progresses the aim of global nuclear disarmament, as well as 
strengthens the legal framework governing nonproliferation, while at 
the same time ensuring that civilian nuclear energy programs may be 
freely pursued and developed by states that choose to do so. 
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CAROLINE REVISITED: 
AN IMAGINED EXCHANGE BETWEEN 
JOHN KERRY AND MOHAMMAD JAVAD 
ZARIF 
James W. Houck* 
“If you have remonstrated for some time without 
effect and see no prospect of relief, when begins your 
right to defend yourself?”1 
 
 Lord Ashburton,  
 British Minister in America, 
July 8, 1842 
I. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY STANDARD 
Late in the evening of December 29, 1837, a band of British 
officers conducted a bold raid on the American merchant vessel 
Caroline, which was moored on the Niagara River near Buffalo, New 
York. After wounding several and killing an American citizen named 
Amos Durfee, the British set the Caroline ablaze, and then adrift. 
Shortly thereafter, she went over Niagara Falls to a violent demise. 
                                                 
 * James W. Houck, Interim Dean and Distinguished Scholar in Residence, 
Dickinson School of Law and School of International Affairs, Pennsylvania State 
University. 
 1 See Letter from the British Minister to the United States Lord Alexander 
Baring Ashburton to Secretary of State Daniel Webster, (July 28, 1842), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp [hereinafter Ashburton 
Letter].  
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Within a week, U.S. Secretary of State John Forsyth wrote in protest 
to Henry Stephen Fox, the British Minister in Washington.2 Fox 
replied that the Caroline had been shuttling men, money, and arms to 
Canadian rebels and that the attack and the Caroline’s destruction were 
acts of necessary self-defense.3 
The Forsyth-Fox exchange launched a four and one-half year 
diplomatic, political, and judicial saga that threatened to pull the 
United States, Great Britain, and Canada, into broader armed 
conflict. The Caroline controversy finally came to rest during the 
summer of 1842 when U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster and 
British Minister in America Lord Alexander Baring Ashburton 
exchanged three letters destined for legal history.4 
In his first letter, Webster wrote that the Caroline attack was 
“a wrong, and an offense to the sovereignty and the dignity of the 
United States . . . .”5 Reiterating his comments from an earlier letter, 
Webster famously placed the burden on Great Britain to show: 
“[U]pon what state of facts, and what rules of national law, the 
destruction of the Caroline is to be defended. It will be for that 
Government to show a necessity of self-defen[s]e, instant, 
                                                 
2 See British-American Diplomacy: The Caroline Case, THE AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp (last visited October 30, 
2013).  
3 See id.  
4 See Letter from Secretary of State Daniel Webster to British Minister to 
the United States Lord Alexander Baring Ashburton (July 27, 1842), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp [hereinafter Webster Letter 
#1]. See also Ashburton Letter, supra note 1; Letter from Secretary of State Daniel 
Webster to British Minister to the United States, Lord Alexander Baring Ashburton 
(Aug 6, 1842), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp [hereinafter 
Webster Letter #2]. Although the final Webster-Ashburton exchange is best 
known, it actually culminated a multi-author correspondence through the years 
1838-1842. Others who exchanged letters throughout the Caroline affair included 
Secretary of State John Forsyth, British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston, British 
Minister in Washington Henry S. Fox, and American Minister to the United 
Kingdom Andrew Stevenson. 
5 Webster Letter #1, supra note 4.  
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overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation.”6 
Ashburton quickly replied, affirming that the two statesmen 
were “perfectly agreed as to the general principles of international law 
applicable to this unfortunate case.”7 Ashburton disagreed with 
Webster, however, on the application of the principle to the facts 
before them and also posed a fundamental question: 
[I]f cannon are moving and setting up in a battery 
which can reach you and are actually destroying life 
and property by their fire, if you have remonstrated 
for some time without effect and see no prospect of 
relief, when begins your right to defend yourself . . . ?8 
Ashburton had no doubt of the answer: the attack on the 
Caroline was a necessary and justified act of self-defense.9 
The Caroline letters’ lasting effect on international law has 
been profound. Through their exchange, Webster and Ashburton 
established a principle that has assumed an important place in the 
international legal canon: a nation need not stand passively by while 
another prepares to launch an attack. Their failure to agree on the 
principle’s application to the facts before them, however, 
foreshadowed a challenge that has vexed diplomats and scholars in 
successive conflicts to this day. 
One wonders if the parties in the Caroline matter might have 
averted bloodshed, destruction, and affronts to national honor had 
they been able to negotiate with the Caroline principle in mind before 
the attack. We can only speculate. Once the water (and vessel) was 
over the dam, so to speak, the parties may have been constrained by 
immutable facts and found it politically difficult to compromise their 
respective positions. 
                                                 
6 Id.  
7 Ashburton Letter, supra note 1. 
8   Id.  
9 See id.  
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While the British, Canadian, and American governments may 
not have foreseen the Caroline confrontation, the same cannot be said 
for diplomats involved in today’s crisis over Iran’s nuclear program. 
The basic disagreement between Iran and the international 
community has been well publicized: the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) and United Nations Security Council have 
declared Iran noncompliant with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), and Iran disagrees.10 Meanwhile, both President 
Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu have declared that Iran 
must not be permitted to develop a nuclear weapon, and both have 
suggested that force might be used to underwrite this commitment.11 
Given that most official statements and public discourse to 
date have focused on the issue of Iran’s compliance with the NPT 
safeguards regime, relatively little attention has been given to the legal 
issues underlying the potential use of force. While no one should 
confuse a 19th century dispute on the Niagara River with a 21st 
century crisis over uranium enrichment in Western Asia, Caroline 
provides the logical place to begin analysis. In addition to serving as 
the wellspring for relevant legal doctrine, the 19th century Webster-
Ashburton letter exchange also provides a convenient model for 
                                                 
10 See generally Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Implementation of the 
NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Rep. of the Dir. Gen.,  IAEA Doc. GOV/2012/55 (Nov. 16, 2012), 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2012/gov2012-55.pdf 
(outlining Iran’s nuclear progress, enrichment facilities, possible military 
dimensions, design information, additional protocol compliance, and other related 
matters). See also Elaine Sciolino, Iran is Not Cooperating, Agency Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 28, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/28/world/middleeast/28cnd-
iran.html?_r=3&oref=slogin&; Iran Defiant in the Face of U.N. Nuclear Sanctions, 
FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Dec. 24, 2006,  
http://www.fpa.org/newsletter_info2584/newsletter_info.htm (last visited Oct. 
30, 2013).  
11 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013), 
http://www.cspan.org/SOTU/ (“[W]e will do what is necessary to prevent them 
from getting a nuclear weapon.”). Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 
Speech to joint session of U.S. Congress (May 24, 2011), 
http://www.cfr.org/israel/netanyahus-address-us-congress-may-2011/p25073 
(“The more Iran believes that all options are on the table, the less the chance of 
confrontation . . . When we say never again, we mean never again. Israel always 
reserves the right to defend itself.”).  
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framing the current protagonists’ radically different perspectives, 
both of which are critical for an informed understanding of today’s 
crisis. Short of an actual public dialogue about the use of force, there 
is no better way to capture the competing arguments than to imagine 
a 21st century letter exchange between the United States’ Secretary of 
State and the Iranian Foreign Minister. 
II. A TWENTY FIRST CENTURY IMAGINED EXCHANGE 
July 19, 2013 
From John Kerry, Secretary of State of the United States of 
America to Mohammad Javad Zarif, Foreign Minister of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran: 
Despite years of effort, the international community has been 
unable to persuade your government to be forthcoming on critical 
aspects of your uranium enrichment program. Given this impasse, 
the United States must now ensure you do not misunderstand how 
the international community and the United States view our vital 
interests. 
As always, the United States continues to seek resolution of 
this matter in accord with current United Nations Security Council 
resolutions and the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, which fully 
account for Iran’s right to develop and operate a nuclear energy 
program for peaceful purposes.12 However, absent resolution in 
accordance with these agreements, we view the Iranian nuclear 
program with grave concern. Your government’s willingness to flaunt 
the existing international safeguards regime13 has been, and remains, 
unacceptable. Today, the United States is unable to confirm the 
status of either your nuclear enrichment program or any related 
                                                 
12 See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for 
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.  
13 See IAEA], Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Rep. of the Dir. Gen., ¶ 32, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/40 (June 6, 
2003), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-
40.pdf. (“Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement 
with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use 
of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and 
processed.”).  
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military development you may have undertaken. Your government 
could put the world at ease simply by allowing IAEA inspectors the 
access they require and have long sought. Regrettably, your 
government’s actions to date are inconsistent even with agreements 
you have already signed. 
In the absence of such assurances, the United States is left 
with no choice but to assume the Islamic Republic of Iran is 
developing a nuclear weapon that may be launched without warning. 
As more time passes without required access and disclosure, the 
international community is increasingly threatened and options for 
resolution are narrowing. 
I call upon your government to comply with existing Security 
Council resolutions and your obligations under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and related Safeguard Agreements. I am willing 
to meet with you personally to discuss further details, as this may be 
our last, best hope. Thank you for your attention to these concerns. 
July 29, 2013 
From Minister Zarif to Secretary Kerry: 
Thank you for your letter. The Islamic Republic of Iran is 
committed to constructive resolution of the issues between us. I 
respectfully submit, however, that if there is a crisis, it is brought 
about by the United States’ refusal to respect the sovereign right of 
the Islamic Republic to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, 
a right which is expressly permitted in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Iran might be more receptive to your concerns if they were 
not so self-serving. You have nuclear weapons with enough 
destructive power to destroy the world within hours. Indeed, you 
provided the best evidence of their power by annihilating Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. 
You seem quite willing to accept the “unacceptable” from 
other nations when your interests dictate. Other nations that actually 
possess nuclear weapons have not joined the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and some have even declared their intention to use nuclear 
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weapons against you.14 Yet, you remain fixated on the Islamic 
Republic. The government of Iran can only conclude that your 
concerns arise not from your fear of nuclear weapons, but, rather, 
from your fear of an assertive Islamic state. 
The Islamic Republic will not be threatened or bullied. We 
will continue our peaceful nuclear program without your permission, 
supervision, or interference. I remain hopeful that your current 
administration will walk away from the United States’ traditional 
approach vis-à-vis my country. Confrontation certainly is not the 
way. 
August 9, 2013 
Secretary Kerry to Minister Zarif: 
In response to your letter of [45 days before JLIA], let me 
reassure the people of Iran that the United States has no quarrel with 
Islam nor any desire to interfere with a peaceful and transparent 
nuclear energy program that complies with international safeguards. 
You must understand, however, that Iran’s assurances alone cannot 
provide the sole basis for its neighbors’ security. The following facts 
are well known to you, but are recounted here to ensure there is no 
doubt about why your government’s actions are viewed with such 
grave concern by the entire international community. 
In 2002, the IAEA substantiated allegations that the Islamic 
Republic conducted secret nuclear activities. When the IAEA 
requested additional access to Iran’s nuclear facilities, your 
government refused. In 2007, rather than provide required disclosure, 
your government announced instead that you would no longer 
adhere to the Additional Protocol to your IAEA safeguards 
agreement.15 Your government has consistently failed to notify the 
                                                 
14 See Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What?, CNN.COM, 
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2013/03/world/nuclear-weapon-states/ (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2013). See also Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, U.S. Department of 
State, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/npt/(last visited Aug. 29, 2013).  
15 See IAEA, supra note 10, at ¶ 49 (“Iran is not implementing its 
Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible 
assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran 
unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency . . . .”).  
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IAEA of nuclear reactor design information and of your decision to 
enrich uranium to 20 percent uranium-235.16 Finally, in February 
2006, the IAEA Board of Governors was forced to refer the matter 
of Iran’s non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council.17 
Since becoming seized of the issue, the Security Council has 
passed six resolutions demanding compliance with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s IAEA safeguards agreements.18 Resolution 1696 
demanded that your government suspend all enrichment-related and 
reprocessing activities.19 When your government failed to comply, the 
Security Council passed Resolution 1737, making IAEA compliance 
mandatory and imposing sanctions that banned the supply of 
nuclear-related materials and technology and froze assets of key 
individuals and companies.20 These sanctions were later expanded in 
four subsequent Security Council resolutions.21 In addition, the 
European Union has imposed restrictions of its own.22 Finally, as a 
sign of both the United States’ resolve and abiding desire to settle 
this matter peacefully, our Congress passed the Comprehensive Iran 
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA)23 
in the hope that the Islamic Republic would respond sensibly. 
                                                 
16 See id. at ¶ 51. 
17 See id. at ¶ 2 n.3. 
18 See S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006); S.C. Res. 
1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1803 (Mar. 3, 
2008); S.C. Res. 1835, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1835 (Sept. 27, 2008); S.C. Res. 1929, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010). 
19 S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006).  
20 See S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006).  
21 See S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 
1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008); S.C. Res. 1835,U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1835 (Sept. 27, 2008); S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 
2010).  
22 See European Union: Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) in Force, 
updated Feb. 21, 2013, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf.  
23 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312, 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ195/pdf/PLAW-111publ195.pdf. 
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Your government’s record of obfuscation and delay on 
nuclear matters is especially alarming in light of its recent history. The 
world remembers your government’s role in the 444-day American 
Embassy hostage crisis, the 1983 bombing of Marine Barracks in 
Beirut that killed 299, the 1992 attack on the Israeli Embassy in 
Buenos Aires that killed 29 and injured another 242, as well as its 
consistent support of Hezbollah.24 
Your government’s consistent refusal to abide by IAEA 
regulations and U.N. Security Council Resolutions and its well-
documented history of state-sponsored terrorism provides no 
confidence that Iran is enriching uranium solely for peaceful 
purposes or that your government will show restraint if it acquires a 
nuclear weapon.25 Iran’s conduct, both past and present, is creating 
an immediate threat that, as I noted in my letter of [55 days before 
JLIA], is rapidly narrowing options for resolution. Accordingly, the 
United States calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran yet again to take 
the required verifiable steps before it is too late. 
August 19, 2013 
Minister Zarif to Secretary Kerry: 
The Islamic Republic cannot accept the threats implicit in 
your correspondence. You lecture us about international law, but you 
                                                 
24 See CASEY L. ADDIS & CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R41446, HEZBOLLAH: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR 
CONGRESS (2011), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41446.pdf (noting the 
strong connection between Iran and Hezbollah). See also U.S. Dep’t of 
Def., Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International 
Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/beirut-
1983.pdf (noting that Hezbollah is considered a terrorist organization according to 
the U.S. Department of State and is on the Foreign Terrorist Organization and 
Specially Designated Terrorist lists); U.S. Department of Defense, Imposition of 
Sanctions With Respect to the Financial Sector of Iran, Section 1245 of the 
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act, Jan. 2012 (stating that Iran financially 
supports international terrorism and proliferation). 
25 See Marcus George, Iran has new rocket site, ballistic missile tests possible: 
report, REUTERS, Aug. 8, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/08/us-
iran-space-idUSBRE9770A920130808?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews 
(noting that Iran has constructed a rocket site that may be used for ballistic 
missiles).  
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know that a preemptive attack would be a gross violation of 
international law. The United Nations Charter prohibits states from 
using armed force in self-defense unless “an armed attack occurs.”26 
Given that Iran has not, and will not, attack anyone first, you would 
be acting illegally in express violation of the Charter. Your own 
scholars have said as much.27 
Furthermore, the International Court of Justice has ruled that 
the mere possession of nuclear weapons does not violate the Charter 
or general principles of international law.28 Thus, even if Iran did 
possess nuclear weapons, any attack would be blatant aggression. 
As a peace-loving nation, Iran hopes you will abandon any 
further consideration of an illegal, immoral, and foolish preemptive 
strike. 
August 29, 2013 
Secretary Kerry to Minister Zarif: 
I am encouraged by your mention of international law. If we 
act within international law, our chances for a satisfactory solution 
increase. Our discussion of international law must, however, be 
accurate and complete. Article 51 simply reaffirmed the right nations 
already possessed: the inherent right of self-defense. Article 51 
includes not only the right to respond to an armed attack, but also the 
                                                 
26 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (stating: “All Members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). See also U.N. Charter art. 51 (stating: 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations . . . .”). 
27 See Mary Ellen O’Connell & Maria Alveras-Chen, The Ban on the Bomb–
And Bombing: Iran, the U.S., and the International Law of Self-Defense, 57 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 497, 497 (2007) (“The use of force [against Iran] should ‘come off the table,’ 
as diplomats search for a constructive way forward.”).  
28 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).  
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inherent right to prevent an imminent attack.29 A nation’s right to 
defend itself through preventative measures is well established when 
circumstances present an immediate threat and no alternative means 
are available for guaranteeing the safety of its people or territorial 
integrity. Your ability to launch a nuclear weapon at a regional target 
without detection would present such a threat to our allies as well as 
U.S. citizens and property lawfully in the region. 
September 9, 2013 
Minister Zarif to Secretary Kerry: 
Your position on the preemptive use of force is intriguing, 
particularly given that the Islamic Republic has lived in the shadow of 
nuclear weapons, most notably those possessed by the United States 
and Israel, for many years. If Iran were so inclined, we could apply 
your criteria as justification to strike each of your nations. Obviously, 
we have not. 
Iran would never execute a policy that has already been 
deemed illegal by the international community. Have you forgotten 
how the United States, and the rest of the world, condemned Israel’s 
attack on the Iraqi nuclear program in 1981?30 Have you forgotten 
the 2005 World Summit, where the General Assembly, including the 
United States, reaffirmed the Charter’s text and with it, the principle 
that unilateral first use of force outside the express text of the 
Charter is not permitted?31 
                                                 
29 The French text of Article 51 refers to “le droit naturel,” that is, “the 
natural right.” Charte des Nations Unies art. 51. This is a very expansive view of 
preemptive action, permitting more preemptive attacks than the U.N. Charter.  
30 See S.C. Res. 487, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (Jun. 19, 1981) (stating 
that the Security Council “strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international 
conduct . . . .”).  
31 See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 79, U.N. Doc 
A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005) (stating: “We reaffirm that the relevant provisions of 
the Charter are sufficient to address the full range of threats to international peace 
and security. We further reaffirm the authority of the Security Council to mandate 
coercive action to maintain and restore international peace and security. We stress 
the importance of acting in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
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Likewise, Iran would never execute a policy that is based on 
so many flawed premises. Preemptive attacks rely on suppositions, 
which, in turn, depend on information and intelligence that may be 
wrong. Recall how your country invaded Iraq based on the false 
intelligence that Iraq posed “a continuing threat to the national 
security of the United States [by] continuing to possess and develop 
significant chemical and biological weapons.”32 Recall how your 
predecessor, General Colin Powell, lectured the United Nations 
Security Council in 2003, claiming that Saddam Hussein was 
concealing weapons of mass destruction.33 As the world has since 
learned, your information was either grossly mistaken or deliberately 
misleading. In either case, your misplaced invasion led to needless 
suffering and death. Your calamity in Iraq shows the folly of 
substituting paranoia and deception for actual facts. 
For all these reasons, Iran will never attack first, and we 
categorically deny your right to do so. Iran has shown discipline and 
patience in the face of an actual, as opposed to imaginary, threat. Iran 
has chosen the path of peace over the path of mob violence. 
However, do not be mistaken: the Islamic Republic will defend itself 
if you are so foolish as to launch an armed attack first. Your bombers 
will fall from the sky, your ships will sink, and your sailors and 
soldiers will die. If the deaths of your young people are an 
insufficient deterrent, know also you will watch your gas lines grow, 
your freeways lie empty, and your fading economy wither even more 
quickly. Most ironically, your attack will be wasted because our 
nuclear facilities are invulnerable. If you attack them, you will fail. 
September 13, 2013 
Secretary Kerry to Minister Zarif: 
Your most recent letter is deeply disappointing. Even so, 
because the stakes are so high, I invite you, on behalf of the President 
                                                 
Charter.”) This is important as Article 51 of the U.N. Charter only permits military 
action in self-defense “if an armed attack occurs.”  
32 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498. 
33 Colin Powell, U.S. Sec’y of State, Presentation to the U.N. Security 
Council on the U.S. Case Against Iraq (Feb. 6, 2003), 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript. 
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of the United States, to meet with me in Geneva as soon as possible 
to continue this discussion. I extend this offer in good faith and in 
the sincere hope that we might yet find a way to preserve the peace. I 
look forward to your reply.34 
III. ASSESSING THE EXCHANGE 
Aside from demonstrating that “fantasy diplomacy” is as 
intractable as real diplomacy, who has the better legal argument?35 
As the imagined Zarif letter suggests, some international 
lawyers would argue that nothing would justify a preemptive strike on 
Iranian nuclear capabilities.36 They argue that possession of nuclear 
                                                 
34 See Thomas Erdbrink, Iran’s New President Calls for Nuclear Talks Without 
Rejecting Direct U.S. Role, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/07/world/middleeast/irans-new-president-
says-nuclear-talks-could-succeed.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=0 (noting that 
Iran’s new President, Hassan Rouhani, has called for serious negotiations with the 
United States on Iran’s nuclear program but calling for the United States to take the 
first step).  
35 Some contend that legal arguments contribute little to the use of force 
debate. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. 
REV. 699, 717 (2005) (“[Some] see the rules on the use of force embedded in the 
[U.N.] Charter as completely devoid of any legally significant normative value.”). 
See also Jeremy Rabkin, American Self-Defense Shouldn’t Be Too Distracted by International 
Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 43 (“When one appeals to higher claims . . . 
one should keep in mind that among the very highest claims is the claim of the 
people to security.”).  
36 See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE, 199, 
para. 525 (5th ed. 2011) (“U.N. Member States are barred by the Charter from 
exercising self-defense[] in response to a mere threat of force”). See also THE 
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1422, para. 50 (Bruno 
Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012) (“[A]n anticipatory right of self-defence would be 
contrary to the wording of Art. 51 (‘if an armed attack occurs’). . .”); Rep. of the 
U.N. Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A 
more secure world: Our shared responsibility, ¶ 190, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), 
http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf (“I]f there are good arguments for 
preventative military action, with good evidence to support them, they should be 
put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to.”); 
Murphy, supra note 35, at 708 (stating that some “hew[] closely to the language of 
Article 51. . . . Neither anticipatory self-defense nor preemptive self-defense can be 
lawful because such forms of self-defense envisage action prior to an armed attack 
actually occurring.”).  
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weapons, per se, does not violate international law, that the U.N. 
Charter permits the use of force only in response to an armed attack, 
and, that the Security Council (including the United States) has 
condemned past acts of preemption against nuclear programs. Within 
this view, force is permitted only if Iran launches a nuclear attack; 
although, some may acknowledge the necessity of preemptive force 
in rare circumstances. Concerned that endorsing any aspect of the 
preemption doctrine would encourage its use, this group would ban 
the first use of force but rely on the international community to judge 
the circumstances of an attack in hindsight, and impose severe or 
minimal sanctions as appropriate.37 
Another group, in the Webster-Ashburton tradition, would 
allow anticipatory force against an enemy who is clearly preparing to 
attack. This view requires evidence that the attack be “imminent,” 
i.e., that the potential target state demonstrates that its adversary is 
making tangible preparations to attack and that the only way to 
prevent the impending attack is to damage or destroy the adversary’s 
capability to launch the attack.38 
Despite the differences in these legal positions, neither 
position would justify an attack on Iran today.39 As the imagined 
Kerry letters suggest, these legal restrictions leave some uneasy, 
including the actual leaders of the United States and Israel. To the 
extent the Obama Administration has discussed the issue publicly, 
official statements have described the potential Iranian threat not as 
“imminent,” but “existential.”40 While “existential” has not been 
                                                 
37 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 310-11, quoted in 
Murphy, supra note 35, at 711.  
38 See Murphy, supra note 35, at 711-15.  
39 See Cristian DeFrancia, Enforcing The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: The 
Legality of Preventative Measures, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 705, 780 (2012) (“The 
concept of an ‘imminent’ attack remains confined in nineteenth century 
conceptions, as articulated in the Caroline case.”). See also Gregory E. Maggs, How 
the United States Might Justify a Preemptive Strike on a Rogue Nation’s Nuclear Weapon 
Development Facilities under the U.N. Charter, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 465, 476-78 (2007) 
(arguing that the Caroline case does not justify an attack on nuclear capabilities).  
40 See Ron Kampeas, Obama Tells U.N.: Nuclear Iran poses existential threat to 
Israel, JTA (Sept. 25, 2012, 3:24 PM), 
http://www.jta.org/news/article/2012/09/25/3107926/obama-nuclear-iran-
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precisely defined in this context,41 it seems intended to capture the 
increased diplomatic leverage a nuclear-armed Iran would enjoy as 
well as the possibility that Iran might feel emboldened to act more 
aggressively, either directly or as a state-sponsor, under cover of a 
nuclear umbrella. 
As unsettling as the proposal of a nuclear-armed Iran may be, 
a hostile state’s possession of nuclear weapons capability has never 
been sufficiently threatening, per se, to prompt a preemptive armed 
attack by an opposing state. Aside from Israel’s strikes on Iraq and 
Syria, which elicited varying degrees of condemnation from the 
international community,42 the closest example is the U.S. blockade 
of Cuba (or “quarantine,” as it was called) during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. These events contrast with decades of restraint by the Soviet 
Union and the United States vis-à-vis each other, as well as other 
mutual adversaries confirmed or believed to have nuclear weapons. 
To date, the Obama Administration has done little to compare or 
distinguish these precedents. 
                                                 
poses-existential-threat-to-israel (quoting President Obama as saying, “Make no 
mistake, a nuclear-armed Iran is not a challenge that can be contained. It would 
threaten the elimination of Israel, the security of Gulf nations and the stability of 
the global economy.”). See also Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against 
Iran, THE IRAN PROJECT 42 (Sept. 13, 2012), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/106806148/IranReport-092412-Final#fullscreen 
(noting that Prime Minister Netanyahu describes a nuclear-capable Iran as an 
“existential threat” and many members of the U.S. Congress and other political 
leaders agree with the Israeli position); Ivo H. Daalder, Beyond Preemption: An 
Overview, in BEYOND PREEMPTION: FORCE AND LEGITIMACY IN A CHANGING 
WORLD 1, 8 (Ivo H. Daalder ed., 2007) (stating “the very possession of weapons of 
mass destruction by some countries can pose an existential threat, whether or not 
their actual use is truly imminent.”).  
41 Israel typically defines “existential” as meaning a threat to Israel as a 
nation-state.  
42 Israel’s attack on the Iraqi facilities at Orisak was widely condemned. 
See supra note 30. But see Andrew Garwood-Gowers, Israel’s Airstrikes on Syria’s Al-
Kibar Facility: A Test Case for the Doctrine of Pre-emptive Self-Defence?, 16 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 263, 290 (2011) (“Israel’s failure to offer any legal justification for its 
airstrike, and the muted international reaction to the Al-Kibar episode, appear to be 
part of a recent trend in state practice indicating a broader lack of concern over the 
legality of relatively minor uses of force.”). 
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To be fair, the timing is not good for the Obama 
Administration to engage in detailed justifications for using force 
against Iran. In addition to the potentially toxic effect such discussion 
might have on ongoing negotiations, it could highlight potential 
differences between the United States and Israel regarding the 
appropriate threshold for using preemptive force, undermining 
whatever deterrent value the current vaguely defined threat may 
provide. In addition, there are undoubtedly military and intelligence 
capability issues the Obama Administration is unwilling to discuss 
publicly. Reticence is understandable, at least for the moment. 
Ultimately, however, if anticipatory self-defense as traditionally 
understood is insufficient to protect against the “existential” Iranian 
threat, the President might reasonably be expected to offer a more 
precise rationale and afford Congress the opportunity to consider the 
issue as well. 
Even if the Iranian crisis abates, questions surrounding the 
use of preemptive force against weapons of mass destruction are 
likely to persist, and any complete analysis will implicate three 
fundamental questions. First, does a state or non-state actor have the 
capability to use a nuclear weapon? Second, does the potential 
nuclear actor have a strong propensity to use the weapon? Third, at 
what point does a potential target state lose its capability to prevent 
the weapon’s use? 
The answers to each of these questions have important 
implications for the use of preemptive force, and traditional Caroline 
analysis has tended to focus predominantly on the first two. If an 
actor has the capability to use force, then the actor’s intent becomes 
critical. In traditional conflict scenarios, knowing an actor’s intent 
may be difficult, but the limited destructive capacity of the actor’s 
capability will often make erring on the side of caution an acceptable 
risk. To a large degree, traditional international law adopts this 
approach.43 However, when the capability portends mass destruction, 
the risk calculation changes and the third factor above becomes 
especially relevant. 
                                                 
43 See Barry E. Carter & Allen S. Weiner, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 931-
1083 (6th ed. 2011).  
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In the contemporary Iranian context, the third question is 
this: given the ultimate difficulty of knowing Iranian intent, at what 
point does Iran’s capability to deliver a weapon of mass destruction 
exceed the United States’ or Israel’s capability to prevent the weapon’s 
use? Given uncertainty about both Iran’s intent and capability, when 
does the United States or Israeli capability-based window of 
prevention close, thereby creating an unacceptable risk given the first 
two uncertainties? 
This question raises a series of subordinate questions. For 
example, will a potential target state know where an attack will 
originate? If yes, will the target state know when the attack will 
originate? If yes, will the target state have sufficient reaction time to 
respond? If yes, will the target state have sufficient capability of its 
own to respond? If the answer to each of these questions is 
confidently and consistently yes, then the justification for a 
preemptive strike is presumably reduced. The potential target state 
can wait, Caroline style, for indications that a real-time attack is about 
to begin and put a stop to it. 
If, however, the answer to any of the questions above is 
something less than a confident and consistent yes, are policymakers 
in the potential target state required to rest and accept the risk that an 
adversary will be able to launch an attack that cannot be stopped? If 
the answer is yes, then the inquiry ends. If, however, the answer is 
no, and we are unwilling to mandate that states (and their inhabitants) 
accept the resulting risk, we must challenge the classic understanding 
of self-defense and revisit Caroline. 
IV. REVISITING CAROLINE 
Revisiting Caroline in the context of Iran’s alleged pursuit of 
nuclear weapons requires another series of questions. If a potential 
target state is not confident in its ability to prevent a possible nuclear 
weapons attack, is it at least confident in its ability to locate and 
destroy a weapon after it has been created but before an attack 
sequence is imminent. If so, then a revised Caroline doctrine might 
justify a preemptive strike on the weapon itself. If, however, the 
potential target state lacks confidence in its ability to destroy the 
weapon in its crib, is the target state able to prevent the weapon from 
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being built by stopping or impeding development of one or more of 
its critical components, i.e., the fissile material, the nuclear trigger, or 
the delivery system? If so, is this the last, best, objective chance to 
ensure a nuclear attack will not occur? Is this where the potential 
nuclear aggressor’s activities are best illuminated and least dangerous? 
If so, should a potential target state be permitted to take action 
before this window of maximum insight and minimal danger closes? 
Asking these questions in the current Iranian context does 
not assume the answers. The United States or Israel may well have 
the ability to prevent Iran’s “imminent” use of a nuclear weapon as 
imminence is understood in the traditional Caroline context. If a 
potential target state has confidence that it can destroy the weapon 
immediately before launch, then the potential target state ought 
arguably to wait for that moment to give transparency or 
disarmament the fullest opportunity. If, however, an earlier 
preemptive attack is the last realistic chance before the preemption 
window closes, should international law deny the right to use 
preemptive force?44 
There are a host of potential responses. Diplomacy may be 
more effective if states do not have a sanctioned “off ramp” to use 
force; states operating in bad faith may manipulate a preemptive 
right;45 and, states operating in good faith may make honest mistakes 
about the other side’s intentions or capabilities. Each of these 
responses is plausible, but none answers the ultimate question: what 
does a nation do, after negotiating unsuccessfully and in good faith, 
to defend itself or an ally against a catastrophic threat its elected 
leaders reasonably and honestly believe may occur? 
In the age of terror and potential mass destruction, the 
answer cannot be to negotiate tirelessly, accept the risk, and hope for 
                                                 
44 Cf. Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran, supra note 40, 
at 42, 8, 29 (concluding that the United States would have at least a month to make 
a military decision once Iran makes a “dash for the bomb” and that a military strike 
would delay Iran’s ability to build a nuclear weapon “for up to four years”).  
45 See 1986: U.S. Launches Air Strikes on Libya, BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/15/newsid_3975000/397
5455.stm (noting that the 1986 Libya incident was an instance of one state 
provoking the threat and then used it to justify the exercise of force).  
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the best. Likewise, the answer cannot be to ignore international law: 
to assume that the United States may impose its will oblivious to 
both the constraints and legitimizing power of international law in 
the 21st century is naïve and dangerous. Ultimately, however, a ban 
on preemptive action—however aspirational and legally pristine—
does not meet the needs of officials charged with protecting actual 
populations.46 International legal theory notwithstanding, an official 
facing a perceived threat that poses an unacceptable risk will act to 
defeat it.47 In light of this reality, is it not preferable to provide criteria 
                                                 
46 See, e.g., President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Address to 
the American People on the Soviet Arms Build-up in Cuba (Oct. 22, 1962), 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/sUVmCh-sB0moLfrBcaHaSg.aspx (“We 
no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a 
sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear 
weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially 
increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may 
well be regarded as a definite threat to peace”). See also Transcript of the Interview 
at the World Economic Forum in Davos, The Clinton Foundation, January 27, 
2005, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SLqEQyyVNzI&t=1658 (quoting 
President Clinton: “Everybody talks about what the Israelis did at Osirak in 1981, 
which, I think, in retrospect, was a really good thing. You know, it kept Saddam 
from developing nuclear power”); THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 13-16 (2002), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf (claiming that the 
President must prevent nations that assist terrorists from possessing nuclear 
weapons). This position was reiterated in: WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2006).  
47 See Daniel Joyner, Jus Ad Bellum In The Age of WMD Proliferation, 40 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 233, 247 (2008) (“[A]t the heart of the current crisis in 
international use of force law is a continuing, and likely increasing gap between the 
provisions of existing law and the perceptions of a significant number of important 
states of realities of the international political issue area that law is meant to 
regulate - a classic gap between law and reality caused by the law simply lagging 
behind the dynamics of technological and geo-political change.”). See also Daniel 
Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 
106 AM. J. INT’L L. 770, 773 (2012) (“There is little intersection between the 
academic debate and the operational realities. . . . The reality of the threats, the 
consequences of inaction, and the challenges of . . . operational decision making in 
the face of such threats frequently trump a doctrinal debate that has yet to produce 
a clear set of principles that effectively address the specific operational 
circumstances faced by states. This situation is unsatisfactory. Particularly in this 
area of law, it is important that principle is sensitive to the practical realities of the 
circumstances that it addresses . . . .”) Sir Daniel Bethlehem QC was the former 
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to guide decision-making before conflict occurs? If conflict does 
occur, is it not preferable to have criteria available to enhance the 
objectivity, and thereby, the credibility of post-hoc accountability 
assessments? To deny the right of preemptive self-defense is to create 
a dangerous vacuum: a legal doctrine so restrictive that nations 
cannot realistically comply creates a category of potential actions that 
are prospectively ungoverned and retrospectively standard-less. 
It is easier to justify a right to preemption in theory than to 
develop a set of workable criteria upon which to measure whether a 
particular use of force is justified. This difficulty, however, should not 
deter continued attempts to perfect preemptive criteria. Sir Daniel 
Bethlehem and Professor Matthew Waxman have made recent, 
substantial efforts in this regard. Bethlehem stresses factors such as: 
. . .(a) the nature and immediacy of the threat, (b) the 
probability of an attack, (c) whether the anticipated 
attack is part of a concerted pattern of continuing 
armed activity, (d) the likely scale of the attack and 
injury, loss, or damage likely to result therefrom in the 
absence of mitigating action, and (e) the likelihood 
that there will be other opportunities to undertake 
effective action in self-defense. . .48  
Professor Waxman notes factors such as the exhaustion of peaceful 
alternatives, the unacceptable risk of losing the opportunity to 
eradicate the threat, the magnitude of the threat, and the consistency 
with the purposes of the U.N. Charter.49 
                                                 
principal legal advisor of the U.K. Foreign & Commonwealth Office from May 
2006 to May 2011; ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 242 (1994) (“[I]n a nuclear age, common sense cannot 
require one to interpret an ambiguous provision in a text in a way that requires a 
state passively to accept its fate before it can defend itself.”); Matthew C. Waxman, 
The Use of Force Against States That Might Have Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 49 (2009) (“The vitality of the law governing precautionary self-defense 
is dependent upon the ability of this law to adapt to contemporary challenges. . . . 
in a manner that decision-makers and security professionals perceive as sensible.”). 
48 See Bethlehem, supra note 47, at 775.  
49 See Waxman, supra note 47, at 28.  
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An obvious place to start, and possibly develop the 
preemption criteria, is with the parties who hold the information 
indispensable for resolving disputes: the state and non-state actors 
who raise suspicions about their capabilities and intentions through 
their failure to cooperate with transparency regimes. Here too, a host 
of objections might be raised. To begin, the NPT allows countries to 
develop nuclear energy and then withdraw to build weapons; does 
not require the big five nations to reduce their nuclear weapons;50 and 
has no mechanisms to enforce and penalize nations for withdrawing 
or violating the treaty. One might add to the list the inherent 
difficulty of a suspected state proving a negative. 
Regardless how one evaluates these particular objections to 
the status quo, the international community must do more to resolve 
the standoff between states who violate international transparency 
standards and states contemplating the use of preemptive force 
against those potentially in possession of weapons of mass 
destruction.51 A party’s violation of rigorously vetted transparency 
norms—whether status quo or progressively developed in the 
future—should be expressly included in the calculation of revised 
Caroline criteria. 
When Daniel Webster and Lord Ashburton were making 
legal history through their exchange of letters, ships were built from 
wood, combatants wore uniforms, and lethality was measured by the 
range of a smooth bore cannon shot. The world has changed. When 
diplomacy fails in the current era—one characterized by terrorism, 
non-state actors, and the potential for mass destruction—nations 
must have legal authority to remove threats before they are fulfilled. 
Preemptive actions must be governed by criteria carefully drawn to 
                                                 
50 Although the NPT does not require reductions of nuclear weapons 
from the big five nation signatories, Article VI encourages them to actively 
consider making such moves. (“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to 
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the 
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on 
general and complete disarmament under strict and effect international control.”).  
51 See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 27, at 498 (“Iran is obligated under 
international law to comply with Council resolutions. By the same token, those 
states concerned with Iran’s nuclear program must also comply with international 
law and its prohibition on the use of force in how they respond to Iran.”). 
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redefine our understanding of Caroline’s “no choice of means, no 
moment for deliberation,”52 in the face of the extraordinary risks 
posed by weapons of mass destruction in the age of terror. 
The development of a set of preemption criteria is difficult 
but essential. To say otherwise means the law remains silent in the 
face of a potentially dangerous actor who would develop, possess, 
and possibly use a massively destructive weapon. Until states like Iran 
are willing to offer more cooperation in demonstrating they are not 
“actual” threats, such states can expect others to consider them 
“existential” threats with the risk that entails for all concerned. 
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THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF 
FORCE FOR ARMS CONTROL: 
THE CASE OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR 
PROGRAM 
Mary Ellen O’Connell and Reyam El Molla*  
In many discussions of Iran’s nuclear program, there seems 
to be an implicit assumption that states have a right to use military 
force to end the program. For example, the Institute for National 
Security Studies,1 an Israeli think tank, in an article titled, The Legality 
of an Attack against Iranian Nuclear Facilities, places emphasis on 
proving the necessity of an attack as a last resort but fails to indicate 
any accepted legal basis for resort to military force as an initial 
matter.2 In fact, international law does not permit the use of military 
force without United Nations Security Council authorization for 
arms control of any kind, whether to end a nuclear program, to end a 
chemical weapons program, or to prevent missile shipments. 
                                                 
* Mary Ellen O’Connell, Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law and 
Research Professor of International Dispute Resolution, University of Notre Dame 
Law School, and Reyam El Molla, LL.M., University of Notre Dame Law School, 
2012, human rights lawyer, Cairo, Egypt. 
1 See INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, 
http://www.inss.org.il (last visited Aug. 29, 2013). 
2 Robbie Sabel, The Legality of an Attack against Iranian Nuclear Facilities, 345 
INSS INSIGHT 1 (2012), 
http://www.inss.org.il.cdn.reblaze.com/upload/(FILE)1339738543.pdf. 
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INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE 
At the very heart of the international legal system is Article 
2(4) of the United Nations Charter.3 Article 2(4) generally prohibits 
the use of military force in international relations. It has only two 
express exceptions in the Charter and one implied exception in 
general international law. Expressly, states may use force under the 
terms of Article 51 in self-defense if an armed attack occurs.4 States 
may also use force if the U.N. Security Council authorizes it.5 Finally, 
some argue that, under customary international law, a state may use 
military force when invited by a government to assist in ending an 
insurgency.6 In 2001, the United States took the position that 
Afghanistan’s Taliban government was legally responsible for actions 
by Al Qaeda so that, under the law of self-defense, the United States 
had the right to use military force in Afghanistan following the 9/11 
attacks. The use of force in self-defense in Afghanistan, however, 
ended in 2002 when a loya jirga of prominent Afghans selected Hamid 
                                                 
3 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 states: “All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.” 
4 U.N. Charter art. 51 states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported 
to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time 
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.” 
5 U.N. Charter art. 39 states: “The Security Council shall determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and 
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” 
Articles 41 and 42 state in part: “The Security Council may decide what measures 
not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its 
decisions . . . .[I]t may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security . . . .”  
6 See Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by 
Invitation of the Government, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 189, 191-92 (1986), 
http://bybil.oxfordjournals.org/content/56/1/189.full.pdf+html. 
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Karzai to be Afghanistan’s leader.7  Since then the U.S. has been 
fighting at the invitation of President Karzai. 
Despite the fact that many in U.S. international security 
circles overlook these legal obligations, they remain the law. In 2005, 
the United Nations Charter provisions on the use of force were 
reconfirmed by all U.N. member states at the World Summit in New 
York. In 2010, states provided another show of support for Article 
2(4) when a definition of the crime of aggression was formally added 
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (I.C.C.).8 In 
adding to the I.C.C.’s jurisdiction, the 122 states party to the Rome 
Statute indirectly confirmed their support for Article 2(4). Any 
serious violation of Article 2(4) is an act of aggression for which a 
national leader could face individual criminal responsibility.9 
Even where a state has a right to use force based on self-
defense, Security Council authorization, or invitation, the state 
resorting to force must also comply with any applicable rules of state 
responsibility,10 as well as the general principles of necessity11 and 
                                                 
7 See Carlotta Gall & James Dao, A Buoyant Karzai Is Sworn In as 
Afghanistan’s Leader, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2002,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/20/world/a-buoyant-karzai-is-sworn-in-as-
afghanistan-s-leader.html. See also Mary Ellen O’Connell, Remarks: The Resort to 
Drones under International Law, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 585, 592 (2011). 
8 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 
I.L.M. 999, 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%202187/v2187.pdf.   
9 See Amendments to the Rome Statute on the International Criminal 
Court, Jun. 11, 2010, C.N.651.2010.TREATIES-8 (Depositary Notification), 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/CN/2010/CN.651.2010-Eng.pdf. See also 
Mary Ellen O’Connell & Mirakmal Niyazmatov, What is Aggression? Comparing the Jus 
Ad Bellum and the ICC Statute, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 189 (2012). 
10 On the law of state responsibility generally, see G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002), 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/56/83&Lang=
E and G.A. Res. 56/49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/49 (Jan. 22, 2002), 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/56/49&Lang=
E. See also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES 
ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES (2002).   
11 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) [hereinafter Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
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proportionality.12 Given these restrictions on the right to resort to 
force, the Israeli scholar Yoram Dinstein is correct when he says, 
“U.N. member states are barred by the Charter from exercising self-
defense in response to a mere threat of force.”13 The possession or 
development of weapons, even weapons of mass destruction, cannot 
be classified as anything more than a threat. 
APPLYING THE RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE TO  
ATTACKING IRAN 
Soon after the adoption of the U.N. Charter, it might have 
been conceivable that the world would classify the possession of 
nuclear weapons as more than a threat. Such possession could have 
been deemed in law to be an armed attack. While conceivable, the 
plain fact is that the world has not concluded that the development 
or possession of nuclear weapons is the equivalent of an armed 
attack. 
Many experts suspect that Iran is intent on developing 
nuclear weapons. Concerns have existed for many years, but were 
heightened in April 2013 when Iran announced that it planned to 
install advanced centrifuges and a production unit at Natanz.14 A 
February 13, 2013 report published by the Wisconsin Project’s Iran 
Watch,15 estimates, on the basis of data supplied by the International 
                                                 
Weapons]. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. 
12 See Nicaragua, supra note 11, at ¶ 176 (noting the requirements under 
customary international law of necessity and proportionality when using self-
defense). See also Georg Nolte, Multipurpose Self-Defence, Proportionality Disoriented: A 
Response to David Kretzmer, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 283 (2013). 
13 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 199, 
para. 525 (5th ed. 2011).  
14 See Yeganeh Torbati & Fredrik Dahl, Iran Announces Uranium Mining 
After Nuclear Talks Fail, REUTERS, Apr. 9, 2013, 
 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/us-iran-nuclear-
idUSBRE93804L20130409. 
15 See Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, About Iran Watch, 
IRAN WATCH, http://www.iranwatch.org/about-us (last visited Aug. 29, 2013) 
(“The Wisconsin Project carries out research and public education designed to stop 
the spread of nuclear weapons, chemical/biological weapons and long-range 
missiles.”). 
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Atomic Energy Agency, that “[b]y using the approximately 9,000 
centrifuges operating at its Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, Iran could 
theoretically produce enough weapon-grade uranium to fuel a single 
nuclear warhead in about 1.5 months.”16 Iran denies that it is 
developing nuclear weapons; it claims to be developing a domestic 
power source.17 With respect to resort to military force, however, 
neither the development nor the possession of nuclear weapons is 
classified as an armed attack sufficient to trigger the right of self-
defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 
In its 1996 advisory opinion, the Legality of the Threat or the Use 
of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice said this about 
the possession of nuclear weapons: 
It does not seem to the Court that the use of nuclear 
weapons can be regarded as specifically prohibited on 
the basis of certain provisions of the Second Hague 
Declaration of 1899, the Regulations annexed to The 
Hague Convention IV of 1907 or the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol. The pattern until now has been for 
weapons of mass destruction to be declared illegal by 
specific instruments. But the Court does not find any 
specific prohibition of recourse to nuclear weapons in 
treaties expressly prohibiting the use of certain 
weapons of mass destruction; and observes that, 
although, in the last two decades, a great many 
negotiations have been conducted regarding nuclear 
weapons, they have not resulted in a treaty of general 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Iran’s Nuclear Timetable, 
IRAN WATCH (May 24, 2013), 
 http://www.iranwatch.org/ourpubs/articles/iranucleartimetable.html. See also Iran 
‘has tripled’ uranium-enriching centrifuges at Natanz plant, RT NEWS (published Apr. 17, 
2013, 19:54), http://rt.com/news/iran-nuclear-centrifuges-natanz-016/.  
17 See Islamic Republic of Iran Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Basic Facts 
About Iran’s Peaceful Nuclear Activities, THE EMBASSY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF 
IRAN IN OSLO, http://iranembassy.no/en/6.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2013) 
(discussing the Report issued by the Iranian Embassy in Oslo regarding the reality 
of Iran’s nuclear program). 
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prohibition of the same kind as for bacteriological 
and chemical weapons.18 
If the Security Council were to authorize the use of force to 
stop Iran’s nuclear program, states using force would not need to 
prove that development or possession of nuclear weapons amounted 
to an armed attack. These states would have to show, however, that 
using force would be a last resort and could succeed in ending Iran’s 
program or possession of weapons.19 The International Court of 
Justice in its 2003 Oil Platforms case, brought by Iran against the 
United States for unlawful attacks, said: 
[I]n order to establish that it was legally justified in 
attacking the Iranian platforms in exercise of the right 
of individual self-defence, the United States has to 
show that attacks had been made upon it for which 
Iran was responsible; and that those attacks were of 
such a nature as to be qualified as “armed attacks” 
within the meaning of that expression in Article 51 of 
the United Nations Charter, and as understood in 
customary law on the use of force. As the Court 
observed in the case concerning Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, it is 
necessary to distinguish “the most grave forms of the 
use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from 
other less grave forms,” since “[i]n the case of 
individual self-defence, the exercise of this right is 
subject to the State concerned having been the victim 
of an armed attack.”20 
Moreover, the states using force would need to show that the 
cost of using force—in terms of persons killed and property 
                                                 
18 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 
49-73 (discussing rules on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of nuclear weapons as 
such).  
19 See Mary Ellen O’Connell & Maria Alevras-Chen, The Ban On the Bomb-
and Bombing: Iran, the U.S., and the International Law of Self-Defense, 57 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 497, 509-13 (2007). 
20 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 51 (Nov. 6) (quoting, in 
part, Nicaragua, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 191, 195). 
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destroyed—did not outweigh the value of the military objective. 
When a state resorts to the use of force, especially in populated areas, 
it should be limited to the minimum force needed to accomplish the 
military objective without the loss of life. 
Israel has used military force on several occasions to control 
weapons developments and shipments. It attacked Iraq in 1981, 
Sudan in 2009, Syria in September 2007 and again in January and May 
2013.21 In the 2007 Syrian case, Israel sent eight fighter jets to bomb a 
factory site. Allegedly, Syria was cooperating with North Korea in the 
construction of a secret weapons production facility. It was only days 
after the bombing that Syria protested. Syria likely did not protest 
sooner because it did not wish to draw attention to its illicit 
activities.22 The situation could be analogized to an unclean hands 
finding—courts will not hear the claims of a plaintiff when the 
plaintiff has committed a wrong of its own in the matter. Despite the 
muted protests, the 2007 incident did not result in any change to the 
binding terms of the U.N. Charter prohibiting the use of force. Other 
attacks by Israel have resulted in greater levels of criticism and 
condemnation. 
In addition to the lack of legal basis to attack a state for arms 
control purposes, any attack on Iran would likely fail to meet the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality. While some speculate 
that attacking Iran could end the nuclear program, plenty of experts 
doubt this outcome and even speculate that attacking Iran will induce 
the Iranians to accelerate the program or divert it from energy 
production to weapons production.23 Moreover, any use of military 
force in Iran will result in widespread death, injury, and destruction.24 
It is well known that the nuclear sites are scattered throughout the 
                                                 
21 See Timeline: Israeli attacks on Syrian targets, AL JAZEERA (last modified 
May 5, 2013, 17:53), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/05/20135512739431489.html.  
22 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Affirming the Ban on Bombing Iran, SYRACUSE 
L. REV. (2012), http://www.law.syr.edu/student-life/publications/law-review/iran-
nuclear-symposium/mary-ellen-oconnell.aspx.  
23 See Attacking or Threatening Iran Makes No Sense (Key Points), AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY PROJECT, http://americanforeignpolicy.org/military-option-
iran/attacking-iran (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).  
24 Id. 
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country and are underground with people living near areas that might 
be affected. Further, attacking Iran in these circumstances would 
result in giving Iran the right to counter-attack. Other states would 
have the legal right to come to its aid in collective self-defense. 
Attacking Iran could result in yet another destructive war in Western 
Asia and the Middle East, even as the Iraq War drags on, and 
instability and violence plague nations in the midst of the transition 
known as the Arab Spring. 
 MEASURES SHORT OF FORCE AGAINST IRAN’S NUCLEAR 
PROGRAM 
What about measures short of the use of armed force such as 
economic sanctions or cyberattacks such as the Stuxnet worm? Such 
measures are prohibited in the first instance under the principle of 
non-intervention but could be permissible if imposed by the U.N. 
Security Council or as countermeasures if the conditions for 
countermeasures are met. 
The United Nations Security Council has imposed sanctions 
on Iran, and these are generally lawful.25 The United States and the 
European Union, however, have more questionable sanctions 
programs in place.26 The United States and Israel have also, 
apparently, used a computer virus to attack Iran, which is difficult to 
justify under international law.27 Stuxnet caused centrifuges in Iran’s 
                                                 
25 See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Imposes 
Sanctions on Iran for Failure to Halt Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously Adopting 
Resolution 1737 (2006), U.N. Press Release SC/8928 (Dec. 23, 2006), 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm. See also Press 
Release, Security Council, Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran, 
Voting 12 in Favour to 2 Against, with 1 Abstention, U.N. Press Release SC/9948 
(June 9, 2010) (adopting Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010)), 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm. 
26 See Reuters, U.S. senators seek to block Iran from billion-dollar reserves, AL 
ARABIYA (last updated May 9, 2013, KSA 09:02–GMT 06:02), 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/economy/2013/05/09/US-senators-
seek-to-block-Iran-from-billion-dollar-reserves.html.  
27 For a good account of the possible involvement of the U.S. and Israel 
in the use of the Stuxnet worm against Iran, see DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT 
AND CONCEAL: OBAMA’S SECRET WARS AND SURPRISING USE OF AMERICAN 
POWER 197-209 (2012). 
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nuclear facilities to turn far more rapidly than appropriate.28 As will 
be discussed below, to be lawful, Stuxnet, like unilateral economic 
sanctions, would have to meet the rules governing countermeasures. 
Both attempts to pressure Iran fall short of those rules. 
Countermeasures are mechanisms allowed under international 
law for states to carry out self-help, coercive enforcement of their 
rights. Self-help plays a larger role in international law enforcement 
given the absence at the international level of both a central police 
force and compulsory judicial body. In the Gabčikovo- Nagymaros 
case,29 the International Court of Justice laid down four elements of a 
lawful countermeasure: 
           In the first place it must be taken in response 
to a previous international wrongful act of another 
State and must be directed against that State. . . . 
           . . . [T]he injured State must have called upon 
the State committing the wrongful act to discontinue 
its wrongful conduct or to make reparation for it. . . . 
           . . . [T]he effects of a countermeasure must be 
commensurate with the injury suffered, taking 
account of the rights in question. . . . 
. . . .  
           . . . [I]ts purpose must be to induce the 
wrongdoing state to comply with its obligations under 
international law, and the measure must therefore be 
reversible.30 
If a state is a victim of an international law violation and it 
has clear and convincing evidence that the wrongful act is attributable 
to a foreign sovereign state, the victim state may itself commit a 
wrong, so long as it is commensurate with the initial wrongful act 
                                                 
28 See id.  See also Mary Ellen O’Connell, Cyber Security Without Cyber War, 
17 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L.187, 194 (2012).  
29 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slov.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).  
30 Id. at ¶¶ 83-87. 
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(proportionality) and the response is aimed at inducing an end to the 
initial wrong (necessity) or the provision of damages. In the Stuxnet 
case, if the United States and Israel released the worm, they are the 
states that committed the wrong, not Iran.31 Therefore, it was an 
unlawful, disproportionate countermeasure because forty percent of 
the computers it affected were not in Iran. Moreover, the worm has 
been reverse-engineered and is now a weapon in the hands of 
criminals.  Finally, the worm could not have been intended to prevent 
the wrongdoing. 
The Security Council has the right to impose sanctions on 
Iran as it has for many years, but the U.S. does not have the right to 
act unilaterally beyond discretionary areas of activity, such as the 
provision of aid. Imposing sanctions on individuals, corporations, or 
states that do not adhere to unilateral U.S. demands violates a variety 
of international legal principles, inter alia, due process, property rights 
of individuals, and the principle of non-intervention in the case of 
interference with sovereign state activities. It is important to draw a 
distinction between Security Council sanctions and unilateral 
sanctions by individual states because the former’s purpose is to 
modify behavior, not punish; whereas, the latter seeks to punish 
states and to compel them to act in a certain manner. A unilateral 
sanction would not only be unlawful, but also inefficient in Iran’s 
case as it will hamper a diplomatic resolution to the situation. The 
U.S. recently targeted companies that are accused of evading 
sanctions imposed on Iran, and according to some reports, imposed 
financial penalties “on an Iranian businessman, a Malaysian bank and 
a network of companies it accused of attempting to evade 
                                                 
31 The one wrong that Iran has committed is failure to comply with 
Security Council resolutions against it. The Security Council has not authorized the 
U.S. and Israel to take measures to respond to that wrong.  The U.S. and Israel 
claim Iran has violated an International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards 
agreement.  Again, even if that is correct, the Security Council is addressing Iran’s 
nuclear activities, meaning the U.S and Israel have no independent right to take 
enforcement action unilaterally. See S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 
31, 2006); S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); S.C. Res. 1747, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1803 
(Mar. 3, 2008); S.C. Res. 1835, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1835 (Sept. 27, 2008); S.C. Res. 
1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010).  
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international sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program through money 
laundering.”32 
Flynt Leverett has assessed U.S. sanctions against Iran, 
concluding: 
I’ve had any number of Iranians, official and 
otherwise, say this to me—that sanctions, in some 
ways, actually help Iran, in that they give the 
government a kind of political cover to take some 
steps toward what you might call economic reform, 
that would be politically difficult otherwise. . . .Iran 
has done more to expand non-oil exports, it is less 
dependent on oil revenues for both its government 
budget and to cover its imports, than any other major 
oil-exporting country in the Middle East. It has done 
far more in that kind of diversification than Saudi 
Arabia or any of the states on the other side of the 
Persian Gulf . . .33 
Obviously, imposing new economic and diplomatic sanctions 
will not stop Iran from continuing its nuclear plans. On the contrary, 
sanctions will only make negotiations more difficult and could make 
Iran more determined not to comply with U.S.-Israeli demands. With 
the election of a new Iranian president in mid-2013, Iran indicated a 
renewed interest in good faith negotiations and greater transparency 
in disclosing information about its nuclear programs.34 
                                                 
32 Timothy Gardner, U.S. targets companies accused of evading Iran sanctions, 
REUTERS, Apr. 11 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/12/us-usa-iran-
sanctions-idUSBRE93A16Z20130412.  
33 Flynt Leverett, The Strategic And Moral Bankruptcy of U.S. Sanctions Policy 
Toward Iran–Flynt Leverett and Trita Parsi on HuffPost Live, GOING TO TEHRAN 
(posted April 16, 2013), http://goingtotehran.com/the-strategic-and-moral-
bankruptcy-of-u-s-sanctions-policy-toward-iran-flynt-leverett-and-trita-parsi-on-
huffpost-live.  
34 Iran’s president-elect calls his election victory a mandate for change, GUARDIAN, 
June 29, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/29/iran-president-
election-victory. 
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Russia takes the same position as Iran. According to the 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, “Moscow believes 
that all rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including its right to 
enrich uranium, should be recognized in exchange for its concessions 
on its nuclear program.”35 Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Sayyid 
Ali Khamenei, said in a statement that the U.S. should recognize 
Iran’s right to uranium enrichment and that it should stop trying to 
force them to suspend it if they want a peaceful solution.36 
In the first months following the election of Iran’s President 
Rouhani, the Obama administration indicated renewed interest in 
achieving a diplomatic solution rather than using military action, 
which is appropriate; however, it does require affirmative steps 
toward negotiations. Iran says that it is also open to negotiations. In a 
statement made by the Head of the Judiciary Ayatollah Sadegh Amoli 
Larijani, he said that “the path for rational negotiations and rational 
nuclear dialogues are open and we hope Western countries come to 
their senses.”37 This may indicate Iran’s willingness to reach a 
peaceful diplomatic solution without the threats from the United 
States. Indeed, while talks held in Kazakhstan in April 2013 seemed 
to yield no positive result,38 the logjam against talks was finally 
opened. Success in achieving the elimination of Syrian chemical 
weapons through peaceful means would be an encouraging example 
of what is possible. 
CONCLUSION 
The rules of the U.N. Charter were designed to maintain 
peace in the post-World War II era. No state may resort to the use of 
                                                 
35 Russia says Iran’s right to enrich uranium should be recognized in a nuclear deal, 
TEHRAN TIMES (Apr. 8, 2013, 15:13),  
http://www.tehrantimes.com/politics/106651-russia-says-irans-right-to-enrich-
uranium-should-be-recognized-in-a-nuclear-deal.  
36 United States Institute of Peace, Khamenei Open to Direct U.S. Talks, THE 
IRAN PRIMER (Mar. 24, 2013, 10:46 PM),  
http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/mar/24/khamenei-open-direct-us-talks.  
37 Iran News Round Up April 10, 2013, IRAN TRACKER (Apr. 10, 2013), 
http://www.irantracker.org/iran-news-round-april-10-2013.  
38 See Iran nuclear talks end without progress, AL JAZEERA, Apr. 6, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/04/2013442165893529.html.  
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force against another state unless it is acting in individual or collective 
self-defense to an actual armed attack or with Security Council 
authorization. In addition, all use of force must be necessary and 
proportionate. Member states of the U.N. have the responsibility to 
honor the core principles of the U.N. Charter, which are to maintain 
international peace and security. Attacking Iran is clearly contrary to 
these obligations. In facing a situation of great concern such as the 
Iranian nuclear program, Article 33 of the U.N. Charter requires that 
states resolve disputes peacefully: 
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which 
is likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional 
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of 
their own choice. 
The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, 
call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such 
means.39 
 
                                                 
39 See U.N. Charter art. 33, paras. 1-2. 
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HOW PRECIPITOUS A DECLINE?: 
U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS AND THE 
TRANSITION FROM AMERICAN 
PRIMACY 
Hillary Mann Leverett* 
The present essay is grounded in two basic propositions.  The 
first is that the greatest strategic challenge facing the United States is 
extricating its foreign policy from a well-worn but deeply 
counterproductive quest for hegemonic dominance in critical areas of 
the world, especially the Middle East. The second is that 
Washington’s handling of its relations with the Islamic Republic of 
Iran constitutes a crucial test of America’s capacity to put its foreign 
policy on a more productive and realistic trajectory. 
On the first proposition, it has been just a little more than 
two decades since the United States came out of the Cold War with a 
multi-faceted supremacy in global affairs like the world had not 
witnessed for centuries, if not millennia. If one compares where 
America was just twenty years ago to where it is today, in terms of its 
ability to achieve its international objectives, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that the United States is a declining power. It is declining, 
in part, because of the emergence of new power centers in key 
regions around the world—China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and even the 
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Islamic Republic of Iran itself.1 It is declining because of an 
economic “triple whammy” of accumulated debt, eroding 
infrastructure, and lagging economic growth.2 In much of the world, 
it is also declining because of the perceived culpability in the United 
States for the global financial crisis of 2007-2009.3 More recently, the 
                                                 
1 For representative discussion from an already vast and burgeoning 
literature, see, for example, MARTIN JACQUES, WHEN CHINA RULES THE WORLD: 
THE END OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND THE BIRTH OF A NEW GLOBAL ORDER 
(2d ed. 2012); ZACHARY KARABELL, SUPERFUSION: HOW CHINA AND AMERICA 
BECAME ONE ECONOMY AND WHY THE WORLD’S PROSPERITY DEPENDS ON IT 
(2009); CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, NO ONE’S WORLD: THE WEST, THE RISING REST, 
AND THE COMING GLOBAL TURN (2012); KISHORE MAHBUBANI, THE NEW ASIAN 
HEMISPHERE: THE IRRESISTIBLE SHIFT OF GLOBAL POWER TO THE EAST (2008); 
Flynt Leverett & Pierre Noël, The New Axis of Oil, NAT’L INT., Summer 2006; 
Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner, & Steven Weber, Report and Retort: A World Without 
the West, NAT’L INT., July-Aug. 2007; Christopher Layne, The Waning of U.S. 
Hegemony—Myth or Reality?: A Review Essay, 34 INT’L SEC. 147, 152-57 (2009); NAT’L 
INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2025: A TRANSFORMED WORLD 
(2008), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2025
_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf; and NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL 
TRENDS 2030: ALTERNATIVE WORLDS 16-20 (2012), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/115962650/Global-Trends-2030-Alternative-Worlds. 
2 The “triple whammy” metaphor is adapted from Stephen Walt, The End 
of the American Era, NAT’L INT., Nov.-Dec. 2011.  See also Flynt Leverett, Black Is the 
New Green, NAT’L INT., Jan-Feb. 2008; DAVID P. CALLEO, FOLLIES OF POWER: 
AMERICA’S UNIPOLAR FANTASY 94-125 (2009); STEPHEN S. COHEN & J. 
BRADFORD DELONG, THE END OF INFLUENCE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN OTHER 
COUNTRIES HAVE THE MONEY (2010); MICHAEL MORAN, THE RECKONING: 
DEBT, DEMOCRACY, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POWER (2012).   
3 On the “soft power” costs to the United States of the global financial 
crisis (from various perspectives), see, for example, the following: Dennis Blair, 
Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment, Testimony to the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Washington, D.C., Feb. 12, 2009, 2-3, 
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/090212/blair.pdf; Christopher Layne, The 
Unbearable Lightness of Soft Power, in SOFT POWER AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: 
THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 51, 65-66 
(Inderjeet Parmar & Michael Cox, eds., 2010); Susan Aaronson, Financial Crisis 
Hurts U.S. Soft Power, POL’Y INNOVATIONS (Oct. 29, 2008), 
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/commentary/data/000090; Peter Beinart, 
How the Financial Crisis Has Undermined U.S. Power, TIME, June 21, 2010, 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1995884,00.html; and 
U.S.’s soft power is under challenge, XINHUA, Oct. 20, 2008, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-10/20/content_10224257.htm.  
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United States’ continuing inability to address its fiscal challenges, 
either in the short- or long-term, prompted China’s Xinhua news 
agency to editorialize about the need to start “building a de-
americanized world.4 
But on top of these factors, American standing and influence 
in world affairs is declining because of the failure of American 
political and policy elites, especially since the end of the Cold War, to 
define clear, reality-based goals and to relate the diplomatic, 
economic, and military means at Washington’s disposal to realizing 
them soberly and efficaciously.5 In the wake of the Cold War, 
American policymakers in Democratic and Republican 
administrations have ignored a key lesson that foreign policy realism, 
balance of power theory, and an even minimally sensitive reading of 
international history all teach: while global dominance and hegemony 
seem nice in theory, in the real world they are unattainable; not even 
a state as powerful as the United States coming out of the Cold War 
can achieve them. Moreover, pursuing hegemony actually ends up 
making a state weaker, by dissipating resources and sparking 
resistance from others.6 
In the post-Cold War period, the counterproductive 
consequences of America’s hegemonic strategy have been especially 
acute in the Middle East. As Flynt Leverett and I note in our book, 
Going to Tehran, the temptations of empire have lured great powers 
before the United States into what the historian Paul Kennedy 
                                                 
4 U.S. fiscal failure warrants a de-Americanized world, XINHUA, Oct. 13, 2013,  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-10/13/c_132794246.htm]   
5 This is the animating theme of Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, 
The Balance of Power, Public Goods, and the Lost Art of Grand Strategy: American Policy 
toward the Persian Gulf and Rising Asia in the 21st Century, 1 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L 
AFF. 202 (2012).   
6 See also ANDREW BACEVICH, THE LIMITS OF POWER: THE END OF 
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM (2008); CALLEO, supra note 2, at 1-38; STEPHEN M. 
WALT, TAMING AMERICAN POWER: THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO U.S. PRIMACY 1-
178 (2005); John Mearsheimer, Structural Realism, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
THEORIES: DISCIPLINE AND DIVERSITY (Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, & Steve Smith 
eds., 2006); John Mearsheimer, Imperial By Design, NAT’L INT., Jan.-Feb. 2011.   
 2013 Mann Leverett 2:2 
331 
famously called “imperial overstretch.”7 But America’s post-Cold 
War imperial turn in the Middle East has arguably set a new record 
for the largest amount of influence and wealth squandered by a great 
power in the shortest period of time.8 
An ill-considered posture toward the Islamic Republic has 
contributed mightily to Washington’s current strategic predicament in 
the Middle East. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, America’s Iran 
policy has emphasized three main elements, all grounded in hostility: 
first, diplomatic isolation; second, economic pressure, largely through 
sanctions; and third, barely veiled support for regime change in 
Tehran. This approach has manifestly failed, even on its own terms.9 
Today, as Flynt Leverett notes in his contribution to this symposium, 
the United States is a power in relative decline in the region.  In 
contrast, the Islamic Republic, is a rising power.10 As we will see, 
continued U.S. hostility toward Iran only courts further and even 
more precipitous decline in America’s standing and influence in this 
vital part of the world. 
America’s dysfunctional Iran policy also threatens the long-
term sustainability of U.S. influence—or, as American policymakers 
prefer to say, “leadership”—on the global level. Three issues illustrate 
this dynamic. First, Washington regularly claims that it is the Islamic 
Republic which endangers the free flow of hydrocarbons from the 
Persian Gulf to international markets. Today, however,  it is 
America’s efforts to compel Tehran to surrender its developments of 
indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capabilities by imposing more and more 
sanctions on the Islamic Republic and through the continuing threat 
of U.S.-initiated (or Israeli-initiated and U.S.-supported) military 
action against it—not Iranian behavior—that are the leading threats 
                                                 
7 PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: 
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1987).   
8 FLYNT LEVERETT & HILLARY MANN LEVERETT, GOING TO TEHRAN: 
WHY THE UNITED STATES MUST COME TO TERMS WITH THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
OF IRAN 4 (2013).   
9 Id. at 279-82.   
10 Flynt Leverett, The Iranian Nuclear Issue, the End of the American Century, 
and the Future of International Order, 2 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 240 (2013).   
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to the security of Persian Gulf hydrocarbon flows.11  For China and 
other rising powers dependent on the free flow of Persian Gulf 
energy supplies to international markets, this raises real questions 
about America’s claim to provide the global public good of 
international energy security by ensuring the physical security of 
those supplies.12 
Second, the expansion of Iran-related secondary sanctions to 
cover not only investment in Iranian hydrocarbon production but 
also simple purchases of Iranian crude oil and most non-energy-
related transactions with Iran is incentivizing China and other rising 
powers to develop alternatives to established, U.S.-dominated 
mechanisms for conducting, financing, and settling international 
transactions.13 This, too, has potentially profound, negative 
implications for America’s international economic leadership. 
Third, as Flynt Leverett notes in his contribution to this 
volume, the larger part of the international community—120 of the 
U.N.’s 193 member states that are part of the Non-Aligned 
Movement—are already on record in support of Iran’s right to 
pursue safeguarded enrichment.14 The ongoing efforts of American 
administrations unilaterally to rewrite the NPT where Iran is 
                                                 
11 Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, America’s Iran Policy and the 
Undermining of International Order, WORLD FIN. REV., July-Aug. 2013, at 38, 
http://law.psu.edu/_file/TWFR%20Jul-Aug%202013America%20Iran-v2.pdf.   
12 Discussions with Chinese academics, analysts, and officials, Beijing, 
China, June 2011, June 2012, and July 2013. See also JOHN GARVER, FLYNT 
LEVERETT, & HILLARY MANN LEVERETT, MOVING (SLIGHTLY) CLOSER TO IRAN: 
CHINA’S SHIFTING CALCULUS FOR MANAGING ITS “PERSIAN GULF DILEMMA” 3-
17 (2009), http://legacy2.sais-
jhu.edu/centers/reischauer/moving_slightly_closer.pdf. 
13 Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 5 at 229-30. See also Leverett & 
Mann Leverett, supra note 11, at 40-42; Neelam Deo & Akshay Mathur, Guest post: 
BRICS ‘Hostage’ to west over Iran sanctions, need financial institutions, FIN. TIMES BLOG 
(June 27, 2012, 11:05 AM), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/06/27/guest-
post-brics-hostage-to-west-over-iran-sanctions-need-their-own-financial-
institutions/#axzz2ZsLPgSNs.   
14 Jason Ditz, Non-Aligned Movement Unanimously Backs Iran’s Civilian 
Nuclear Program, ANTIWAR.COM (Aug. 31, 2012), 
http://news.antiwar.com/2012/08/31/non-aligned-movement-unanimously-
backs-irans-civilian-nuclear-program/; Leverett, supra note 10.   
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concerned is extremely troubling to Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and 
other rising powers in the Global South, further undermining the 
perceived legitimacy of American international “leadership” and 
feeding a growing unwillingness in much of the world to tolerate 
such hegemonic assertions by the United States. 
On the second of my two basic propositions, Flynt Leverett 
and I lay out in Going to Tehran what is at stake for the United States 
in its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Just as Washington’s 
dysfunctional approach toward the Islamic Republic is a crucial 
element in America’s strategic decline, in the Middle East and 
globally, America’s capacity to recast its policy toward Iran will be 
critical to its strategic recovery. In the Middle East, the United 
States—for its own interests and on classic balance-of-power 
grounds—needs to pursue strategic rapprochement with the Islamic 
Republic. On a global level, too, putting America on a more positive 
and productive strategic trajectory requires a thoroughgoing revision 
of its Iran policy. 
But, as the U.S.-Iranian competition for influence over the 
Middle East’s regional order intensifies, Washington’s approach to 
Tehran has grown ever less receptive to serious, strategically-
grounded engagement and ever more oriented toward coercive 
options, including the militarized prevention of Iranian nuclearization 
and the assertive rollback of Iranian influence. These options raise 
the risk of another U.S.-initiated war in this vital region. Moreover, 
by pursuing them, the United States condemns itself to a future as an 
increasingly flailing, and failing, superpower—and as an obstacle to, 
rather than a facilitator of, a rules-based international order.15 
I. THE PERILS OF DEMONIZATION 
Washington’s antipathy toward the Islamic Republic is 
grounded in unattractive, but fundamental, aspects of American 
strategic culture. They include: difficulty accepting independent 
power centers; hostility to non-liberal states, unless they subordinate 
their foreign policies to U.S. preferences (as Egypt did under Sadat 
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and Mubarak); and an unreflective but deeply rooted sense that U.S.-
backed norms, rules, and transnational decision-making processes are 
meant to constrain others, not the United States itself.16 
These features of American strategic culture are both 
conditioned and reinforced by the hegemonic thrust of American 
foreign policy. In the Middle East, America’s imperial turn has 
prompted it to demonize would-be challengers to its primacy there. 
One of the more significant manifestations of this practice has been 
Washington’s persistent refusal to understand and accept the basic 
model underlying Iran’s postrevolutionary order—the integration of 
participatory politics and elections with principles and institutions of 
Islamic governance and a strong commitment to foreign policy 
independence. 
This refusal has real consequences for America’s Iran debate. 
Instead of recognizing the dysfunctionality of their country’s Iran 
policy and correcting course, American political, policy, and media 
elites have preferred, and continue to prefer, looking to “regime 
change”—whether “hard” or “soft”—in Tehran to solve America’s 
Iran problem. To justify such a posture, these elites go on depicting 
the Islamic Republic as an illegitimate system so despised by its own 
population as to be in imminent danger of overthrow. American 
elites have been doing this for more than thirty years, virtually since 
the Islamic Republic’s founding out of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. 
And for more than thirty years, the Islamic Republic has consistently 
defied their relentless predictions of its collapse or defeat.17 
The Islamic Republic has survived because its basic model 
(participatory Islamic governance and foreign policy independence) 
is—according to polls, electoral participation rates, and other 
indicators—what a majority of Iranians living inside their country 
want. They do not want a political order grounded in Western-style 
secular liberalism. They want an indigenously-generated political 
order reflecting their cultural and religious values—as the reformist 
                                                 
16 Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, Consequences of western 
intransigence in nuclear diplomacy with Iran, AL JAZEERA, May 10, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/05/2013589151459212.html.   
17 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 8, at 142-46.   
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President Mohammad Khatami wrote, “freedom, independence, and 
progress within the context of both religiosity and national 
identity.”18 
This was the vision of Grand Ayatollah Seyed Ruhollah 
Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s founding father. It is embodied in 
the Islamic Republic’s constitution; it is what the Islamic Republic, 
with all its flaws, offers Iranians the chance to pursue, on their own 
terms.  Even most of those Iranians who want the Islamic Republic 
to evolve in significant ways still want it to be, at the end of the day, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran.19 Impressive developmental outcomes 
since the revolution reinforce Iranians’ sense of the Islamic Republic 
as a genuinely national project that is theirs to build and own. Under 
the Islamic Republic, Iran has diversified its economy to a greater 
extent than any other major oil-exporting country in the Middle East. 
This means, among other things, that Iran today is less dependent on 
oil revenues to cover both its government budget and its imports 
than Saudi Arabia or any of the smaller Gulf Arab monarchies on the 
other side of the Persian Gulf.20 Contrary to deeply rooted but ill-
informed Western stereotypes, the Islamic Republic has achieved far 
more progressive outcomes in alleviating poverty, delivering health 
care, providing educational access, and (yes) expanding opportunities 
for women than the Shah’s regime ever did.21 
Notwithstanding the Islamic Republic’s staying power, 
foreign policy pundits who, in many cases, have no direct connection 
to on-the-ground reality inside Iran continue telling us that the 
system is on the verge of collapse. This message is reiterated by 
America’s so-called Iran “experts,” many of whom are Iranian 
expatriates or Iranian-Americans whose families fled the Revolution 
                                                 
18 The quote is from “Letter for Tomorrow,” an open letter published by 
Khatami in May 2004.  
19 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 8, at 177-87. 
20 See, for example, the data presented in Mehran Kamrava, The Political 
Economy of Rentierism in the Persian Gulf, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 
PERSIAN GULF 39, 42-47 (Mehran Kamrava, ed., 2012), showing that Iran now 
covers 50-60 percent of its imports with non-oil exports. 
21 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 8, at 187-94.   
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and want to see the Islamic Republic overthrown, perhaps even 
violently overthrown.22 
A good example of this came in 2009, when, in a collective 
act of analysis-by-wishful-thinking, American elites widely anticipated 
a victory by former Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi over 
incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in that year’s Iranian 
presidential election.23 Many Western analysts and commentators saw 
a Mousavi victory as the key to solving America’s strategic problems 
in the Middle East. Some—including senior Obama administration 
officials—even posited what they called an “Obama effect,” through 
which the United States would be able to effect “soft” regime change 
in Iran, achieved much more effectively than through the heavy-
handed and overly militarized approach applied by neoconservatives 
in Iraq.24 
When, in June 2009, Ahmadinejad won re-election in the 
Islamic Republic’s presidential contest, American analysts and elites 
almost universally condemned the outcome as a fraud.25 They did so 
even though every methodologically sound poll conducted in Iran 
before and after the election—including polls conducted by Western 
polling groups (14 polls in all)—showed that Ahmadinejad’s re-
election with roughly two-thirds of the vote (which is what the 
official results show that he got) was eminently plausible.26 And 
                                                 
22 See id. at 285-326, for a discussion of this point.   
23 Id. at 228-31, 232-38. 
24 See, e.g., Athena Jones, Obama Administration Has Eye on Iran, MSNBC, 
June 12, 2009; Howard LaFranchi, Wildcard in Iran Election: Obama, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (June 11, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-
Policy/2009/0611/p06s28-usfp.html; Paul Brandeis Raushenbush, The Obama Effect 
in Iran and Lebanon - Role Model Instead of Straw Man, HUFFINGTON POST, June 8, 
2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-raushenbush/the-obama-effect-in-
iran_b_212399.html; Michael Slackman, Hopeful Signs for U.S. in Lebanon Vote, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 8, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/world/middleeast/09lebanon.html?_r=0; 
Simon Tisdall, Lebanon Feels the Obama Effect, GUARDIAN, June 8, 2009, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/jun/08/lebanon-elections-
obama-effect.  
25 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 8, at 231-32.   
26 Id. at 238-43.  On Iranian public opinion in connection with the 
Islamic Republic’s 2009 presidential election, see also Ben Katcher, LIVE 
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American elites embraced a narrative of election fraud even though 
neither Mousavi nor anyone else ever presented any evidence of how 
the election was stolen.27 This never-demonstrated but fervently-
espoused narrative also conditioned American and Western elites’ 
romanticization of the Green Movement, widely portrayed in the 
West as a mass popular uprising poised to sweep away the Islamic 
Republic, perhaps within just a few months. But it was evident to 
anyone prepared to look soberly at reality that, even at its height, the 
Green Movement did not represent anything close to a majority of 
Iranians and that, within a week of the June 2009 election, the 
movement’s social base was already contracting.28 
                                                 
STREAM: What Does the Iranian Public Really Think?, RACE FOR IRAN (Feb. 3, 2010), 
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And yet the myth of the Islamic Republic’s illegitimacy and 
instability did not die as a result of the Green movement’s failure. 
Indeed, it got a new lease on life in early 2011, when the Arab 
Awakening began. Through the pro-Green lens that continues to 
shape most Western commentary on Iranian politics, it seemed 
inevitable that the waves of popular discontent breaking across the 
Arab world would soon engulf the Iranian government. Most of the 
pundits who had jumped on the regime-change bandwagon in 2009 
hopped back on for another ride. 
On February 20, 2011, billionaire financier George Soros, 
appearing on CNN’s GPS with Fareed Zakaria, offered a bet that 
“the Iranian regime will not be there in a year’s time.”29  Two days 
later, in Foreign Policy, Flynt Leverett and I took Soros up on his 
wager.30 We even bet that not only would the Islamic Republic still be 
Iran’s government in a year’s time but that the balance of influence 
and power in the Middle East would be tilted even further in its 
favor. More than two years have elapsed since Soros made his wager; 
we are eager to collect on it. 
Today the myth of the Islamic Republic’s illegitimacy and 
fragility comes in two interlocking versions: one, that sanctions are 
now finally “working” to undermine the Islamic Republic’s basic 
stability; and two, that the Arab Awakening has left the Islamic 
Republic isolated in its own neighborhood. 
On sanctions, Flynt Leverett and I made our most recent visit 
to Iran in October 2013. No one who has walked the streets of 
Tehran recently, as we did, seen that Iran’s economy is not 
collapsing, and talked with a range of Iranians living in Iran could 
possibly think that sanctions are “working” in a way that will compel 
either the Islamic Republic’s implosion or its surrender to American 
demands on the nuclear issue. There is no constituency—among 
conservatives, reformists, or even what is left of the Green 
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30 Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, Obama Is Helping Iran, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 23, 2011),  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/23/obama_is_helping_iran.   
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Movement—prepared to accept such an outcome. Those arguing to 
the contrary have never explained why Iran’s economy is so much 
worse that it was in the 1980s, when the Islamic Republic lost half its 
GDP while defending itself in its eight-year war with Iraq—and yet, 
even then, its population did not rise up to force fundamental change 
or concessions to hostile powers. 
Indeed, there is no precedent anywhere for a sanctioned 
population mobilizing to overthrow its government and replace it 
with one that would adopt the policies preferred by the sanctioning 
foreign power.31 In the Iranian case, moreover, the Islamic Republic 
has over years demonstrated its capacity to adapt dynamically to 
sanctions, in ways that do not just stave off collapse but, in some 
instances, actually benefit its economy.32 
                                                 
31 Even in Iraq, where severe sanctions were imposed for over a decade, 
killing more than one million Iraqis (half of them children), the population did not 
rise up to overthrow Saddam Hussein.  In the end, Saddam was displaced only by a 
U.S. invasion—and, even after that, Iraqis did not set up a pro-American, secular, 
liberal government ready to subordinate Iraq’s sovereignty and national rights to 
Washington’s preferences.  For critical discussion of Western commentators’ 
exaggerated claims about sanctions’ impact on popular attitudes and official 
decision-making in the Islamic Republic, see Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann 
Leverett, Time to Face the Truth About Iran, THE NATION, Feb. 25, 2013, 
http://www.agenceglobal.com/index.php?show=article&Tid=2965, MIDDLE EAST 
ONLINE, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=56911; Sune Engel 
Rasmussen, Tight Times in the Grand Bazaar, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/16/sanctions_iran_daily_life; 
Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Understanding the Rial’s Freefall, LOBE LOG FOREIGN POL’Y 
(Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.lobelog.com/understanding-the-rials-freefall/; and 
Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Is Iranian Hyperinflation a Mirage?, AL-MONITOR (Jan. 23, 
201), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/01/hyperinflation-iran-
manti-teo.html.   
32 See, e.g., LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 8, at 281 
(discussing how sanctions can encourage greater self-sufficiency in Iran, citing how, 
in response to the 2010 enactment of U.S. secondary sanctions targeting gasoline 
exports to Iran, the Islamic Republic accelerated the expansion of its refining 
capacity to a point that, in 2011, it became a net exporter of gasoline, with 
Afghanistan as one of its biggest customers); Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 
30 (discussing how the realignment of the rial’s nominal value with its real value has 
boosted Iran’s non-oil exports); William Yong & Alireza Hajihosseini, Understanding 
Iran Under Sanctions, OXFORD ENERGY COMMENT FROM THE OXFORD INSTITUTE 
FOR ENERGY STUDIES (Jan. 2013), http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
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Recently, some commentators have claimed that Hassan 
Rohani’s victory in the Islamic Republic’s 2013 presidential election 
proves U.S.-instigated sanctions are finally “working” by fueling 
popular discontent with nuclear policies that have prompted 
escalating international pressure. Such discontent supposedly drove 
Iranians to elect a candidate inclined to cut concessionary deals with 
the West. This “analysis,” badly misreads Rohani’s views on the 
nuclear issue.33 Furthermore, a close examination of the 2013 
presidential election—including, once again, analyses of high-quality 
polling data from methodologically-sound surveys—demonstrates 
that, in fact, it was not sanctions but a functioning political system 
that worked to produce Rohani’s election.34 
On the Arab Awakening, the same pundits who say that 
sanctions are working advise Americans and others to embrace the 
logic-defying proposition that the same political and social currents 
that deposed pro-American leaders in Tunisia and Egypt and are 
empowering Islamists in countries across the Arab world will, in Iran, 
somehow transform the Islamic Republic into a secular liberal state. 
This is truly analysis-by-wishful-thinking. In Tehran, policymakers 
and analysts see the Arab Awakening as hugely positive for the 
Islamic Republic’s regional position. They judge—correctly, in my 
view— that any Arab government which becomes more 
representative of its people’s beliefs, concerns, and preferences will, 
virtually by definition, become less enthusiastic about strategic 
                                                 
content/uploads/2013/01/Understanding-Iran-Under-Sanctions-Oil-and-the-
National-Budget.pdf.   
33 See Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, How Washington Should 
Engage Iran’s New President, HUFFINGTON POST, June 17, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/flynt-and-hillary-mann-leverett/iran-new-
president_b_3456007.html; Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, What Rouhani’s 
Election Should Mean For Washington, THE HINDU, June 18, 2013, 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/what-rouhanis-election-should-mean-
for-washington/article4823926.ece. 
34 Flynt Leverett, Hillary Mann Leverett, & Seyed Mohammad Marandi, 
Op-Ed., Rouhani won the Iranian election.  Get over it, AL JAZEERA, June 16, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/201361681527394374.html.   
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cooperation with the United States, let alone Israel, and more open to 
the Islamic Republic’s message of foreign policy independence.35 
More particularly, over the last two and a half years 
Washington commentators have regularly intoned that, because of 
the Arab Awakening, Tehran is going to “lose Syria,” its “only Arab 
ally,” with “dire consequences” for Iran’s regional position and 
internal stability. These observations underscore how deeply 
American elites are in denial about basic political and strategic trends 
in the Middle East. They highlight how slow American elites have 
been to grasp that, today, the Islamic Republic’s most important Arab 
ally is not Syria, but post-Saddam Iraq the first Arab-led Shi’a state in 
history, an outcome made possible by the U.S. invasion and 
occupation. Besides this, Tehran’s assessment that Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad will not be overthrown—at least not by Syrians—has 
proven, against Washington pundits’ confidently dismissive critiques, 
correct.36 
Looking ahead, any plausibly representative government in 
Syria will not be more pro-American or pro-Israel than the Assads 
have been. That is why Tehran has strongly endorsed negotiations 
between the Assad government and oppositionists aimed at a 
political settlement; it is oppositionists and their external backers 
(including the United States) that refuse to deal with Assad. The 
Islamic Republic strenuously resists the Assad government’s 
replacement by a Taliban-like political structure. But it is external 
support for opposition forces, in which foreign jihadis play an 
increasingly prominent role, that generates this risk—a risk that, 
perversely, also threatens the security interests of the United States, 
which has foolishly called for Assad’s removal.  Iranian decision-
makers—and their allies in Lebanese Hizballah—judge that they are 
on the right side of history in resisting efforts to use Syrian 
                                                 
35 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 8, at 97. 
36 On this point, see also Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 30.   
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oppositionists to shift the regional balance so as to prop up 
America’s declining strategic position.37 
II. THE IMPERATIVE OF U.S.-IRANIAN RAPPROCHEMENT 
What all of this constant “getting Iran wrong” reflects is a 
delusion that the United States is still basically in control of the 
strategic situation in the Middle East. In this delusion, sanctions are 
inflicting ever-rising hardship on Iran’s economy. Either Tehran will 
surrender to U.S. demands that it stop enriching uranium, or the 
Iranian public will rise up and transform the Islamic Republic into a 
pro-Western liberal state. And if neither of those things happens, 
then at some point, the American military will destroy Iranian nuclear 
installations. 
This is a truly dangerous delusion, grounded in persistent 
American illusions about Middle Eastern reality. If, under current 
conditions in the region, the United States launches another war to 
disarm yet another Middle Eastern country of weapons of mass 
destruction it does not have—even as Washington stays quiet about 
Israel’s nuclear arsenal—the blowback against American interests will 
be disastrous. It will make the extraordinary damage done to 
America’s strategic position by the Iraq War look almost trivial by 
comparison.38 But this is where our current strategy—negotiating on 
terms that could not possibly interest Iranian leaders while escalating 
covert operations, cyber-attacks, and economic warfare against the 
Islamic Republic—leads. 
A preventive attack against Iranian nuclear facilities by the 
United States would be, as Flynt Leverett and Mary Ellen O’Connell 
argue in their contributions to this symposium, utterly devoid of 
                                                 
37 For further discussion, see Hal intahat julat Qusayr wa tudā’yāthā [Has the 
Qusayr round ended and what are its implications?] (Interview with Flynt Leverett), 
MIN AD-DAKHIL (Al-Mayadeen), July 7, 2013,  
http://www.almayadeen.net/ar/Programs/Episode/dmqS2FYuUkeiDqH3AP3_4
w/2013-07-07-له-تهت نا-ة لوج-ري ص ق لا-و-اه تاي عاد ت.   
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international legitimacy.39 There will be no United Nations Security 
Council resolution authorizing such action; growing Russian and 
Chinese disaffection with the thrust of American Middle East policy 
and distrust of America’s long-term intentions in the region preclude 
this.40  The Non-Aligned Movement is already on record that it 
would consider an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities illegal; the United 
States would have no allies for the purpose, save Israel and—
perhaps—the United Kingdom.41 
The use of force against the Islamic Republic to destroy non-
existent nuclear weapons would ratify America’s image, in the Middle 
East and beyond, as an outlaw superpower. This prospect is even 
more dangerous to America’s strategic position today than it was 
after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
Just a few years ago, the United States was effectively still an 
unchallenged superpower. The views of publics—or even many 
elites—in most other countries did not matter much to American 
decision-makers; especially in the Middle East, Washington could 
usually impose its requirements on compliant governments whose 
foreign policies were largely unreflective of their own peoples’ 
opinions.  Today, as more Middle Eastern publics seek both a larger 
voice in political processes and greater independence for their 
nations, their views on regional and international issues matter much 
more. The utter rejection, internationally and in the United States, of 
President Obama’s publicly announced intention to attack Syrian 
government targets earlier this year raises a serious question 
whether—after strategically failed military interventions in 
                                                 
39 Leverett, supra note 10; Mary Ellen O’Connell and Reyam El Molla, 
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Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya—America can still even credibly 
threaten the effective use of force in the Middle East.42 
In this context, Washington needs better relations with 
Tehran to save what is left of the U.S. position in the Middle East. At 
this point in the evolution of the Middle Eastern balance of power, 
the United States cannot achieve any of its high-priority goals in the 
region absent a realignment of relations with Tehran. Iran is a critical 
player for shaping the future not only of Iraq and Afghanistan, but 
Syria as well. America needs Iranian help to contain the rising tide of 
jihadi terrorism and, more generally, Sunni-instigated sectarian 
agitation and violence in the region—phenomena fueled by Saudi 
Arabia and Washington’s other ostensible Arab allies in the Persian 
Gulf. More broadly, U.S. foreign policy must adapt itself to and 
accommodate the rising demand for participatory Islamist 
governance in the Middle East. Coming to terms with the Islamic 
Republic is an essential step in such a process. 
On a global level, too, rapprochement with Iran is vital to 
America’s long-term strategic recovery.  U.S.-Iranian realignment is 
necessary to ensure the future adequacy and security of hydrocarbon 
flows from the Persian Gulf to international energy markets—
something that will continue to be a high-order economic and foreign 
policy interest for the United States, regardless of how far the shale 
revolution ends up pushing it toward a (strategically artificial) 
                                                 
42 This was an important theme in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 
New York Times Op-Ed in September 2013, in which he wrote, “It is alarming that 
military intervention in internal conflicts in foreign countries has become 
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an analogy between Iraq and Syria, and ask why their government would want to 
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standard of “energy independence.”43 Furthermore, there are huge 
prospective costs that will accrue to America’s interests and strategic 
standing, globally as well as in the Middle East, from continued U.S. 
hostility toward Iran.44 
More than ever before, American interests require 
rapprochement with the Islamic Republic. Flynt Leverett and I argue 
that, for its own interests, the United States must therefore take a 
fundamentally different approach in its Iran policy—an approach 
captured in the title of our book (Going to Tehran) and in its subtitle 
(Com[ing] to Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran). America needs to 
come to terms with the Islamic Republic—not as a favor to Iran, but 
to save its own strategic position and avert the catastrophe of another 
U.S.-initiated Middle Eastern war, with all that would flow from such 
a conflict. Coming to terms with the Islamic Republic means 
accepting it as a legitimate political order representing legitimate 
national interests—and as a rising regional power unwilling to 
subordinate its foreign policy to Washington. No American president 
since the Iranian Revolution—not even Barack Hussein Obama—has 
been prepared to do this.  But it is a key argument in our book that 
this is not just the only basis on which diplomacy with Iran can 
succeed—it is the only way for the United States to forestall strategic 
implosion.45 
III.  THE CHINA MODEL 
There is an important precedent in recent American history 
for this kind of strategically-grounded, genuinely transformational 
diplomacy. Accepting a rising regional power as a legitimate entity 
pursuing its interests in a fundamentally rational and defensive way is 
                                                 
43 On this point, see also Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 5, at 210-
11. 
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how President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger enabled the 
historic opening to China in the early 1970s.46 
Nixon and Kissinger’s achievement was not to “talk” to 
Beijing; Washington had been doing that for years in ambassadorial-
level discussions in Geneva and Warsaw. As Kissinger himself has 
noted, the United States and the People’s Republic held one hundred 
and thirty-six iterations of these talks, over sixteen years, before the 
Nixon-Kissinger opening. They were narrow in scope, focused 
overwhelmingly on grievance, and, as Kissinger describes it, served 
only to institutionalize stalemate.47 Nixon and Kissinger’s 
achievement was not to talk to Beijing. Rather, it was to accept—and 
to persuade Americans to accept—the People’s Republic as, in 
Nixon’s words, “[a nation] pursuing [its] own interests as it 
perceive[s] these interests, just as we follow our own interests as we 
see them.”48 
Nixon came to office with a deep understanding that the 
United States needed to realign relations with the People’s Republic.  
For twenty years, from the time of the Chinese Revolution, the 
United States had worked to isolate and undermine the People’s 
Republic of China.  Washington did not just pursue a “regime 
change” policy toward the People’s Republic; it recognized a whole 
other political structure based on Taiwan as the “real” government of 
China.49  The results of these policies were terrible for the United 
States and its strategic standing.  Trying not to “contain” but to 
suppress and undermine China ended up undermining the U.S. 
position in Asia, and got America into the draining quagmire of 
Vietnam. 
                                                 
46 Id. at 369-87 (providing a comprehensive discussion that draws lessons 
from the experience of Sino-American rapprochement for U.S. diplomacy with the 
Islamic Republic of Iran).   
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In this challenging context, Nixon saw that rapprochement 
with the People’s Republic was a strategic imperative for the United 
States.  Suggestions that Nixon’s outreach to Beijing was motivated 
primarily by an interest in “triangulating” with China against the 
Soviet Union define his vision—and, ultimately, his achievement—
too narrowly.50  On a tactical level, extricating America from Vietnam 
figured far more prominently in Nixon’s diplomatic calculations vis-à-
vis China.51 On a strategic level, Nixon apprehended that realigning 
Sino-American relations would, as Kissinger later put it, allow 
Washington “to regain the diplomatic initiative while the war in 
Vietnam was still in progress.”52 
To be sure, realigning relations with the People’s Republic 
meant that the United States would have to give up its failed quest 
for hegemony in Asia.  This quest, though, had already proven 
grossly counterproductive for American interests, in Asia and 
globally, while the strategic benefits of an opening to China would, in 
Nixon’s judgment, be enormous.  At a time when the People’s 
Republic was a rising regional power, but far removed in many 
respects from the status of global economic powerhouse it holds 
today, Nixon understood that, as Kissinger later wrote, “excluding a 
country of the magnitude of China from America’s diplomatic option 
meant that America was operating internationally with one hand tied 
behind its back.”53 In the end, their initiative to realign relations with 
China saved America’s position in Asia after the tragedy-cum-strategic 
stupidity of Vietnam and restored Washington’s global leadership. 
Nixon did not just grasp the need for U.S. rapprochement 
with China; he also recognized that achieving it would require two 
fundamental changes in Washington’s posture toward Beijing. First, 
                                                 
50 KISSINGER, ON CHINA, supra note 47, at 213-15; HENRY KISSINGER, 
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he realized that it was incumbent on the United States, as the 
stronger party with a record of stubborn hostility toward the People’s 
Republic, to demonstrate its bona fides proactively to Chinese leaders. 
So, upon taking office, Nixon directed the CIA to stand down from 
its longstanding covert operations programs in Tibet and ordered the 
U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet to stop what Beijing considered aggressive 
patrolling in the Taiwan Strait.54 Nixon did these things so that the 
Chinese leadership would know his diplomatic outreach  was serious. 
Second, Nixon astutely assessed that the incremental, step-by-
step diplomacy being intermittently pursued in ambassadorial 
channels would never achieve a real breakthrough. On the basis of 
this assessment, he took what Kissinger called the “extraordinary” 
decision “to put aside all the issues which constituted the existing 
Sino-American dialogue,” (where “each side stressed its grievances,”) 
and to instead concentrate “on the broader issue of China’s attitude 
toward dialogue with the United States.”55 When Nixon did this, 
Chinese leaders knew they had a serious partner, prepared to accept 
the People’s Republic, and responded accordingly. Two and a half 
years later, this approach bore rich fruit with the announcement of 
the Shanghai Communiqué in February 1972.56 
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Republic. See also U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, supra note 48, at 140-42; 
KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY, supra note 47, at 723-24; KISSINGER, ON CHINA, supra 
note 47, at 210-20.  
55 KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY, supra note 47, at 722. 
56 Joint Statement Following Discussions with Leaders of the People’s Republic of 
China (Feb. 27, 1972) IN FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969-
1976, Vol. 17, CHINA, 1969-1976, doc. 203, 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d203. 
 2013 Mann Leverett 2:2 
349 
IV. GOING TO TEHRAN 
Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei and the four Iranian 
presidents elected over the course of Khamenei’s 24-year tenure as 
the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader have all said repeatedly that 
Tehran is open to better relations with America—but only on the 
basis of mutual respect, equality, and American acceptance of Iran’s 
post-revolutionary political order. These terms are strikingly similar 
to those that China’s communist leaders specified for Sino-American 
rapprochement. The core argument of Going to Tehran is that, today, 
America must engage Iran on precisely this basis and realign its 
relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran as thoroughly as Nixon 
and Kissinger realigned U.S. relations with the People’s Republic of 
China in the early 1970s.57 
What would it mean, in practical terms, for Washington to 
accept the Islamic Republic and realign relations with it in this way, 
particularly with reference to the nuclear issue?  On the nuclear issue, 
it would mean accepting Iran’s right to safeguarded enrichment of 
uranium.  Insisting on “zero enrichment”—or even open-ended 
“suspension—only ensures that negotiations will fail. American 
recognition of Iran’s nuclear rights is a key to diplomatic success. In 
return for such recognition, the Islamic Republic would ratify and 
implement the Additional Protocol to the NPT and agree to other 
more intrusive verification and notification requirements. These steps 
would give the IAEA as robust a level of access to Iranian nuclear 
facilities, similar to the access it enjoys to comparable facilities 
anywhere in the world. Once the terms of the deal were finalized, the 
United Nations Security Council would lift the multilateral sanctions 
it has imposed on Iran over its nuclear activities, and Washington 
would roll back its Iran-related unilateral and secondary sanctions.58 
Additionally, America and its international partners should 
lock in a deal on the nuclear issue through expanded nuclear 
cooperation with the Islamic Republic.  Very senior Iranian officials 
                                                 
57 For further discussion of Sino-American rapprochement in the 1970s 
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have said repeatedly, including in conversations with Flynt Leverett 
and me, that countries concerned about aspects of Iran’s nuclear 
program should send scientists and technicians to work 
collaboratively on those activities with Iranian counterparts. Tehran 
has said for years that Iran would be open to associating its nuclear 
program with multilateral nuclear consortia (including for the 
production of nuclear fuel) and other joint venture arrangements. 
The United States and its partners should take up these expressions 
of openness to international nuclear cooperation.59 
Accepting Iran’s right to enrich is important not only as the 
key to a diplomatic solution on the nuclear issue.  t also implies 
acknowledgement of the Islamic Republic as a legitimate and 
enduring political order representing legitimate national interests. 
Thus, resolving the nuclear issue can and should be used as the basis 
for a more comprehensive realignment of relations between 
Washington and Tehran. As part of a broader process of U.S.-Iranian 
rapprochement, the United States should invite the Islamic Republic 
into regional negotiations about post-conflict stabilization in 
Afghanistan and about a prospective political settlement in Syria. 
America’s strategic recovery in the Middle East will necessarily 
include a reinvention of the “Middle East peace process;” in this 
vein, Washington should also engage Tehran on the daunting array of 
issues gathered under the heading “the Arab-Israeli conflict.”60 
Achieving this sort of comprehensive, “Nixon-to-China” 
rapprochement with the Islamic Republic of Iran is the biggest 
strategic challenge facing the United States today. 
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60 For more detailed discussion, see id. at 393-95.  
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THE COST OF FEAR: AN ANALYSIS OF 
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION, 
COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION, AND 
CIVIL COMMITMENT LAWS IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
Kate Hynes* 
INTRODUCTION 
“Stranger danger” has become a common phrase in the 
United States and the United Kingdom.1 The term has been used as 
an educational tool to protect children from danger, especially from 
sexually based crimes.2 In both countries, highly publicized sex 
crimes have maintained public focus on the evil nature of sexual 
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1 See National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, 
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crimes and led to reactionary legislation.3 The two countries have 
taken different approaches in dealing with the public outcry. 
One method of dealing with sex offenders is “keeping a close 
eye on them.” In the United States, the general public has access to 
personal information about sex offenders by federal mandate.4 Yet, 
worldwide, the public availability of sex offender information is not a 
widely accepted premise.5 The vast majority of countries that have 
created sex offender registries do not allow public access to the 
records.6 Like many countries that maintain sex offender registries, 
the United Kingdom restricts open access to registry information.7 
A second method of controlling sex offenders is keeping 
them confined beyond their prison sentence. Civil commitment is the 
involuntary commitment of a mentally-ill individual for an indefinite 
period of time.8 Both the United States and the United Kingdom 
practice civil commitment, but only the United States has passed 
specific civil commitment legislation for sex offenders.9 
Sex offender laws in the United States are detrimental to both 
the general public and to the offenders themselves. In contrast, the 
                                                 
3 See Meghann J. Dugan, Megan’s Law or Sarah’s Law? A Comparative 
Analysis of Public Notification Statutes in the United States and England, 23 LOY. L.A. 
INTL. & COMP. L. REV. 617, 633 (2001) (noting the high profile murder and sexual 
assault of eight year old Sarah Payne in the United Kingdom); MEGAN NICOLE 
KANKA FOUNDATION, 
 http://www.megannicolekankafoundation.org/mission.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 
2012) (describing the rape and murder of seven year old Megan Kanka in New 
Jersey); Benjamin Radford, Predator Panic: Reality Check on Sex Offenders, LIVE 
SCIENCE (May 16, 2006), http://www.livescience.com/776-predator-panic-reality-
check-sex-offenders.html (explaining that media focus on inaccurate information 
regarding sex offenders creates a false perception that sex offenders pose a real and 
present threat at all times).  
4 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16914(West 2006). 
5 See David Crary, Human Rights Watch Report Criticizes State, Federal Sex-
Offender Laws, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 12. 2007), 
http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=7482413. 
6 See id. 
7 See Dugan, supra note 3, at 617.   
8 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (9th ed. 2009). 
9 See generally 42 U.S.C.S. § 16911 (LexisNexis 2006); The Mental Health 
Act, 1893, c. 4, § 63 (U.K.). 
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United Kingdom’s trend toward protecting the rights of sexual 
offenders in both case law and legislation is a more appropriate and 
effective way to handle sex offenders. In Part I, this Comment will 
outline the diverging trends in the right to privacy for sex offenders 
that has developed in the United Kingdom and the United States.10 
Part II offers evidence to disprove many common misconceptions 
regarding sex offenders and the economic consequences of these 
perceptions.11 Parts III and IV discuss sex offender laws in the 
United States and the United Kingdom and the dramatic impact that 
public opinion has had on such legislation.12 In Part V, the comment 
will explore judicial authority regarding issues of sex offender 
registration, community notification, and civil commitment.13 Finally, 
Parts VI and VII will analyze the effectiveness of current sex 
offender laws in both countries and provide recommendations for 
the future.14 
I. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The United States Constitution does not explicitly reference a 
right to privacy,15 but the Supreme Court has recognized privacy as a 
fundamental right in certain contexts.16 The Supreme Court has 
established that the right to privacy is a “penumbra” which is derived 
from other, more explicit Constitutional protections.17 Courts have 
also established that a sex offender’s privacy rights remain secondary 
to maintaining public safety.18 In the United States, when a right is 
considered fundamental the government must provide compelling 
reasons to infringe on the right and must use means that are 
“narrowly tailored” to achieve its goal.19 The Supreme Court has 
                                                 
10 See infra Part I. 
11 See infra Part II.A, B. 
12 See infra Part III, IV.  
13 See infra Part V. 
14 See infra Part VI, VII. 
15 See generally U.S. CONST.  
16 See Lee Goldman, The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 84 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 601, 605 (2006).  
17 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).   
18 See Kimberly B. Wilkins, Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Laws: Will These Laws Survive?, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1245, 1254-55 (2003). 
19 Goldman, supra note 16, at 602.  
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protected individual decisions in some areas like family life, marriage, 
and the upbringing of children under the right to privacy.20 
Instead of a written Constitution the United Kingdom relies 
on several governing treaties.21 Like the United States, the United 
Kingdom’s privacy rights are not unequivocally articulated in these 
governing documents. In 1998, the United Kingdom adopted the 
European Convention on Human Rights [hereinafter “ECHR”] into 
law through the Human Rights Act of 1998, making it binding law in 
the United Kingdom.22 Article 8 of the ECHR contains a privacy 
provision: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence.”23 Paralleling the trends 
in the United States, Article 8 restricts the right to privacy in the 
interest of public safety.24 
II. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF SEX OFFENDER 
LEGISLATION 
A. Social Implications 
The surge of sex offender legislation in the United States and 
the United Kingdom mirrors the public’s fear and opinion toward sex 
offenders.25 Studies in each country have shown that the general 
population’s perceptions of sex offenders are often skewed.26 The 
                                                 
20 See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 944 (2004).  
21 Bradley P. Jacob, Back to Basics: Constitutional Meaning and “Tradition,” 39 
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 261, 271 (2007). 
22 See An Introduction to Child Protection Legislation in the UK, NSPCC (Oct. 
25, 2011), 
http://www.nspcc.org.uk/inform/research/questions/child_protection_legislation
_in_the_uk_wda48946.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).  
23 R and Thompson v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
[2010] UKSC 17, [2011] 1 A.C. 331, 339 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
24 See id.  
25 See Brittany Enniss, Quickly Assuaging Public Fear: How the Well-Intended 
Adam Walsh Act Led to Unintended Consequences, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 697, 699 (2008). 
26 See generally Karen Gelb, Recidivism of Sex Offenders, SENT’G ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE (2011), 
http://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/sites/sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/files/
recidivism_of_sex_offenders_research_paper.pdf. 
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public tends to view strict sex offender laws as necessary to protect 
the most vulnerable people in the population, children.27 Moreover, 
individuals tend to see these laws as legitimate, because they perceive 
sex offenders as having high recidivism rates.28 These perceptions 
often fall far from reality. Studies have indicated that sex offenders 
have among the lowest recidivism rates when compared to all 
criminals.29 Additionally, some of the most dangerous sexual crimes, 
those involving rape and murder, account for less than three percent 
of sexual offenses perpetrated in the United States.30 
The perception that many sex crimes against children are the 
result of strangers prowling around playgrounds is also a 
misconception.31 In reality, ninety-three percent of sex offenders who 
perpetrate crimes against children know their victims.32 Children are 
much more likely to be abused by someone they know and trust, than 
from an unknown individual holding out candy from a dark sedan.33 
The perpetuated fear of “stranger danger” might actually be giving 
parents an unwarranted feeling of safety around the people with 
whom their children are most familiar. 
B. Economic Implications 
Penal systems in the United States create large budgetary 
concerns for both the federal government and the states.34 Experts 
indicate that prison systems are the second fastest growing 
                                                 
27 See Jill S. Levenson, Public Perceptions About Sex Offenders and Community 
Protection Policies, 7 ANALYSES OF SOC. ISSUES AND PUB. POL. 1, 17 (2007).  
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See Robert E. Freeman-Longo, Revisiting Megan’s Law and Sex Offender 
Registration: Prevention or Problem, AM. PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOC. (2001), 4  
http://www.appa-net.org/eweb/docs/appa/pubs/RML.pdf.  
31 See Levenson, supra note 27, at 17.  
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
34 See Carrie Johnson, Budget Crisis Forces a New Approach to Prisons, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Feb. 15, 2011), 
 http://www.npr.org/2011/02/15/133760412/budget-crunch-forces-a-new-
approach-to-prisons (the cost to maintain the prison system in the United States is 
$50 billion annually). 
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expenditure in state budgets.35 Administering additional sex offender 
programs after the inmate is released from incarceration inevitably 
adds to the already overinflated penal system budget.36 
Large registration systems can be nearly impossible for law 
enforcement to effectively monitor.37 One police captain in Georgia 
noted that he needed four police officers working full time just to 
monitor the sex offender database in one county.38 As the number of 
sex offenders on a registry increases, it becomes more difficult for 
both police and civilians to distinguish between dangerous sexual 
offenders and non-violent offenders.39 
Sex offender registration and community notification also has 
an economic effect on the community where a sex offender resides.40 
One study showed that home prices deflate by approximately nine 
percent if a sex offender lives within one tenth of a mile of the 
property.41 The perception of safety is a considerable factor for many 
homebuyers.42 
Civil commitment also carries an enormous financial burden. 
The Washington Institute for Public Policy determined that the cost 
of operating facilities to hold sex offenders in 2004 was $224 million 
                                                 
35 See id. 
36 Maggie Clark, States Struggle with National Sex Offender Law, STATELINE 
(Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=622764. 
37 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No Easy Answers Sex Offender Laws in the 
US (Sept. 12, 2007),   
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/09/11/no-easy-answers-0. 
38 See Stephanie Chen, After Prison, Few Places for Sex Offenders to Live, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2009), at A16 (explaining that law enforcement are among the 
most vocal critics of rigid sex offender legislation). 
39 See Sex Laws Unjust and Ineffective, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 2009, at 31. 
(describing an incident of oral sex that caused a sixteen year old girl to become a 
registered sex offender).  
40 See Press Release, Longwood University, Research by Longwood Business 
Professor Examines Sex Offenders’ Effect on Home Sales (Aug. 06, 2009), 
http://www.longwood.edu/2010releases_26711.htm.  
41 See id. 
42 See id. 
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annually.43 In New York, the average cost to hold a sex offender in a 
facility in 2010 was $175,000.44 
III. SEX OFFENDER LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 A.  Federal Legislation 
In the United States, public fear and outrage have been 
effective motivators in passing broad legislation regarding sex 
offenders.45 In 1994, Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes 
against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 
which required every state to maintain a sex offender registry.46 The 
Act was named in honor of an eleven-year old boy who was 
kidnapped near his home by an unidentified male and is still missing 
today.47 The statute provided that sex offenders had to register with 
the police, but lacked a public notification provision.48 
 In 2006, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act (“Walsh Act”), which expanded on the prior federal 
                                                 
43 See Involuntary Commitment of Sex. Violent Predators: Comparing State Laws, 
WASH. INST. FOR PUB. POL. (Mar. 2005), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/05-
03-1101.pdf (civil commitment of sex offenders differs drastically from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction, some states have a very large range of offenders who qualify for 
commitment). 
44 See Rosemary Black, Treatment for a Sexual Predator Costs a Whopping 
$175,000 Per Person Per Year in New York: Study, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 22, 2010, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/treatment-sexual-predator-costs-
whopping-175-000-person-year-new-york-study-article-1.181482.  
45 See Public Opinion and the Criminal Justice System: Building Support for Sex 
offender Management Programs, CENTER FOR SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT (2000), 
http://heartland.org/policy-documents/public-opinion-and-criminal-justice-
system-building-support-sex-offender-management. 
46 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(West 2006). 
47 See id. 
48 Alisha Powell, A Systematic Review of Surveys on Public Attitudes 
Toward Community Notification for Sex Offenders, University of Alabama 
(2010)(unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Alabama) (on file with the University 
of Alabama Library System)(Under the Jacob Wetterling Crimes against Children 
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act a sex offender is anyone who is 
convicted of a sex crime, but sexual offences are not limited to crimes that involve 
the act of sex).  
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sex offender legislation.49 The statute’s purpose is to “protect the 
public from sex offenders and offenders against children” by 
establishing a comprehensive national system for the registration of 
sex offenders.50 Under the Walsh Act, a sex offender is required to 
provide his/her name, social security number, address, place of 
employment, and license plate number.51 The statute indicates that 
this information, as provided by the offender, will be accessible to the 
public.52 
In addition, the Walsh Act provides guidance to the states on 
structuring state sex offender legislation.53 The Walsh Act mandates 
that the Federal Attorney General promulgate guidance and 
regulations for structuring state-specific sex offender databases.54 The 
Attorney General’s guidelines explicitly state that the Walsh Act 
establishes the minimum applicable standard for sex offender 
registration.55 As a result, states have the authority to create 
registration requirements that are more comprehensive than the 
federal legislation.56 
One example of the direction that the Walsh Act provides to 
states is the length of time a sex offender will remain on the registry.57 
The length of the registration requirement is dependent on the 
classification of the sex offender.58 The Walsh Act sets out the 
maximum registration for Tier I offenders as fifteen years, Tier II 
offenders as twenty-five years, and Tier III offenders can be required 
to register for life.59 Under the Walsh Act, Tier III offences are those 
punishable by more than one year in prison and require at least one 
of the following: a) aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse; b) 
                                                 
49 See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901 (West 2006). 
50 Id.  
51 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16914(West 2006). 
52 See id. § 16918. 
53 See id. § 16914. 
54 See id. § 16912. 
55 See The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification, 72 Fed. Reg. 30212 (May 30, 2007). 
56 See id. 
57 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16915 (West 2006). 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
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abusive sexual conduct with a minor under the age of thirteen; c) 
kidnapping of a minor; or d) that the offense be committed after the 
offender becomes a Tier II offender.60 
Tier II offenses are also punishable by more than one year in 
prison and include one of the following: a) sex trafficking; b) 
coercion and enticement; c) transportation with intent to commit 
sexual activity; or d) committing an offence after becoming a Tier I 
offender.61 Each of the previous offences must incorporate either 
sexual activity with a minor, soliciting a minor for prostitution, or the 
creation or circulation of child pornography.62 
Tier I offenses include all sexual offenses not included in Tier 
II and Tier III, which can include both felonies and misdemeanors.63 
The all-encompassing nature of Tier I offenses shows that an 
extensive number of crimes can land an individual on the sex 
offender registry. 
The overly-broad guidance provided by the Walsh Act has 
significant consequences.64 Many state laws show that a relatively 
mild offense can cause an individual to become part of the sex 
offender registry.65 To illustrate, thirteen states have incorporated 
public urination into their list of sexual offenses; and twenty-nine 
states include consensual sex between teenagers.66 
 B. State Specific Legislation: A Study of Two States 
Currently, under the Adam Walsh Act, every state has 
developed a sex offender registry and community notification 
scheme.67 States have taken different approaches in enacting sex 
offender legislation and managing sex offenders. The legislation of 
                                                 
60 See id. § 16911. 
61 See id. 
62 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16911 (West 2006). 
63 See Lori McPherson, Practitioner’s Guide to the Adam Walsh Act, AM. 
PROSECUTORS RES. INST., 2007, at 1. 
64 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
67 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16912(West 2006). 
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two states, Vermont and Alabama, highlights the enormous amount 
of discretion provided by the Walsh Act.68 
Vermont’s Community Notification of Sexual Offenders 
Statute [hereinafter “Vermont Notification Statute”] does not 
automatically publicize a convicted sex offender’s information.69 The 
statute requires sex offenders to provide the information suggested 
by the federal guidelines in the Walsh Act: name; general physical 
description; sentence; address; place of employment; nature of the 
offense; and compliance with treatment recommendations.70 Instead 
of making all sex offender information available to the public, the 
Vermont Notification Statute permits courts to determine whether an 
individual is a “sexually violent predator.”71 If the court determines a 
sex offender to be a sexually violent predator by clear and convincing 
evidence, the offender will be placed on the sex offender registry for 
life and be subject to community notification.72 An individual who is 
adjudged not to be a sexually violent predator will not be subject to 
community notification.73 
Alabama’s sex offender legislation has taken a different path. 
In 2011, the Alabama House of Representatives unanimously voted 
to make the State’s sex offender laws stricter through the Alabama 
Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act 
[hereinafter “Alabama Sex Offender Act”].74 The statute requires all 
offenders who have been convicted of a sex offense to join the 
registry and be subject to public notification of their status.75 Unlike 
Vermont’s law, Alabama’s statute does not distinguish between levels 
of crimes for purposes of public notification.76 The statute’s 
definition of a sexual offense broadly encompasses many crimes, 
                                                 
68 See generally Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5402 (2009); AL ST § 15-20A-3.   
69 See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5405 (2009).  
70 See id. § 5411. 
71 See id.  
72 See id. 
73 See id. 
74 See House Passes Stronger Sex Offender Bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 25, 
2011, at A12. 
75 See AL ST § 15-20A-3. 
76 See id. § 15-20A-5. 
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ranging from very serious crimes like sexual torture to comparatively 
minor crimes like indecent exposure.77 
The Alabama Sex Offender Act further imposes substantial 
burdens on registered sex offenders for the duration of the 
registration.78 For example, sex offenders are required to verify their 
registration in person every three months.79 This obligation will be 
enforced indefinitely in cases where the particular sex offense 
requires lifetime registration.80 Homeless sex offenders bear the even 
greater burden of being required to report in person to local law 
enforcement every seven days to verify their registration.81 If an 
individual does not comply with the verification procedures, he or 
she may be subject to felony charges.82 
One of the most striking aspects of the Alabama Sex 
Offender Act is the electronic monitoring system.83 The statute 
compels individuals who were either guilty of a Class A felony or 
deemed to be a sexually violent predator to comply with electronic 
monitoring procedures for at least ten years.84 The monitoring system 
produces reports, upon request, of a particular sex offender, to 
determine if he or she was near a crime scene, left an identified area, 
or violated curfew requirements.85 
 C.  The Diverging State Trends under the Walsh Act 
The significant contrast in legislation promulgated in 
Alabama and Vermont shows the immense discretion provided to 
states by the Walsh Act.86 Furthermore, the approaches illustrate two 
major issues that sex offender legislation addresses: public safety and 
the human rights of sex offenders. Ideally, such legislation will 
                                                 
77 See id. 
78 See id. § 15-20A-10.  
79 See id. 
80 See AL ST § 15-20A-10. 
81 See id. § 15-20A-12. 
82 See id.  
83 See id. § 15-20A-20. 
84 See id. 
85 See AL ST § 15-20A-20. 
86 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 16914(West 2006). 
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balance both issues without allowing fear to tip the scales against 
preserving sex offender rights. 
One positive aspect of the Vermont Notification Statute is 
that it considers public safety while also acknowledging the rights of 
convicted sex offenders.87 An official within the Vermont 
Department of Justice explained that reducing the number of sex 
offenders subject to community notification serves two purposes.88 
First, it aids the community in recognizing the offenders that pose a 
significant threat; and second, it helps sex offenders reintegrate into 
society.89 
The first purpose indicated by the Vermont Department of 
Justice addresses the safety concerns that have been a driving force in 
the creation of sex offender registration laws throughout the United 
States. An individual’s ability to determine the potential danger posed 
by an offender can be reduced when a registry has a mixture of 
violent offenders and non-violent offenders. Vermont’s legislation 
assists with this concern by providing public access to the offenders 
who potentially pose the largest threat to society. 
The second purpose, reintegration, is focused on the rights of 
sex offenders rather than public safety. Vermont’s legislation aids 
reintegration into the community because it allows sex offenders, 
who have committed a non-violent offense, to remain anonymous. 
This anonymity arguably does not have a detrimental effect on public 
safety because the police still have access to all sex offender 
information.90 
In contrast, the Alabama Sex Offender Act infringes 
significantly on the lives of sex offenders living in the state,91 and 
thereby demonstrates the problem with the massive amount of 
discretionary power provided by the Walsh Act.92 The Walsh Act 
lacks provisions regarding reporting requirements and electronic 
                                                 
87 See generally Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 (2009). 
88 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37.  
89 See id. 
90 See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5411 (2009). 
91 See generally AL ST § 15-20A-3. 
92 See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 16901(West 2006). 
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monitoring.93 The Alabama Sex Offender Act states that the purpose 
of the legislation is public safety, but it fails to provide evidence to 
show that electronic monitoring or rigid reporting requirements aid 
the goal of public safety.94 As a result, the State’s ability to implement 
strict reporting requirements and monitor a private citizen’s 
movements at all times is a strong curtailment of sex offender’s 
privacy without proper justification. 
 D.  The Effectiveness of Current Sex Offender Laws 
 1.  The Effectiveness of Notification Laws 
Several studies have been conducted on the effectiveness of 
registration and community notification laws. One study examined 
the effect of notification laws on deterrence by examining data from 
fifteen states over a period of ten years.95 The study concluded that 
an average-sized sex offender registry reduces crime by thirteen 
percent, with the reduction in crime increasing with the size of the 
registry.96 A second study found that public notification laws increase 
recidivism rates of offenders.97 The study hypothesized that once sex-
offender information becomes public the psychological, social, and 
financial costs of the information make a crime-free lifestyle less 
desirable for the offender.98 
A comprehensive analysis of sex offenders in New Jersey 
determined that the state’s largest decline in sexual offenses occurred 
before the passage of registration and notification laws.99 Further, the 
                                                 
93 See generally id. 
94 See generally AL ST § 15-20A-2 (2006). 
95 See J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?, 1 J.L. ECON 54, 15 (2008).  
96 See id. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. 
99 See Kristen Zgoba & Karen Bachar, Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification: Limited Effects in New Jersey, NAT’L INST. JUST. (2009), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225402.pdf.  
 2013 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2:2 
364 
study concluded that notification laws had no effect in reducing the 
number of sexual offenses or the number of victims.100 
 2.  The Effectiveness of Civil Commitment 
Currently, there have been no studies conducted to determine 
the effectiveness of civil commitment in reducing recidivism.101 One 
state attempted to reduce the number of offenders held in civil 
commitment facilities by relaxing the standards for discharge.102 
None of the offenders released committed a new sexual offense.103 
Yet, subsequent media scrutiny caused the legislature to backtrack by 
strengthening its release standards once again.104 
IV. UNITED KINGDOM SEX OFFENDER LEGISLATION 
The United Kingdom first adopted sex offender registration 
with the Sex Offender Act of 1997 (“1997 Act”).105 Although the 
1997 Act requires sex offenders to provide certain information upon 
release, it does not require as much information as the United States’ 
legislation.106 Additionally, the 1997 Act does not allow public access 
to sex offender data.107 In fact, European courts have consistently 
held that sex offender registration data is not to be made public 
domain.108 The Sexual Offences Act of 2003 replaced the 1997 Act, 
with more definitive language.109 
                                                 
100 See id. 
101 See Hollida Wakefield, The Vilification of Sex Offenders: Do Laws Targeting 
Sex Offenders Increase Recidivism and Sexual Violence?, 1 J. OF SEXUAL OFFENDER CIV. 
COMMITMENT: SCI. AND THE L. 141, 147 (2006).  
102 See id.  
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
105 See Sex Offences Act, 1997, c. 51 (U.K.); Sexual Offenses Act, 2003, c. 
42 (U.K.)(the United Kingdom adopted the Sexual Offences Act of 2003 which 
replaced the Sex Offender Act of 1997 without significantly altering the sex 
offender registration requirements from the original act). 
106 See id. 
107 See Dugan, supra note 3, at 631. 
108 See id.  
109 See  Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42 (U.K.).  
 2013 Comment 2:2 
365 
Similar to the United States, a highly publicized crime 
involving a child created political pressure in the United Kingdom to 
ensure public safety.110 However, the United Kingdom refused to 
create a system of absolute public notification as the United States 
implemented.111 Rather, in 2000, the United Kingdom added the 
Child Sex Offender Disclosure Scheme (“Sarah’s Law”), which 
allowed victims and their families to be informed about specific 
perpetrators.112 The newest version of Sarah’s Law, adopted in 2009, 
is even more permissive, allowing parents to request the sex offender 
status of an individual who has regular, unsupervised contact with 
their children.113 The provision applies only if the sex offender was 
incarcerated in excess of one year.114 
Even though Sarah’s Law does not allow the general public to 
access sex offender information, there is an obvious potential for an 
individual’s sex offender status to spread throughout a community.115 
The new law also has the attendant risk of causing sex offenders to 
resist compliance with registration requirements.116 The widespread 
dissemination of sex offender information is supported by the large 
number of people requesting sex offender records. Statistics 
                                                 
110 See id. at 617. 
111 See Autumn Long, Sex Offender Laws of the United Kingdom and the United 
States: Flawed Systems and Needed Reforms, 18 TRANSNAT'L. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
145, 159 (2009).  
112 See id. 
113 See Press Release, Home Office, National Rollout of Scheme to 
Protect Children (Aug 6, 2010), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-
centre/press-releases/national-rollout-scheme-protect (official government 
statement explaining that Sarah’s Law will help  protect children from sexual 
offences by allowing parents to access the information about potentially dangerous 
individuals).  
114 See Long, supra note 111, at 159. 
115 See Stephen Wright, Sarah’s Law to go Nationwide: Finally, Parents Win 
Access to Police Intelligence on ‘Suspects’ in Contact with their Children, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 
25, 2010), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1245680/Sarahs-Law-
allowing-parents-carry-sex-offender-checks-rolled-out.html.  
116 See Daniel Chadwick, Sarah’s Law, INSIDE TIME (May 2007), 
http://www.insidetime.org/articleview.asp?a=24.  
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regarding a pilot version of Sarah’s Law indicated that one in fifteen 
people requested information about potential sex offenders.117 
Restrictions on public notification in the United Kingdom 
may be further eroded with the government’s proposal of Clare’s 
Law.118 This new law would provide a mechanism for individuals to 
inquire about an intimate partner’s history of domestic violence.119 
Currently, it is unclear whether the government plans to model the 
law after Sarah’s Law.120 
A. The Proper Balance between Sex Offender Rights and Public 
Safety 
The United Kingdom’s method of sex offender registration 
and community notification is a more reasonable approach. Like the 
United States, the United Kingdom’s legislature had to deal with the 
public fear emanating from a high profile crime.121 Rather than 
succumbing to public sentiment, the adoption of the 1997 Act 
demonstrated dedication to protecting the public while still 
maintaining the privacy of sex offenders. The legislation remains 
focused on public safety because sex offender records are provided 
to the police. Sex offender information should lie solely in the hands 
of police for two reasons. First, when citizens are given access to 
public information there is always the possibility of vigilantism. 
Second, the responsibility of monitoring dangerous situations should 
be left to officials who are trained to deal with offenders rather than 
defenseless citizens. 
                                                 
117 See Mark Hughes, Sarah’s Law to be Rolled Out Nationally, THE 
INDEPENDENT, Mar. 3, 2010, at 16 (the pilot program of Sarah’s law was originally 
initiated in four cities).  
118 See Press Release, HOME OFFICE, Consultation of ‘Clare’s Law’ 
Launched (Oct. 25, 2011), available at 
 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/consultation-on-clares-law-launched. 
119 See id. 
120 See Lucy Reed, Why Clare’s Law Won’t Prevent Domestic Violence, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jul. 22, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2011/jul/22/why-
clares-law-wont-prevent-domestic-violence.  
121 See supra note 3, at 617.  
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Unfortunately, the United Kingdom appears to be veering 
away from its original stance. The adoption of Sarah’s Law and the 
proposal of Clare’s Law are a disturbing trend in the United 
Kingdom. Both laws indicate an erosion of the original privacy 
protections afforded to sex offenders. If the trend continues, the 
United Kingdom’s system may start to look more like the United 
States’ model. 
V. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT 
 A.  Sex Offender Registration and Disclosure 
 1.  United Kingdom 
In 2010, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom laid 
down a significant decision regarding the rights of sex offenders. The 
court decided R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department based on 
Article 8 of the ECHR.122 In the case, two sex offenders, who were 
subject to lifetime registration requirements, appealed to the Supreme 
Court arguing that the Sexual Offences Act of 2003 violated their 
right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR. They argued that the 
violation occurred because there was no mechanism within the 
statute for the courts to review lifetime registration on a case-by-case 
basis.123 
The Court reasoned that the government’s goal was 
unmistakably legitimate and that deterrence of sexually related crimes 
was of “great social value.”124 However, the court focused the 
discussion on the proportionality of subjecting individuals to 
notification requirements for life without the ability to obtain judicial 
review.125 The court, using a balancing analysis, decided in favor of 
protecting the victims due to the serious impact of sexual offenses; 
                                                 
122 See R and Thompson v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
[2010] UKSC 17, [2011] 1 A.C. 331 (appeal taken from Eng.).  
123 See id. at 339.  
124 See id. at 342.  
125 See id. 
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yet, the Court also acknowledged that the scheme must not effect 
additional punishment on the offender.126 
Even though the protection of victims was its primary 
concern, the Court still reasoned that lifetime registration 
requirements for sex offenders, without the ability to appeal, 
interfered with privacy rights pursuant to ECHR Article 8.127 The 
registration requirements alone were acceptable to the court because 
the interference was directed at the “prevention or crime and the 
protection of rights and freedoms of others.”128 The court found that 
the problem was the deprivation of judicial review when an offender 
was subject to lifetime registration.129 The court found an interference 
with privacy rights because the registration information had the 
potential to reach third parties.130 The court determined that the risk 
associated with the likely dissemination of sex offender information 
gave offenders subject to registration a substantial interest in 
petitioning removal from the list.131 
The decision in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
was controversial in the United Kingdom, and many powerful figures 
in the government disagreed with the ruling. The Prime Minister 
expressed his disgust, remarking that the decision “seems to fly 
completely in the face of common sense.”132 Home Secretary, 
Theresa May, publicly announced that the Government would make 
“minimal changes” and that the standards for obtaining an appeal 
would be set as “high as possible.”133 The strong government reaction 
                                                 
126 See id. 
127 See R and Thompson v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
[2010] UKSC 17, [2011] 1 A.C. 331(appeal taken from Eng.). 
128 Id. at 348.   
129 See id. at 353. 
130 See id. at 348-49. 
131 See id.  
132 See generally Sophie Lockley, The Supervision of Sex Offenders in the 
Community – At What Cost?, INTERNET J. OF CRIMINOLOGY, 
http://www.internetjournalofcriminology.com/Lockley_The_Supervision_of_Sex_
Offenders_in_the_Community_IJC_Aug_2011.pdf. 
133 See Sex Offender Registration Appeals to Go Ahead, BRITISH 
BROADCASTING COMPANY (Feb 16, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
12476979 (the United Kingdom’s sex offender register is not a centrally held 
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demonstrates that the tension between fear of sexual predators and 
the civil rights of sex offenders is not a phenomenon unique to the 
United States. 
In the same year, a United Kingdom Court of Appeals 
considered the disclosure of sex offender information under Article 8 
of the ECHR in H and L v. A City Council.134 In that case, a man was 
convicted of indecent assault of a seven year old boy while he had a 
pending trial for a similar offense.135 A local authority determined that 
his conviction and pending trial would be communicated to several 
organizations with which he had contact, that the public university 
would discontinue employing his company, and that he would be 
asked to leave several community committees of which he was a 
part.136 The court reasoned that the need for disclosure must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.137 In this instance, a blanket 
disclosure to several organizations violated the sex offender’s Article 
8 privacy rights.138 
 2.  The United Kingdom’s Balanced Approach 
The two decisions discussed above are an important step in 
sex offenders’ rights. The cases demonstrate the Court’s view that 
protecting sex offenders’ rights does not necessarily diminish 
community safety. The decision in R v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department does not reduce safety within the community because it 
does not encourage the automatic removal of sex offenders from the 
registry.139 Rather, the decision simply finds that sex offenders must 
be able to present the reasons why they believe that they are no 
longer a danger to the community.140 Courts are charged with trust 
and discretion to make decisions on very important issues in many 
                                                 
database of sex offender information, but rather a notification system used to 
update the police).  
134 H and L v A City Council, [2011] EWCA (Civ) 403, (Eng.)   
135 See id. at 4. 
136 See id. at 7. 
137 See id. at 67.   
138 See id. at 29.   
139 See R and Thompson v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
[2010] UKSC 17, [2011] 1 A.C. 331, 348-49 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
140 Id. at 342. 
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other areas of law. There should be the same level of confidence in 
the court to make determinations regarding a sex offender’s 
registration status. 
H and L v. A City Council follows a similar trend, properly 
giving courts discretionary power to determine the rights of sex 
offenders on a case-by-case basis.141 
Regrettably, the United Kingdom’s legislature appears to be 
moving in the opposite direction, based on its passing and proposing 
legislation that allows for more community access to sex offender 
information.142 The split between the courts and the legislature can 
likely be explained by the fact that legislative officials are elected into 
office. A legislative action will often be significantly influenced by 
public fears and desires. If public perceptions regarding sex offenders 
remain the same, it is very unlikely that the legislature would adopt a 
law protecting the privacy rights of sex offenders. The result of this 
public influence is that the burden of protecting the privacy rights of 
unpopular groups, like sex offenders, will frequently fall to the courts. 
 3.  United States 
The Supreme Court of the United States has affirmed the 
constitutionality of sex offender registration and community 
notification.143 In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 
Connecticut’s public disclosure of the state’s sex offender registry 
was challenged on procedural due process grounds.144 Connecticut 
state law made a sex offender’s name, address, photograph, and 
description of the sexual offence available to the public.145 
Respondent argued that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were 
violated because he was not provided a hearing to determine his 
                                                 
141 See H and L v. A City Council, [2011] EWCA (Civ) 403, 67 (Eng.).  
142 See Press Release, Home Office, National Rollout of Scheme to 
Protect Children (Aug 6, 2010), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-
centre/press-releases/national-rollout-scheme-protect. 
143 See generally Connecticut Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 
(2003). 
144 See id. at 4. 
145 See id. 
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current level of dangerousness.146 Respondent claimed that the liberty 
interest implicated by the Fourteenth Amendment was his 
“reputation” and his “status under state law.”147 
The Supreme Court determined that respondent’s claim was 
meritless because the statutory scheme did not require a showing that 
the offender was currently dangerous.148 In essence, respondent had 
no claim under the Fourteenth Amendment because the statute did 
not provide for a hearing as required process.149 The law only 
required a conviction for an offender to be placed on the public 
registry.150 As a result, the court determined that the claim was not 
relevant to the statutory scheme.151 
 4.  Privacy Concerns Under the Walsh Act 
Importantly, the court noted that it decided Connecticut 
Department of Safety on procedural due process grounds, and explicitly 
stated that it held no opinion on whether the state law violated 
substantive due process rights.152 Accordingly, the decision left room 
for further substantive law challenges to be brought before the court. 
At the time of this publication, no further due process challenges on 
the Walsh Act’s community notification scheme have been granted 
certiorari before the Supreme Court.153 However, the successful 
privacy challenge against the disclosure of sex offender information 
in the United Kingdom shows that there is a strong argument to be 
made that public notification laws are a violation of privacy rights.154 
The United States has not extended a fundamental right of 
privacy to sex offenders. However, there is a possibility that the 
                                                 
146 See id. 
147 Id. at 5-6. 
148 See Connecticut Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). 
149 See id.  
150 See id. at 7. 
151 See id. at 8. 
152 See id. at 7-8. 
153 See generally Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89-118 (2003) (confirming the 
constitutionality of community notification laws under the Walsh Act based on an 
Ex Post Facto challenge).  
154 See H and L v. A City Council, [2011] EWCA (Civ) 403, 67 (Eng.). 
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Supreme Court will consider privacy rights if a substantive claim 
regarding sex offender registration and community notification is 
brought before the Court. If the Court determines that sex offenders 
have a fundamental right to privacy, the government cannot infringe 
on the privacy right without a substantial interest which is narrowly 
tailored to meet the goal provided.155 There is little doubt that 
community safety is a substantial government interest. In the case of 
a substantive due process claim, the question before the court will 
likely be whether registration and community notification are 
sufficiently tailored to meet the goal of public safety. In such a case, 
the burden will be on the government to show that community 
notification actually aids in the goal of keeping the public safe. 
 B.  Civil Commitment 
Civil Commitment of sexual offenders is the involuntary 
commitment of offenders beyond their prison sentence based on the 
concern that they are likely to reoffend.156 The proceeding is 
considered civil, so it lacks many of the constitutional protections 
provided during criminal proceedings.157 Generally, civil commitment 
actions will not provide protections such as the right to remain silent, 
jury trials, procedural rights, the guarantee of a speedy process, and 
bail.158 The Supreme Court of the United States has considered the 
constitutionality of statutes allowing for the civil commitment of sex 
offenders in two cases.159 
The Supreme Court first considered sex offender civil 
commitment in Kansas v. Hendricks, which involved a defendant who 
was convicted for taking indecent liberties with two thirteen-year-old 
                                                 
155 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(established 
the fundamental right to privacy under the United States Constitution by 
invalidating a statute that banned contraceptive distribution to married couples).  
156 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (9th ed. 2009). 
157 See Eric S. Janus & Brad Bolin, An End-Game for Sexually Violent 
Predator Laws: As-Applied Invalidation, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 25, 27 (2008). 
158 See Corey Rayburn Yung, Sex Offender Exceptionalism and Preventive 
Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969, 979 (2011).  
159 See generally U.S. v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010); see also Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).  
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boys.160 After the defendant’s conviction, Kansas enacted the Sexually 
Violent Predator Act, creating procedures to civilly commit an 
individual beyond his or her prison sentence if the individual was 
deemed likely to commit “predatory acts of sexual violence.”161 
Shortly before the defendant’s release he was civilly committed 
pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator’s Act.162 The defendant 
appealed his civil commitment claiming a violation of due process.163 
The Supreme Court held that the civil commitment statute 
did not violate substantive due process. The decision noted an 
important restriction on a citizen’s right to liberty: “although freedom 
from physical restraint has always been at the core of the liberty 
protected by Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action, 
that liberty interest is not absolute.”164 The Court reasoned that 
involuntary civil commitment does not violate substantive due 
process if the commitment follows “proper procedures” and 
“evidentiary standards.”165 The Kansas statute required a previous 
conviction, finding of “future dangerousness”, and a “mental 
abnormality” or “personality disorder” that made a person unable to 
control the unwanted behavior.166 Because the statute limited civil 
confinement to a sufficiently narrow class of people, only those who 
were unable to control their dangerous behavior, the Court ruled that 
the statute did not infringe on constitutionally protected liberties.167 
The Court also examined the significant procedural 
safeguards found in the Kansas statute.168 The procedures included: 
(1) notification to the prosecutor that a person might have met the 
statutory requirements sixty days before the inmate’s release; (2) 
forty-five days for the prosecutor to decide whether to file a petition; 
(3) a determination by a court that probable cause existed to support 
that a person was a “sexually violent predator;” (4) professional 
                                                 
160 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 353. 
161 Id. at 350. 
162 See id. at 355-56. 
163 See id. at 353. 
164 See id. at 356. 
165 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357. 
166 See id. at 358. 
167 See id.  
168 See id. at 352-56.  
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evaluation; and (5) a trial to determine whether the individual was, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, a “sexually violent predator,” with the 
state carrying the burden of proof.169 
Federal civil commitment for sex offenders is addressed in 
the Walsh Act.170 Under the Act, the Attorney General, or an 
individual authorized by the Attorney General, has the ability to 
identify an individual as a “sexually dangerous person.”171 Upon this 
classification, the clerk in the jurisdiction where the individual is 
confined will receive a certificate and the court will order a hearing to 
determine if an individual is sexually dangerous.172 The court then has 
the discretion to hold an individual in civil commitment, beyond his 
prison term, if the individual: 1) has “engaged or attempted to engage 
in sexually violent conduct or child molestation”; 2) “suffers from a 
serious mental illness, abnormality or disorder”; and 3) “as a result of 
that mental illness, abnormality, or disorder is sexually dangerous to 
others.”173 The evidentiary standard to civilly commit an individual 
under the Walsh Act is proof by clear and convincing evidence.174 
In 2010, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality 
of a federal civil commitment statute in United States v. Comstock.175 
The issue before the Court was whether the Walsh Act was an 
unconstitutional expansion of congressional powers under Article 
I.176 The Court held that civil commitment section of the Walsh Act 
was constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, 
cl. 18.177 The Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to 
“enact laws governing prisons and prisoners” as long as Congress is 
acting within their enumerated powers.178 As a result of the Court’s 
                                                 
169 Id. at 353-54. 
170 See Generally 42 U.S.C.S. § 16911(West 2006). 
171 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 4248 (West 2006).  
172 Id. 
173 See id. § 4248.  
174 See id.  
175 See U.S. v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1954. 
176 See id. at 1955. 
177 See id. at 1970. 
178 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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focus on the broad scope of federal power, Comstock is often cited for 
issues of federalism rather than civil rights issues of sex offenders.179 
Unlike the Court in Hendricks, the Comstock Court did not 
consider the procedural due process claim.180 Consequently, the 
Comstock Court did not spend very much time comparing the federal 
statute with the state statute found in Hendricks. From a procedural 
standpoint, civil commitment under the Walsh Act is distinguishable 
from the state statute in Hendricks. Under the federal statute, the 
Attorney General’s certification that an individual is sexually 
dangerous is sufficient to begin commitment proceedings, rather than 
the factors provided under the statute in Hendricks.181 Further, the 
burden of proof in the statute in Hendricks was beyond a reasonable 
doubt, while the burden of proof in the Walsh Act was the clear and 
convincing evidence standard.182 
1. Do Sexually Violent Predators Need Procedural Protections? 
The relatively lengthy evidentiary and procedural standards 
set forth by the statute in Hendricks show an attempt by the state 
legislature to avoid arbitrary decision-making. Because civil 
commitment can be an indefinite restriction of physical freedom, 
procedural safeguards are vastly important to ensure that the decision 
to incapacitate an individual is necessary. In contrast, the lack of 
certain protections under the Walsh Act should be cause for alarm. 
The “clear and convincing evidence” standard is a lower burden of 
proof than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard used in 
criminal prosecutions.183 This lower standard is troubling because the 
statute allows individuals to be detained in civil commitment 
indefinitely.184 
                                                 
179 See Jeffrey Toobin, Without a Paddle; Can Stephen Breyer Save the Obama 
Agenda in the Supreme Court?, NEW YORKER, Sept. 27, 2010, at 34, 40.  
180 See generally U.S. v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
181 See 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006). 
182 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 353-54; 18 U.S.C.A. § 4248(d) 
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The Walsh Act does provide a mechanism for review, which 
includes both continuing psychiatric care and judicial review every six 
months.185 The availability of review may provide a false sense of 
security for individuals detained in civil commitment.186 Studies have 
shown that offenders who enter civil commitment generally will 
never be released.187 
 2.  The United Kingdom and Civil Commitment 
The United Kingdom’s Sexual Offenses Act does not contain 
a section permitting the civil commitment of sex offenders.188 
However, the United Kingdom does have a general process for 
detaining certain individuals.189 The Mental Health Act of 1983 (“The 
Mental Health Act”) was enacted “with respect to the reception, care, 
and treatment of mentally disordered patients, the management of 
their property, and other related matters.”190 Section 63 of the Act 
allows for the compulsory treatment of a patient suffering from a 
mental disorder.191 There is no specific provision for the compulsory 
treatment of mentally ill inmates or sexually violent predators.192 The 
act applies to patients generally, rather than targeting a specific group 
of potentially dangerous individuals.193 
 3.  Reconsidering Procedural Safeguards for Civil Commitment 
Civil commitment can, in some ways, be more restrictive than 
incarceration because of the possibility of an indefinite term.194 The 
United Kingdom’s lack of a civil commitment provision in its sex 
offender legislation shows that the practice specifically aimed at 
                                                 
185 See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1955. 
186 See 18 U.S.C. § 4247 (2006). 
187 See generally Wakefield, supra note 101 (describing the government’s 
doctrinal shift from punishing crimes that have already been committed to 
categorizing individuals who pose a potential threat of committing future crimes).  
188 See Sexual Offenses Act, 2003, c. 42 (U.K.). 
189 See The Mental Health Act, 1893, c. 4, § 63 (U.K.). 
190 Id. c. 1, § 1. 
191 See id. c. 4, § 63. 
192 See generally The Mental Health Act, 1893 (U.K.). 
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sexual offenders may not be a necessity.195 If the United States 
continues with the practice of civil commitment of a sex offender, 
strong procedural safeguards must be in place. One potential model 
is the criminal trial. A civil commitment proceeding modeled after a 
criminal trial would use the “beyond a reasonable double standard.” 
 4.  Studies Support Reform 
The studies performed in the United States confirm that the 
United Kingdom has taken a superior approach in creating sex 
offender laws.196 Community notification laws have the opposite 
effect of their intended result, while registration laws only become 
problematic when the registry grows to be too large to manage. The 
detrimental effect of notification laws makes sense because ordinary 
citizens have no way of using the knowledge other than ostracizing 
the offender. The negative results stemming from community 
notification indicate that the goal of public safety is not served by 
these laws. 
The lack of any significant research on the civil commitment 
of sex offenders is problematic. The process denies an individual the 
ability to freely live his life after he has finished paying his debt to 
society. In order for such a pervasive restriction on freedom to be 
worthwhile, there must be significant benefits. Without proper 
research there is no way to determine whether the indefinite 
commitment of certain sex offenders is benefiting the public in any 
real way. 
VI. UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACHES 
Several unconventional sex offender programs have been 
established in some states and the United Kingdom. One such 
alternative program is Circles of Support and Accountability 
                                                 
195 See Sexual Offenses Act, 2003, c. 42 (U.K).  
196 See Zgoba & Bachar, supra note 99; see also Prescott & Rockoof, supra 
note 95. 
 2013 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2:2 
378 
(“COSA”).197 COSA involves a group of volunteers who form a 
“circle” around an offender, who is known as the “core member.” 
The “circle” essentially provides consistent support for the sex 
offender’s reintegration into the community.198 The group serves duel 
functions: 1) providing a “supportive social network” to the core 
member; and 2) requiring that the offender take accountability for his 
future risk to society.199 
In the United States, several states have implemented a 
program known as Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative 
(“SSOSA”).200 SSOSA is offered to certain offenders in lieu of a 
lengthy jail sentence.201 Generally, a SSOSA will require a shorter jail 
sentence followed by treatment and supervision.202 After analyzing 
five years of data, the Washington Institute for Public Policy found 
that the recidivism rates for sex offenders granted SSOSA were lower 
than offenders not granted SSOSA.203 
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Public fear and outrage have caused both the United States 
and the United Kingdom to take action to control the perceived 
danger presented by sex offenders.204 The United Kingdom’s 
legislation has attempted to balance both the interests of sex 
                                                 
197 See Circles of Support and Accountability, FRESNO PACIFIC UNIVERSITY, 
http://peace.fresno.edu/cosa/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2011); see also CIRCLES UK, 
http://www.circles-uk.org.uk/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).  
198 See Circles of Support and Accountability, FRESNO PACIFIC UNIVERSITY, 
http://peace.fresno.edu/cosa/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2011); see also CIRCLES UK, 
http://www.circles-uk.org.uk/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).  
199 See CIRCLES UK, http://www.circles-uk.org.uk/ (last visited Jan. 18, 
2011)(explaining that COSA is a community based approach to solving the 
problem of sex offender recidivism where the community acts as a unit to aid the 
offender).   
200 See Wash. Inst. for Pub. Pol., Sex Offender Sentencing in Washington State: 
Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative Trends (Jan. 2006), 
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/06-01-1205.pdf. 
201 See id. 
202 See id. 
203 See id. 
204 See Public Opinion and the Criminal Justice System: Building Support for Sex 
Offender Management Programs, supra note 45.  
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offenders and the interests of the public. In contrast, the legislation 
promulgated in the United States appears to be based solely on 
disputed views of the dangerousness of sex offenders in the 
community.205 
Several studies have called into question the effectiveness and 
economic burden of registration and community notification.206 The 
dearth of positive results from community notification gives more 
credence to the possibility that community notification is an 
inadequate form of protection and possibly unconstitutional. If the 
Supreme Court adopted a fundamental rights analysis, then there is a 
significant argument that community notification is not narrowly 
tailored to the goal of keeping the public safe. Further, the complete 
lack of research regarding the civil commitment of sexually violent 
predators is problematic considering the lack of adequate procedural 
protections and the low burden of proof in the federal statute. 
These considerations tip the scale toward reforming sex 
offender laws in the United States to something more like the United 
Kingdom’s approach. In order to effectuate a positive change, three 
adjustments need to be made. First, the United States should prohibit 
community notification. However, registration laws have shown 
some benefit, so continuing to provide sex offender information to 
the police should persist. Second, the United States should re-
examine the civil commitment provisions in the Walsh Act. Any 
additions to the Act should ensure that strict procedural standards are 
in place and create a higher burden proof. Finally, the United States 
should include some unconventional approaches to future sex-
offender legislation. Including these provisions will be beneficial in 
helping sex offenders reintegrate into society. Without implementing 
these—or other similar—changes, the United States will continue on 
the path of blatantly disregarding the rights of many of its citizens. 
                                                 
205 See Radford, supra note 3.  
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THE CASE OF CHRISTMAS ISLAND:  
HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW AFFECTS 
THE AUSTRALIAN-MALAYSIAN 
REFUGEE DEAL 
Ria Pereira

 
INTRODUCTION 
In July of 2011, Australia and Malaysia entered an 
arrangement in which Australian asylum seekers would be removed 
to neighboring Malaysia to have their asylum claims processed.1 
Following widespread criticism in the media, Australia’s High Court 
(“High Court” or “Court”) ruled that such a deal violated Australia’s 
refuges protection laws.2 While this ruling should have put an end to 
the deal, Australia’s Immigration Minister, Chris Bowen, indicated 
that the agreement might nevertheless be feasible.3 Policy makers 
                                                 

 J.D. Candidate, 2013, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State 
University. 
1 See Matt Siegel, Plan to Deal With Seekers of Asylum Roils Australia, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011, at A7. 
2 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32  (Austl.); British Broadcasting 
Corporation, Australia Court Rules Out Refugee ‘Swap’ with Malaysia, BBC NEWS, Aug. 
31, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14727471; Crystal Ja & 
Julian Drape, Opponents Demand Government Rule Out Malaysia Deal, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD, Sept. 7, 2011, http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-
national/oppn-demands-govt-rule-out-malaysia-deal-20110907-1jwh4.html. 
3 See Madeleine Coorey, Australia’s Malaysia Refugee Swap Under Fire, AFP, 
Sept. 16, 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g—
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proposed amending Australian domestic immigration laws to allow 
the deal to go forward unencumbered; and a bill to amend Australia’s 
Migration Act was subsequently introduced.4 
This comment addresses the conflict and interplay between 
Australia’s internal laws and its international obligations. Part I of this 
comment describes the origin and structure of the Malaysian refugee 
deal.5 The existing legality of the third party schemes under 
Australia’s current immigration system is then examined in Part II.6 
The High Court has not only expounded on third party schemes in 
general, but has also ruled on the legality of the 2011 Malaysian deal. 
The High Court’s holding and rationale is taken up in Part III.7 Given 
Australia’s international obligations as a State Party to the United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee 
Convention” or “Convention”), Part IV and V will then explore the 
wrongfulness of such a deal under standards of international law and 
effective protection.8 To further this analysis, Part VI will examine 
Malaysia’s treatment of refugees.9 As it currently stands, Australian 
law and international obligations are in agreement: the Malaysian deal 
would be improper. However, officials within the Australian 
government propose disrupting this synchronicity by amending the 
country’s internal laws to allow for such a deal. It is thus necessary to 
look at how these two bodies of governance work in synergy. Part 
VII addresses whether amending Australia’s Migration Act would 
fulfill the country’s international obligations.10 
The deal has significance for both Australia and the 
international community. The Australian government’s continued 
insistence of the deal’s legality, despite the High Court’s ruling, 
presents a challenge to future asylum seekers in Australia. On a 
broader scale, the deal raises a question regarding the interplay 
                                                 
d3pIxV72sQf8rsMPnO4dRF2nQ?docId=CNG.79d23623538adc9507ec3c37e5062
f1b.251. 
4 See id. 
5 See infra Part I. 
6 See infra Part II. 
7 See infra Part III. 
8 See infra Part IV, V. 
9 See infra Part VI. 
10 See infra Part VII. 
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between domestic and international law.11 The proposal of amending 
Australia’s immigration laws is premised on the idea that domestic 
law trumps international obligations.12 This rationale raises concerns 
about member states’ obligations under the U.N. Refugee 
Convention. 
I. THE MALAYSIAN DEAL AND ITS ORIGINS 
Australia receives about two percent of the world’s asylum 
claims.13 In 2010, only 8,250 immigrants applied as asylum seekers 
within the country.14 By comparison, 55,530 noncitizens sought 
asylum in the United States in 2010.15 However, it is not the lack of 
asylum seekers that have given rise to this controversy. Because of its 
proximity to Burma, Australia has become a popular destination for 
immigrants arriving by sea from Southeast Asia.16 Dubbed the “boat 
                                                 
11 Scholars have recently addressed Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 
of 2011 in different lights. See Michelle Foster, Reflections on a Decade of International 
Law: International Legal Theory: Snapshots From a Decade Of International Legal Life: The 
Implications Of the Failed ‘Malaysian Solution’: The Australian High Court and Refugee 
Responsibility Sharing At International Law, 13 MELB. J. INT’L L. 395, 422 (2012) 
(explaining that, according to the Migration Act as it presently stands, any future 
offshore processing arrangement undertaken by Australia must accord with 
Australia’s international legal obligations); see also Hannah Stewart-Weeks, Out of 
Sight But Not Out of Mind: Plaintiff M61/2010E v. Commonwealth, 33 SYDNEY L. 
REV. 831, 843-46 (2011) (arguing that the Migration Act would not necessarily have 
to be amended because section 198A(3) provides a way for the Minister to declare a 
country safe if it “meets relevant human rights standards in providing protection”). 
12 See Katina Curtis, No Deal Yet on Asylum Seekers, SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD, Dec. 23, 2011, http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/no-
deal-yet-on-asylum-seekers-20111223-1p7mm.html. 
13  See U.N. REFUGEE AGENCY, ASYLUM LEVELS AND TRENDS IN 
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 2010 15 (2011), 
 http://www.unhcr.org/4d8c5b109.html. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See Tony Keim, Accused People Smugglers’ Boat Stranded at Sea, THE 
COURIER-MAIL, Oct. 4, 2011, 
 http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/national/accused-people-smugglers-boat-
stranded-at-sea-court-told/story-e6freooo-1226158318125. 
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people,” these immigrants have garnered attention both in the media 
and within the Australian government.17 
Christmas Island, an Australian territory located in the Indian 
Ocean, has been designated as an “excised offshore place.”18On this 
island, unlawful noncitizens, who have come to Australia via 
“offshore entry,” are detained.19 On July 25, 2011, the Australian and 
Malaysian governments devised a plan by which 800 asylum seekers, 
who had yet to have their claims assessed in Australia, would be sent 
to Malaysia for processing.20 The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (“the UNHCR”) would then evaluate 
these asylum seekers’ claims in Malaysia.21 
The Australian government justified the deal as a valid 
exercise of power under sections 198(2) and 198A(1) of the 
Migration Act of 1958.22 Section 198(2) provides that an immigration 
officer must remove noncitizens who are determined to be unlawfully 
present “as soon as reasonably possible,” but does not indicate the 
location to which these Asylum seekers should be removed.23 Section 
198A further provides that Australia may remove “offshore entry 
person[s]” to safe third countries.24 Under this provision, for a 
country to be a valid port, it must meet “relevant” human rights 
                                                 
17 Nick Butterly & Andrew Probyn Canberra, Gillard Turns the Boat Jeat on 
Abbott, THE WEST AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 24, 2011, 
http://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/-/breaking/10329656/gillard-turns-the-
boat-heat-on-abbott/. 
18 See DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, FACT SHEET 
81 - AUSTRALIA’S EXCISED OFFSHORE PLACES (2010). 
19 See DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, supra note 19; 
see also Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 5(1) (Austl.) (defining a non-citizen as any 
individual who has been determined not to be an Australian citizen and an 
“offshore entry person” as a non-citizen who has entered unlawfully at an excised 
offshore place). 
20 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011, (2011) HCA 32, at 
¶ 8; Siegel, supra note 1. 
21 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, [2011] HCA 32, at ¶ 8. 
22 See id. 
23 Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 198(2) (Austl.). 
24 Id. § 198A(1). 
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standards.25 Furthermore, such a third country must also provide 
protection to persons seeking asylum or returning to their countries 
of origin.26 
While on its face the deal represents an outsourcing scheme 
to avoid the consumption of government resources, justification for 
the deal has been political rather than administrative.27 By refusing to 
house asylum seekers within Australia, the government hopes to 
deter immigrants from seeking illegal channels of entry.28 
While outsourcing refugee processing might appear to be an 
uncommon solution, this deal hardly marks the first time Australia 
has attempted to implement such a scheme.29 In 2001, a Norwegian 
carrier ship, the MV Tampa, rescued 438 distressed Afghans from 
fishing vessels in international waters.30 The rescued noncitizens 
subsequently sought asylum from the Australian government.31 On 
September 10, 2001, Australia’s Minister of Defense and the 
President of the Republic of Nauru devised the “Pacific Solution”, 
under which the asylum seekers were removed to the Polynesian 
island nation to have their claims processed.32 
                                                 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
27 See Press Release, Australian Human Rights Commission, Sending 
Asylum Seekers To Malaysia Is Not The Answer To Addressing People Smuggling 
(July 25, 2011),  
 http://humanrights.gov.au/about/media/media_releases/2011/61_11.html). 
28 See id. 
29 See Susan Kneebone, The Pacific Plan: The Provision of “Effective 
Protection?”, 18 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 696 (2006); see also Savitri Taylor, Protection 
Elsewhere/Nowhere, 18 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 283 (2006). 
30 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32, at ¶ 13. 
31 See id. 
32 See Kneebone, supra note 30, at 696; Taylor, supra note 30 (for a 
discussion of Australia’s previous third-country arrangements). 
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II. LEGALITY OF THIRD PARTY SCHEMES UNDER AUSTRALIA’S 
MIGRATION ACT 
Australian officials have proposed that they can circumvent 
Australian law and allow for the third party deal by amending 
Australia’s Migration Act.33 An initial question therefore is whether 
the deal does in fact violate Australian law. 
A 1992 amendment to Australia’s Migration Act established 
grounds for the mandatory detention and removal of noncitizens.34 
Under the Migration Act, unlawful noncitizens detained under 
section 178 must be kept in immigration detention until they are 
removed from Australian borders.35 If the noncitizen is given a final 
status determination of unlawful presence, s/he must then be 
removed “as soon as reasonably practical.”36 
Australia’s Migration Act provides for these asylum seekers to 
be sent to territories other than their countries of origin.37 Under 
Section 91D of the Migration Act, such plans are designated as “safe 
third country” schemes.38 The Minister of Immigration has the ability 
to designate a third country as being “safe,” and thus a proper port of 
removal.39 An asylum claimant, who has a right to reside in a third 
country, cannot validly apply for a visa based on protection in 
Australia.40 In addition, Australia would not have any protection 
obligations to such an individual.41 Because a third country to which a 
person has residence ties will have the obligation of assessing his 
                                                 
33 See Migration Legislation Amendment (Offshore Processing and Other 
Measures) of 2011, (Cth) (Austl.); see also Curtis, supra note 13. 
34 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) §§ 188-197 (Austl.). 
35 See id. §§ 177-78 (defining a ‘designated person’ who is to be detained). 
36 See Plaintiff M61 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, (2010) 
85 ALJR 133, 139-140 (Austl.).  
37 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 91D (Austl.). 
38 See id. 
39 See id. § 91D(3). 
40 See id. §§ 91C(1)(b)(ii), 91E. 
41 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32, at ¶ 45 (Austl.). 
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asylum claim, this provision prevents immigrants from “forum 
shopping” for the most lenient admissions system.42 
Section 198A of the Migration Act requires that a declaration 
be made in relation to the third country to which a migrant will be 
sent.43 Australian courts have held that such a declaration must be 
made by the Minister of Immigration in “good faith.”44 Furthermore, 
any declaration must be based on an objective evaluation that a 
designated country is “safe” to send migrants.45 The declaration must 
also comport with obligations under the Refugee Convention.46 For a 
country to be declared “safe,” migrants must be given protection 
both while their claims are being processed and after a final 
determination of their claims has been made.47 
III.  THE HIGH COURT’S RESPONSE TO THE MALAYSIAN DEAL 
While Australia’s Migration Act does allow for certain safe 
third country schemes,48 the High Court has rejected its use in the 
present deal.49 Up until the High Court’s ruling rejecting the 
Malaysian deal, Australian courts generally held that the third-party 
state need not be a party to the Refugee Convention before a transfer 
could take place.50 However, in Plaintiff M70 and M106, the High 
Court ruled that Australia must consider the recipient country’s 
domestic laws and obligations under international law when declaring 
                                                 
42 Penelope Mathew, Current Development: Australian Refugee Protection in the 
Wake of the Tampa, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 661, 672-673 (2002). 
43 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 198A(3) (Austl.). 
44 See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Eshetu, (1999) 197 
CLR 611, 654 (Austl.). 
45 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 198A(3) (Austl.) (establishing the 
criteria used to evaluate a third country as safe). 
46 See id. § 198A(3)(iv). 
47 See id. §§ 198A(3)(ii)-(iii).  
48 See id. § 91D. 
49 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32 at ¶ 66-67. 
50 See, e.g., Kola v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 
(2002) 120 FCR 170, 178 (Austl.). 
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a country to be “safe.”51 When confronted with the issue of whether 
Australia could deport asylum seekers to Malaysia for processing, the 
Court held that migrants, who claim a fear of persecution by their 
countries of origin, may only be taken from Australia pursuant to 
section 198A.52 If no power under section 198A exists, the person 
may only be validly removed once their claims are assessed and found 
to be lacking.53 If, however, the migrant is ultimately determined to 
be a refugee, the person may only be removed pursuant to the non-
refoulement provisions under section 198(2).54 
Section 198A requires certain standards to be met before 
offshore entry persons may be taken to a designated country.55 A 
country of deportation must provide effective procedures for 
assessing asylum claims.56 Protections must be afforded to refugees57, 
as well as noncitizens who are waiting for their claims to be 
processed.58 A third country must also meet “relevant” human rights 
standards in dispensing its protection to refugees and asylum 
seekers.59 
Previous High Court precedent supports the fact that the 
government owes a “protection obligation” to those asserting asylum 
claims under Article 36, Section 2 of the Migration Act.60 Article 36 
states that the criterion for a protection visa in Australia is that “the 
applicant for the visa is a noncitizen in Australia to whom Australia 
has a protection obligation under [the Convention].”61 
                                                 
51 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32, at ¶ 66. 
52 See id. 
53 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32, at ¶ 54. 
54 See id. at ¶ 51. 
55 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth.) § 198A(3)(a) (Austl.). 
56 See id. § 198A(3)(a)(i). 
57 See id. § 198A(3)(a)(ii). 
58 See id. § 198A(3)(a)(iii). 
59 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 198A(3)(a)(vi) (Austl.). 
60 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, 213 ALR 668, at ¶ 42 (Austl.). 
61 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 36(2) (Austl.). 
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In NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the High Court explained the 
fundamental difference between those noncitizens who have entered 
the country and those who have not.62 Because customary 
international law involves rights between states rather than 
individuals, an asylum seeker cannot assert a right to enter a country 
where an individual is not a national.63 However, Australia’s 
Migration Act fills in the gap left by international law. Section 36(2) 
assumes that “obligation[s] are owed. . . by Contracting States to 
individuals” as well as to other member states.64 Under Section 36(2), 
a protection obligation is owed to those who assert an asylum claim.65 
An asylum applicant can take himself out of the class of noncitizens 
to whom Australia owes a protection obligation under the Migration 
Act by committing certain crimes.66 However, simply because a 
noncitizen has not had his asylum claim adjudicated does not mean 
that no protection obligations exist under Section 36.67 Similarly, in 
Plaintiff M61, the Court explained that the Migration Act is premised 
on the idea that Australia has a “protection obligation to 
individuals.”68 The Court held that the Migration Act is structured in 
such a way that the international obligations towards refugees are 
mirrored by Australia’s domestic law.69 
                                                 
62 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, at ¶ 58. 
63 See id. 
64 Id. at ¶ 27; see also Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 36(2) (Austl.). 
65 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth.) § 36(2) (Austl.); NAGV and NAGW 
of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, 
[2005] HCA 6, at ¶ 33. 
66 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 91U (Austl.); see also Migration 
Reform Act of 1992, (Cth) § 4(b) (Austl.). 
67 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, at ¶¶ 2, 9 (Austl.). 
68 Plaintiff M61 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, (2010) 85 
ALJR at 139. 
69 Id. 
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IV. LEGALITY IN LIGHT OF AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE REFUGEE CONVENTION 
In order to be consistent with the principles of the Refugee 
Convention, asylum seekers, who turn to foreign governments 
because their own countries are unable or unwilling to provide them 
with protection,70 should be assured these governments will not in 
turn cast them out. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention adopts this 
idea of non-refoulement, stating that a contracting state will not 
“expel or return” a refugee to a country in which his life or freedom 
“would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”71 
The principle of non-refoulement has long been espoused as 
a necessary protection for asylum seekers.72 On its face, the plain 
language of Article 33 prohibits refoulement to a refugee’s country of 
origin, which poses a threat to his life or freedom.73 However, the 
principle of non-refoulement under Article 33 has subsequently been 
extended to include a prohibition against chain refoulement.74 If an 
asylum seeker is sent to a third country, it must not, in turn, deport 
the noncitizen back to the home from which he is seeking 
protection.75 Third countries might likewise be improper if the 
noncitizen only temporarily resided in such a country and would 
therefore likely be deported for failing to establish residence ties.76 
The principle of non-refoulement extends past the Refugee 
Convention. The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has indicated 
that practices among countries that are widespread enough to 
constitute an international custom can be accepted as international 
                                                 
70 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, G.A. Res. 
2198 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/187, at art. 1 (Dec. 18, 2001). 
71 See id. at art. 2. 
72 See id. at art. 33. 
73 See id. 
74 Stephen H. Legomsky, Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of 
Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 
PPLA/2003/01 (Feb. 2003). 
75 Id. 
76 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 
71, at art. 33. 
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law.77 The United Nations has declared that the principle of non-
refoulement constitutes a rule of international customary law.78 
Because of the widespread incorporation of non-refoulement 
provisions in regional and worldwide treaties, the UN has asserted 
that the principle has come to constitute an international custom as 
well as a rule of international law.79 The UNHCR further pointed to 
the inclusion of non-refoulement in the reaffirmed 1967 UN 
Declaration on Territorial Asylum as evidence that the principle has 
risen to the level of international customary law.80 
Two types of states exist in regards to non-refoulement 
obligations: those countries which are State Parties to the 
international human rights treaties; and those states which have not 
yet acceded to treaty obligations.81 For State Parties to the Refugee 
Convention, there is a delineated obligation under the treaty’s 
language to protect asylum seekers from refoulement.82 For states, 
which are not parties to either the Refugee Convention or its 
protocol, the principle of non-refoulement must nevertheless be 
respected because it has attained the status of customary international 
law.83 The ICJ has explained that states have an obligation to act in 
conformity with customary law on the international stage.84 If a state 
deviates from such courses of conduct, it will be treated as being in 
breach of such rules, rather than as a forerunner in the creation of a 
                                                 
77 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993, at art. 38, ¶ 1. 
78 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, The Principle of Non-
Refoulement as a Norm of Customary International Law. Response to the Questions Posed to 
UNHCR by the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in Cases 2 
BvR 1938/93, 2 BvR 1953/93, 2 BvR 1954/93, Jan. 31, 1994, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/437b6db64.html. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 79. 
84 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 425 (June 27). 
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new international standard.85 The state’s action will be considered to 
be prima facie evidence that a rule has been violated.86 
Australia’s High Court has extended the concept of non-
refoulement to safe third country schemes.87 In NAVG, the Minister 
of Immigration argued that the principle of non-refoulement under 
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention only protected noncitizens 
from deportation to their countries of origin.88 Article 33, therefore, 
did not place any limitations on sending noncitizens to countries 
other than their homelands.89 The High Court firmly rejected this 
reasoning.90 The Court explained that non-refoulement was a broad 
enough concept to include protection from asylum seekers being sent 
to countries where their lives or freedoms would be threatened.91 The 
Court further explained that Article 33 of the Refugee Convention 
should also be read in the negative.92 Thus, if a country is “bound by 
a non-refoulement obligation” with respect to a given asylum 
applicant, and there is no country to which the applicant can be 
removed without the obligation being breached, “the State in 
question has no choice but to tolerate that individual’s presence 
within its territory.”93 Thus, a state might have an obligation to 
                                                 
85 See id. 
86 See id. at 427. 
87 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, at ¶ 25. 
88 See id. at ¶ 24. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. at ¶ 91 (“If the Minister’s argument were accepted. . . it would 
seem to follow that Australia would never have owed protection obligations to any 
person.”). 
91 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, at ¶ 25; see also U.N. High 
Commissioner For Refugees, The Scope And Content of the Principle Of Non-Refoulement, 
June 20, 2001,  
http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=
3b33574d1 (discussing how third country schemes fall under the auspices of Article 
33 of the Convention. Not only does Article 33 require that a State Party consider 
whether a claimant’s life and freedom would be threatened, but also the possibility 
of chain migration). 
92 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, at ¶ 23. 
93 Id. at ¶ 22. 
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protect a noncitizen simply because no other proper and safe country 
exists.94 
While Australia must adhere to the Refugee Convention’s 
non-refoulement principles, the High Court has held that third 
country schemes are not per se prohibited under the terms of the 
Convention.95 In Thiyagarajah, a Sri Lankan applicant in Australia had 
previously been granted refugee status and permanent residence in 
France.96 The respondent was furthermore eligible to apply for 
French citizenship.97 The High Court held that, because France 
would provide effective protection to the respondent, deporting him 
to the third country was consistent with Australia’s obligations under 
the Convention.98 The Federal Court subsequently expanded on the 
High Court’s reasoning, holding that a safe country could be 
designated by an applicant having minimal ties to a territory, such as 
being granted a temporary right to re-enter a third country.99 
The UNHCR has similarly explained that safe third country 
schemes do not represent a violation of a State Party’s obligations 
under the Convention.100 The Executive Committee of the UNHCR 
has conceded that if an asylum seeker has preexisting “connection[s] 
or close links” with another state, deportation to that country might 
be allowed.101 The appropriateness of this deportation, however, is 
dependent on whether it is “fair and reasonable” to expect the 
applicant to first request asylum from the third country.102 
                                                 
94 See id. 
95 See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Thiyagarajah, 
(1997) 80 FCR 543, 563 (Austl.). 
96 See id. at 565. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. at 563. 
99 See Rajendran v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 
1998 AUST FEDCT LEXIS 651, ¶ 11 (Austl.). 
100 See U.N. Human Right Commission, Refugees Without an Asylum 
Country, Conclusion No. 15 (XXX), (A/34/12/Add.1) (Oct. 16, 1979) [hereinafter 
Refugees Without an Asylum Country]. 
101 Id. 
102 See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Thiyagaraja, 
(1997) 80 FCR at 563. 
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V. EFFECTIVE PROTECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Australian courts have clearly interpreted the Convention to 
allow for the deportation of noncitizens who have valid claims to 
asylum.103 However, previous case law indicates that a third country 
must be able to provide an asylum seeker with effective protection.104 
The High Court in Thiyagarajah ultimately held that France was a 
proper third country to which the noncitizen could be deported 
without a substantive consideration of his asylum claim.105 But, the 
determining factor in the case was not only that the respondent had 
previously been granted status in France, but also that the third 
country would provide him with effective protection.106 The High 
Court affirmed the reasoning of the Full Court when it noted that it 
was highly unlikely that the applicant would be in danger of chain 
refoulement if deported to France.107 
Effective protection is a safeguard designed to protect not 
only noncitizens who have already been granted asylum but also 
applicants who assert asylum claims.108 Claiming a credible fear from 
a country of origin affords an applicant with certain minimum 
safeguards while their claims are being adjudicated.109 The means by 
which these safeguards are provided are left open by the terms of the 
Refugee Convention.110 The UNHCR has acknowledged that varying 
                                                 
103 See id. 
104 See generally Rajendran v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs, (1998) 86 FCR 526 (Austl.). 
105 See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Thiyagaraja, 
(1997) 80 FCR at 563. 
106 See id. 
107 See id.; see generally Rajendran v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs, (1998) 86 FCR 526 (Austl.). 
108 See U.N. Refugee Agency, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial 
Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, at 2-3 (Jan. 26, 2007), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/45f17a1a4.pdf. 
109 See id.  
110 See U.N. Human Right Commission, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria 
for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, line 191, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV (1992) [hereinafter Handbook 
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees]. 
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methods of adjudicating claims, including integrating the processing 
of asylum claims into the general immigration system, might 
nevertheless be in line with a country’s obligations under the Refugee 
Convention.111 
While each State Party is given leave to implement its own 
procedures for adjudicating claims based on its particular judicial and 
administrative structure,112 the UNHCR has nevertheless 
promulgated minimum procedural standards which must be met.113 
The Executive Committee of UNHCR has explained that “fair and 
effective protection” includes procedures minimally sufficient to 
allow for the identification of noncitizens that should benefit from 
protection under the terms of the Refugee Convention.114 For 
example, it is not sufficient to designate a third country as “safe” 
based solely on whether that country is a State Party to the Refugee 
Convention.115 Instead, a hallmark of effective protection is whether 
a third country’s asylum processing system is fair to applicants.116 The 
U.N.’s General Counsel has recommended that a fair system of 
asylum adjudication must include a determination of claims by an 
impartial authority and an effective system of appeal.117 
At the twenty-eighth session of the High Commissioner’s 
Programme in October, 1977, the Executive Committee delineated 
certain minimum procedural requirements that would constitute 
effective protection of asylum applicants.118 Asylum seekers should 
first and foremost be given necessary information about the 
procedures they need to follow to assert asylum claims.119 Interpreters 
should be provided to applicants while they are submitting their 
                                                 
111 See id. 
112 See id. 
113 See Refugees Without an Asylum Country, supra note 101, at 2. 
114 See id. 
115 See Legomsky, supra note 75, at 7. 
116 See Refugees Without an Asylum Country, supra note 101. 
117 See Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 111, 
at line 192. 
118 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Determination of Refugee 
Status, No. 8 (XXVIII), A/32/12/Add.1 (Oct. 12, 1977). 
119 See id. at e(ii). 
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claims to the appropriate officials.120 While countries often do not 
recognize the right of an applicant to have appointed counsel, 
noncitizens seeking asylum should nevertheless be granted an 
adequate opportunity to obtain counsel.121 Finally, while an 
applicant’s claim is pending an initial determination or appeal, the 
asylum seeker should not be removed from the country from which 
he is seeking protection.122 
Under best practice procedures, a determination of whether a 
country is “safe” and will provide asylum seekers effective protection 
should be individualized.123 An examination should be conducted by 
a state to determine whether the third country would not apply more 
restrictive criteria in adjudicating a particular claim than the country 
the applicant is already in.124 The Executive Committee of the 
UNHCR has acknowledged that the prevailing legal standard among 
countries places the burden of proof in establishing asylum on the 
noncitizen submitting the claim.125 However, asylum applicants rarely 
flee their homelands carrying documentation of their persecution.126 
Given that the sole evidence for many applicants will be their own 
testimony, the Executive Committee has explained that the duty to 
ascertain all relevant facts is shared between an applicant and 
                                                 
120 See id. at e(iv). 
121 See id. 
122 See id. at e(vii). 
123 See Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 111, 
at line 29; see also Joanne van Selm, Access to Procedures ‘Safe Third Countries’, ‘Safe 
Countries of Origin’ and ‘Time Limits’, UNHCR, June 2001, 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=
3b39a2403 (discussing how countries are classified as safe under the human rights 
obligations of the European Union). 
124 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Asylum Processes (Fair 
and Efficient Asylum Procedures), ¶ 4, EC/GC/01/12 (May 31, 2001). 
125 See Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 111, 
at line 196. 
126 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Annotations for 
Articles 1 to 19 of the Draft Council Directive on Minimum Standards for the Qualification of 
Third Country Nationals and Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need 
International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, Dec. 2002, at 6, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/437cafaa4.html. 
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government examiners.127 For a country to have effective procedural 
protections, the system of adjudicating claims must take into account 
and make allowances for unsupported yet credible statements by 
applicants.128 
The UNHCR does not stand alone in its emphasis on the 
effective processing of asylum claims. The ICJ has similarly linked the 
principle of non-refoulement to a third country having an adequate 
system of adjudicating asylum claims.129 In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 
a noncitizen claiming asylum from Afghanistan entered the European 
Union through Greece.130 The Afghani finally made his way to 
Belgium, where he was detained.131 He was then transferred back to 
Greece to have his asylum claim processed.132 The Grand Chamber 
of the European Court of Human Rights held that Belgium breached 
its obligation of non-refoulement under Article 3 of the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“ECHR”).133 The court emphasized that shortcomings in 
a third country’s system of processing asylum claims alone could 
violate a deporting state’s international obligations of non-
refoulement.134 The court explained that Belgium “knew or ought to 
have known” that the noncitizen, when deported to Greece, had “no 
guarantee that his asylum application would be seriously examined by 
the Greek authorities.”135 In designating Greece as an improper third 
country, the court pointed to deficiencies in the Greek system of 
processing asylum claims, including claimants not receiving adequate 
                                                 
127 See Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 111, 
at line 196. 
128 See id. 
129 See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece,  App. No. 30696/09,  Eur. Ct. 
H.R., 4  (2011), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d39bc7f2.html. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. at 84 (2011). 
134 See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece,  App. No. 30696/09,  Eur. Ct. 
H.R., 75 (2011). 
135 Id. at 75; See also DEPARTMENT OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: 
GREECE, 14(2010)(discussing the refugee protection system in Greece. Greece’s 
asylum system has been characterized as “gravely dysfunctional” in its identification 
of individuals seeking asylum and its processing of claims.). 
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information from Greek officials, a shortage of interpreters, and 
claimants not being given sufficient opportunity to secure legal aid.136 
Because of backlogs in the Greek asylum processing system, 
excessive delays in both initial asylum determinations and subsequent 
appeals were further indicated as negative factors in Greece’s 
immigration system.137 
VI. MALAYSIA’S TREATMENT OF REFUGEES 
International standards and safeguards indicate that a third 
country will be considered improper based on deficiencies in its 
processing of asylum claims alone.138 For Malaysia to therefore 
constitute a proper third country, standards of protection articulated 
by the international community must be met.139 In order to determine 
whether Malaysia would constitute an effective third country, it is 
necessary to examine Malaysia’s system of processing asylum claims, 
as well as its treatment of asylum seekers. 
One of the initial and resounding objections by the media to 
the Malaysian deal was that Malaysia had yet to become a member of 
the Refugee Convention.140 Being a member of the Convention does 
not simply mean that a country acknowledges the need to uphold 
human rights standards for those seeking asylum.141 The UNHCR 
also casts a net of supervision142 over the member states.143 The 
regulations put in place by the Convention were designed to provide 
a uniform system of asylum protection and adjudication between 
                                                 
136 See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece,  App. No. 30696/09,  Eur. Ct. 
H.R., 111 (2011). 
137 See id. at 39. 
138 See id. at 75. 
139 See id. 
140 See British Broadcasting Corporation, supra note 2; see also Ja & Drape, 
supra note 2. 
141 See Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra 
note 71, at 2. 
142 See id. at 4. 
143 See Michelle Foster, Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring 
Refugees To Seek Protection in Another State, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 223, 283 (2007). 
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member states.144In fact, the concept of safe third countries 
originated as a way for member states with common protection 
obligations to share the burden of processing asylum claims.145 
Because Malaysia is not a State Party to the Refugee 
Convention, it does not have an obligation to comply with the 
minimum protections listed in the treaty as would a member state.146 
Moreover, the country does not legally recognize the status of 
“refugee” under its domestic laws.147 The UNHCR has indicated that 
the country does not have any “constitutional, legislative or 
administrative provisions dealing with the right to seek asylum or the 
protection of refugees.”148 This lack of legal recognition means that a 
system has not been established for providing protection for the 
specific processing and protection needs of refugees.149 No 
protection is provided for noncitizens that are ultimately determined 
to be unlawful and expelled to their countries of origin.150 
Under Malaysian law, anyone entering the country without 
appropriate documentation is subject to mandatory imprisonment for 
a maximum period of five years and a fine not exceeding RM10,000 
(approximately $3,000 USD).151 Under Section 6 of Malaysia’s 
Immigration Act of 1959/63, an unlawful noncitizen is also subject 
                                                 
144 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32, at ¶ 117 (“What is clear is that 
signatories to the Refugees Convention and the Refugees Protocol are bound to 
accord to those who have been determined to be refugees the rights that are 
specified in those instruments including the rights earlier described.”). 
145 See id. at ¶ 19. 
146 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, States Parties to the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, Apr. 
2011,http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html. 
147 See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: MALAYSIA, 27 
(2010). 
148 U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR’s Views On The 
Concept of Effective Protection As It Relates To Malaysia, Mar. 2005, at 1, 
http://www.unhcr.org.au/pdfs/Malaysia.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR’s Views On The 
Concept of Effective Protection As It Relates To Malaysia]. 
149 See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: MALAYSIA, at 
27 (2010) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: MALAYSIA]. 
150 See id. at 28. 
151 See Immigration Act 1959/63, § 6(3)(Malaysia). 
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to whipping of not more than six strokes.152 Since the Malaysian 
Immigration Act was amended in 2002, the Malaysian government 
reported in June 2009 that 47,914 noncitizens had been subjected to 
physical punishment for immigration offenses.153 Amnesty 
International has similarly estimated that as many as 10,000 
immigrant prisoners are caned in the country annually.154 
In some ways, the Malaysian government has not been blind 
to the holes existing in its immigration policy. The UNHCR has 
noted that Malaysia has shown a “considerable degree of 
cooperation” with UNHCR officials.155 The country has not impeded 
humanitarian organizations that enter the country and provide 
assistance to the refugee population.156 Those already granted refugee 
status by the UNHCR are not deported and are generally given 
preferential treatment in detention centers.157 Likewise, those with 
UNHCR cards were given access to health care and limited access to 
NGO clinics.158 The country, however, does not provide access to 
formal education, even to noncitizens with UNHCR cards.159 
Yet, this situational compliance does not alleviate the broader 
and deeper problems in Malaysia’s refugee policy. In the Annual 
World Refugee Survey, the UNHCR characterized Malaysia’s refugee 
processing as a system comprised of “arbitrary arrest[s], detention[s] 
and deportation[s]” of refugees.160 Malaysia’s immigration system 
furthermore does not seem to take into account the danger of chain 
refoulement.161 The UNHCR noted that during 2008, Malaysia 
                                                 
152 See id. 
153 See HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: MALAYSIA, supra note 150, at 26. 
154 See AMNESTY INT’L, A BLOW TO HUMANITY—TORTURE BY JUDICIAL 
CANING IN MALAYSIA 5 (2010). 
155 UNHCR’s Views On The Concept of Effective Protection As It Relates To 
Malaysia, supra note 149, at 1. 
156 See HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: MALAYSIA, supra note 150, at 27. 
157 See id. 
158 See id. 
159 See id. at 28. 
160 U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, World Refugee Survey 
2009 – Malaysia, June 17, 2009,  
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deported at least 1,000 asylum seekers to Thailand, which has been 
known to refoule noncitizens to Myanmar.162 
Malaysia’s adjudication of asylum claims has been criticized as 
including inconsistencies and corruption. In the 2008 Annual World 
Refugee Survey, the UNHCR described how authorities in 
immigration holding facilities do not permit detainees to make phone 
calls upon their arrest.163 In order to inform anyone of their arrest or 
to seek aid, the detainees generally had to bribe police officers.164 
Malaysia also has a history of not following the letter of its 
international obligations.165 Despite Malaysia being a State Party to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the country does not 
provide primary education opportunities or free health services to 
most asylum seeking children.166 The UNHCR has further observed 
that the country has failed to consistently implement political 
decisions, specific laws and regulations or even oral agreements with 
the UNHCR to establish a system of refugee protection and 
evaluation.167 
Malaysia’s deficiencies in asylum processing act as a 
counterexample to what the international community characterizes as 
a safe third country. Similar to the International Court of Justice’s 
reasoning in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece that a third country was 
improper because there was no guarantee that asylum applications 
would be considered fairly and properly due to processing 
deficiencies,168 the failure of the Malaysian system to protect against 
the dangers of internal corruption and chain refoulement suggest that 
Malaysia would not be a proper third country.169 Furthermore, similar 
to the reasoning of the UNHCR that hallmarks of a safe third 
country include applicants being given information about their 
                                                 
162 See id. 
163 See id. 
164 See id.  
165 See  World Refugee Survey 2009 – Malaysia, supra note 161. 
166 See id. 
167 See UNHCR’s Views On The Concept of Effective Protection As It Relates To 
Malaysia, supra note 149, at 1. 
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process and access to a fair and impartial system of asylum 
determination and appeal,170 reports indicating that detainees must 
resort to bribery to gain access to outside resources intimate that 
Malaysia lacks the internal system needed to meet international 
standards.171 
VII. CAN DOMESTIC REGULATIONS TRUMP INTERNATIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS? 
Australia’s Constitution dictates that treaty ratification is the 
function of the Commonwealth Executive,172 while the passage of 
laws affecting the Commonwealth is a function of the 
Commonwealth Parliament.173 Because of this separation of powers, 
a treaty is not incorporated into domestic law unless it is 
implemented by legislation.174 This concept has traditionally been 
known as dualism.175 A dualist system requires international laws to 
be translated to domestic regulations in order to take effect.176 
Without such execution, litigants would have no cognizable claim in 
national courts based on international provisions.177 
In the vast majority of cases, statutory construction 
circumvents problems related to incorporation.178 It is 
uncontroverted that a country has the sovereign power to determine 
the means by which international agreements are implemented 
                                                 
170 See Refugees Without an Asylum Country, supra note 101. 
171 See World Refugee Survey 2009 – Malaysia, supra note 161. 
172 See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION § 61; see also Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, Treaties and Treaty Making (2011), 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/treaties/making/making2.html. 
173 See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION § 1. 
174 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, supra note 173. 
175 See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy 
Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 323; see also Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The 
Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 628 (2007). 
176 Id. 
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178 See generally Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, 
(1995) 183 CLR at 273, 32 ALD 420  (Austl.). 
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domestically.179 The principle that ambiguities in legislation should be 
construed in accordance with treaty obligations circumvents the 
majority of conflicts between the international and domestic fields.180 
However, under a system that requires incorporation for treaty 
provisions to take on the force of law, it is theoretically possible to 
change the direct obligations which a treaty would impose by 
amending Australian domestic law. 
Just such an amendment was proposed after the High Court 
ruled against the Malaysian deal.181 On September 21, 2011, a bill to 
amend the Migration Act of 1958 was introduced in the Australian 
House of Representatives.182 The purpose of this bill was to “replace 
the existing framework in the Migration Act for taking offshore entry 
persons to another country.”183 The bill called for the repeal of 
section 198A, the basis for the High Court’s 2011 ruling against the 
Malaysia deal.184 In place of this component, a new section would 
provide that “the designation of a country to be an offshore 
processing country need not be determined by reference to the 
international obligations or domestic law of that country.”185 
The proposed amendment to the Migration Act would 
circumvent the specific ruling of the High Court which disallowed 
the Malaysian deal.186 However, case law indicates that despite this 
incorporation requirement, treaties still impose some indirect 
                                                 
179 See id.; Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth, (1998) 195 CLR 337, 384 
(Austl.); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Mar. 23, 1976) (“Where not already 
provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt 
such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant.”). 
180 See generally Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, 
(1995) 183 CLR at 273. 
181 See Migration Legislation Amendment (Offshore Processing and 
Other Measures) of 2011, (Cth)(Austl.). 
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184 See id. at 17. 
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obligations absent being implemented by legislation.187 In Minister for 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, a Malaysian immigrant was 
ordered deported after being convicted of possessing heroin.188 The 
Federal Court held that the deportation order had been improperly 
issued because of a failure to consider the hardship to Teoh’s wife 
and her children if Teoh was refused legal status.189 On review, the 
High Court affirmed the Federal Court’s decision, reasoning that the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child required the hardship suffered 
by the children to be considered.190 The High Court’s reasoning can 
be applied not only to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, but 
also to other treaties to which Australia is a State Party.191 The High 
Court reasoned that, while international agreements must be 
incorporated into domestic law to have effect, ratification alone holds 
significance.192 The High Court held that Australia’s ratification of an 
international agreement raised a “legitimate expectation” that the 
standards set forth in the treaty would be followed.193 Absent a 
“statutory or executive indication to the contrary,” the obligations 
and rights annunciated in treaties are treated as directives on 
government policy.194 
Teoh contains no reference to what would constitute adequate 
“statutory or executive indication to the contrary.” Here, subsequent 
Australian case law is instructive. In Tien v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs, the Court interpreted sufficient “indications to 
the contrary” to refer to statements made at the time a treaty is 
entered into, “rather than to statements made years after the treaty 
came into force.”195 Take the case of Baldini v. Minister for Immigration 
                                                 
187 See Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, (1995) 183 
CLR at 293. 
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and Multicultural Affairs as a counter-example.196 In this case, a 
Ministerial Direction under s 499 of the Migration Act of 1958 was at 
issue.197 The Ministerial Directions indicate that the best interest of a 
child should be taken into account only in cases involving parental 
relationships.198 These Directions provide a narrower best interest 
analysis than provided for under the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.199 Nevertheless, the Court found that the Ministerial Direction 
provided sufficient “executive indication to the contrary.”200 The 
take-away from post-Teoh interpretations of “statutory or executive 
indication to the contrary” is that such indication must be clear and 
must exist at the time that international obligations are reduced to 
domestic law. 
Recent years have seen a retreat from the ruling in Teoh. Only 
a few short weeks after Teoh’s ruling, Australia’s then-existing 
Attorney General and Minister of Foreign Affairs issued a joint 
statement denouncing the High Court’s reasoning that 
unincorporated treaties impose a “legitimate expectation” under 
domestic law.201 What followed included not only multiple attempts 
to overturn the decision in the Australian Parliament, but also a 
retreat by the High Court itself from its language in Teoh.202 In Ex 
                                                 
196 See Baldini v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 
(2000) FCA 173, ¶ 4; see also Wendy Lacey, In the Wake of Teoh: Finding Appropriate 
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impact on post-Teoh legislation). 
197 See Baldini v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 
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legislation which invalidates Teoh’s language). 
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parte Lam, a noncitizen who had established a family in Australia was 
subject to deportability based on a number of criminal convictions.203 
Based on the precedent in Teoh, it appeared that there was a 
“legitimate expectation” that the best interests of the children who 
would be left behind should be taken into account to comport with 
Australia’s treaty obligations.204 The High Court, however, expressed 
reservations about the language in Teoh.205 The notion was reiterated 
that, in the Australian system, treaty obligations that have not been 
enacted by legislation are not self-executing.206 The High Court 
suggested that Teoh might represent an incompatibility to this 
principle.207 Teoh’s continued significance, the High Court suggested, 
would depend on the limitations that are to be placed on the case’s 
language and on “the basis upon which Teoh rests.”208 
Despite a retreat at both the political and judicial levels, Teoh 
still represents good law in the Commonwealth.209 Furthermore, 
decisions by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal indicate that lower 
courts continue to follow the High Court’s reasoning in Teoh.210 In 
Yad Ram v. Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, the Tribunal 
reviewed the denial of an application for a spousal visa.211 The 
Tribunal applied Teoh and found that the spousal visa should be 
issued based on the best interests of a child who would be affected 
by the decision.212 While Teoh remains contentious within Australia, 
standards annunciated by the international community bolster the 
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High Court’s decision.213 The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties indicates that a country’s domestic laws cannot provide a 
justification for an international treaty violation.214 The International 
Law Commission of the United Nations has further indicated that a 
country’s legislation being deemed ‘wrongful’ is governed by 
international law.215 This character of “wrongfulness” is not affected 
if a law is deemed proper within a country.216 
The continued existence of Teoh indicates that amending 
Australia’s domestic refugee law would not be an effective means to 
circumvent obligations under the Refugee Convention. As the High 
Court in Teoh indicated, while an amendment to the refugee 
processing system can properly alter the means by which asylum 
claims are adjudicated, the ends which result from the process must 
nevertheless comport with the standards and obligations delineated in 
the Refugee Convention.217 Furthermore, international standards 
delineated by such instruments as the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties appear to specifically address and prohibit nations from 
circumventing their international obligations by changing their 
internal laws.218 The weight of such standards indicates that any 
amendment designed to allow for an improper third party deal will be 
in violation of Australia’s international obligations. While altering the 
Migration Act would overcome the immediate blockade by 
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overturning the High Court’s 2011 ruling, international standards 
indicate that Australia would still violate its obligations under the 
Refugee Convention. 
CONCLUSION 
An amendment to Australia’s Migration Act is not an antidote 
to the Malaysian deal. While amending Section 198A of the Migration 
Act has the effect of overturning the discrete High Court ruling 
declaring the Malaysian deal improper, Australia’s international 
obligations remain. 
Certain questions remain unanswered. The conclusions of 
this comment are based on the continued vitality of the High Court’s 
holding in Teoh that Australia’s ratification of an international treaty, 
in the absence of statutory or executive indication to the contrary, 
raises a “legitimate expectation” that the standards set forth in the 
treaty will be followed.219While Teoh still stands as good law in the 
Commonwealth, the High Court’s language in Lam and the 
Executive’s issuance of a statement denouncing Teoh, leave the 
“legitimate expectation” standard on shaky grounds.220 
Further, only the shortcomings in third party schemes have 
been addressed. It has been argued that a country such as Malaysia, 
which is not a State Party to the Refugee Convention and whose 
system of immigration processing is riddled with problems, cannot 
constitute a proper third country. While this comment has suggested 
that certain standards of asylum processing might bring a country up 
to international standards of human rights, a discussion of what 
would generally be considered a safe third country is beyond the 
scope of this discussion. 
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The Refugee Convention emphasizes that its State Parties are 
sovereign states which are nevertheless part of an international 
community.221 While the means by which protection is provided to 
refugees is the province of domestic law, to determine the ends that 
are ultimately met a member state must look outwards to its role as 
an actor on the international stage. 
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PROTECTING SHAREHOLDERS FROM 
THEMSELVES: HOW THE UNITED 
KINGDOM’S 2011 TAKEOVER CODE 
AMENDMENTS HIT THEIR MARK 
Matthew Peetz

 
INTRODUCTION 
American food conglomerate Kraft Foods’ four-month-long, 
hostile-turned-friendly takeover of British icon Cadbury,1 met with 
outcries from unions, politicians, and the general public.2 The uproar 
led to major changes in the United Kingdom’s City Code on 
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editing processes. I would like to thank Professor Sam Thompson for the 
inspiration for this piece. I would like to thank Dean Amy Gaudion for making me 
a better a legal writer and editor. And finally, I would like to thank my Grandfather, 
my Mom & Dad, and Colleen Kasprzak for their continued love and support 
throughout law school and particularly through the long nights associated with 
writing for a journal. 
1 See TIMELINE-Kraft Agrees to Cadbury Deal After 4-month Fight, 
REUTERS, Jan. 19, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/19/cadbury-kraft-
idUSLDE60E0XI20100119 [hereinafter TIMELINE).  
2 See David Jones & Brad Dorfman, Kraft Snares Cadbury for $19.6 Billion, 
REUTERS, Jan. 19, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/19/us-cadbury-
idUSTRE60H1N020100119. Much of the concern among the public was over two 
things: losing Cadbury, a uniquely British company, to a faceless giant of a 
company; and over the potential loss of jobs, which occurs after almost any merger 
when the two newly merged companies start consolidating operations and work 
forces. 
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Takeovers and Mergers (“Takeover Code”).3  Within eighteen 
months of the takeover, The Code Committee (“The Code 
Committee” or “The Committee”) of The Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers (“the Takeover Panel” or “The Panel”) amended the 
Takeover Code. The Committee’s change corrected the perceived 
imbalance of power in favor of bidders in a takeover attempt.4  It is 
unclear, however, whether this inequity was as threatening as the 
public outcry made it seem.5  Rather, The Code Committee may have 
succumbed to political pressures by creating amendments that 
protect target companies at the expense of target company 
shareholders.6  Moreover, some large law firms hypothesized that the 
new Code amendments would deter some potential bidders from 
ever pursuing a target company, thereby chilling the mergers and 
acquisitions (“M&A”) market and reducing potential sale proceeds to 
target shareholders.7  On the other hand, “short-term” investors can 
unduly influence hostile bids.8  Therefore, in practice, the 
                                                 
3 See generally THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY 
CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS (10th ed. 2011), 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf 
[hereinafter Takeover Code]. 
4 THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, REVIEW OF CERTAIN 
ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS, 2010, Consultation Paper 
Issued by The Code Committee of The Panel PCP 2010/2, 4, 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2008/11/PCP201002.p
df [hereinafter Consultation Paper]. 
5 See generally Michael R. Patrone, Sour Chocolate? Cadbury/Kraft and the 
2011 Proposed Amendments to the U.K. Takeover Code – A Call for Further Research, 8 
BYU INT’L L. MGMT. R. 63, 66 (2011),  
http://www.law2.byu.edu/ilmr/articles/winter_2011/BYU_ILMR_winter_2011_4
_Chocolate.pdf. See also note 99.  
6 See Patrone, supra note 5, at 65-66; Takeover Code, Introduction, ¶ 2(a) at 
A1 (stating that the shareholders are the primary constituents whom The Code 
seeks to protect). 
7 See, e.g., Corporate Legal Alert, Mayer Brown, Takeover Code Changes 
Published – Is This a New Era for UK Takeovers? (July 2011) 
http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/Takeover-Code-changes-published—-
is-this-a-new-era-for-UK-takeovers-07-21-2011/; Client Briefing, Clifford Chance, 
Impact of UK Takeover Code Reform, 10 (Sept. 15, 2011) 
http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2011/09/impact_
of_uk_takeovercodereform.html.   
8 See infra Part III.A. See also Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 4 
(describing “short-term” investors as those shareholders who become interested in 
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shareholders of the target company may not be protected to the 
extent The Code originally envisioned.  This “short-term” investor 
problem was the primary problem the amendments intended to fix.9  
Either way the amendments will likely substantially impact how a 
takeover bid will operate in the United Kingdom going forward. 
This comment argues that The Code amendments will 
protect target company shareholders beyond the pre-amendment 
regime, without over-regulating and potentially harming other aspects 
of takeover practice.  Had The Code Committee gone further by fully 
implementing10 the proposed idea of exempting “short-term” 
investors from voting on transactions,11 the M&A market generally, 
and target shareholders specifically, would have been harmed in 
contravention of the principles12 of the Takeover Code.  Although 
the Takeover Panel appeared to react due to the public dismay, the 
amendments will serve the established shareholders of publically 
traded United Kingdom companies, and therefore strengthen the 
protections envisioned under the original spirit of The Code.13 
Part I of this comment will briefly explore the history of the 
Kraft-Cadbury takeover and the resulting fervor surrounding the 
deal.14  Part II will discuss the traditional functions of the Takeover 
Panel and the Takeover Code.15  Part III will explain the four major 
                                                 
the shares of the target company only after a public announcement of a possible 
offer); see also Jean Eaglesham & Lina Saigol, Mandelson Urges Radical Takeover Reform, 
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5491ca8a-2587-11df-
9bd3-00144feab49a.html#ixzz1Y8uy6kxO.  
9 See Steven M. Davidoff, British Takeover Rules May Mean Quicker Pace but 
Fewer Bids, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 19, 2011, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/new-british-rules-will-speed-up-the-
pace-of-takeovers/.   
10 This comment will suggest, infra Part IV, that a measured, limited 
application of this proposed amendment may increase shareholder protection in 
the future. 
11 Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 20. 
12 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, Gen. Principles 1-6, at B1; 
The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Explanatory Paper: Implementation of the 
European Directive on Takeover Bids, 2005/10, apps. 1-2 at 24-26. 
13 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, Gen. Principles 1-6, at B1. 
14 See infra Part I.A.  
15 See infra Part I.B.  
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changes to the Takeover Code and will explore the concerns with, 
and the reasoning behind, each amendment by examining the 
consulting and explanatory papers about The Code amendments 
issued by the Takeover Panel.16  Part IV will first look to economic 
studies of shareholder value in takeovers17 and then explore the 
effects of “short-term” investors18 on takeover attempts.19  Finally, 
this comment will conclude that the new amendments will mitigate 
those “short-term” investor detrimental effects and actually protect 
shareholders as the Takeover Code had always intended. 
I. HISTORY & BACKGROUND 
 A.  The Kraft-Cadbury Deal, the Resulting Fervor, and Swift  
  Action by the Takeover Panel 
It took Kraft Foods four hard-fought months to reach a deal 
with the shareholders of Cadbury.20  After a series of offers and 
rejections, and then over two months of Cadbury posting increasing 
financial projections and share prices, Kraft increased its bid to £11.9 
billion ($19.55 billion U.S.), which the Cadbury board accepted on 
January 19, 2010.21  The Cadbury shareholders accepted Kraft’s 
tender offer22 on February 2, 2010, with over seventy percent of the 
                                                 
16 See infra Parts II.A-D.   
17 See infra Part III.A.  
18 Merger arbitrageurs, discussed infra Part III.B, are the most prevalent 
type of “short-term” investors in M&A practices and the type with which this 
comment will concern itself. 
19 See infra Part III.B.  
20 See TIMELINE, supra note 1.  
21 See Graeme Wearden, Timeline: Cadbury’s Fight Against Kraft, THE 
GUARDIAN, Jan. 19, 2010,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jan/19/cadbury-kraft-takeover-
timeline.  Kraft made a public indicative offer on September 7, 2009, for £10.2 
billion (approximately $16.3 billion U.S.), Kraft submitted its firm hostile bid 
directly to the Cadbury shareholders on November 9, 2009, on the same terms it 
originally proposed to the Cadbury board.  This offer was quickly rejected by the 
shareholders.  See id. 
22 For an explanation of a tender offer see Tender Offer, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’, http://www.sec.gov/answers/tender.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (“A 
tender offer is a broad solicitation by a company or a third party to purchase a 
substantial percentage of a company’s . . . registered equity shares or units for a 
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shareholders tendering their shares.23  During this four-month 
process, the composition of the Cadbury shareholders changed 
drastically.24  By the time the shareholders tendered their shares, 
“short-term” investors such as hedge funds had increased their share 
in Cadbury from five percent to about thirty-one percent of the 
company.25 
Throughout the takeover battle unions and politicians in the 
United Kingdom voiced strong opposition to Kraft swallowing 
Cadbury.26  United Kingdom Business Secretary Lord Peter 
Mandelson, for example, was against the takeover as early as 
September 25, 2009.27  After the transaction was consummated, 
Mandelson urged substantial reform of the United Kingdom takeover 
regime.28  Unions in the United Kingdom also argued against the 
Cadbury takeover due to the fear of large-scale job cuts.29  
Compounding the fears and flaring political tempers, the Royal Bank 
of Scotland, at the time an eighty-four percent taxpayer-owned bank, 
agreed to loan Kraft £630 million (approximately $1.03 billion U.S.) 
to finance the takeover after the bank had been bailed out by the 
                                                 
limited period of time. The offer is at a fixed price, usually at a premium over the 
current market price, and is customarily contingent on shareholders tendering a 
fixed number of their shares or units”). 
23 David Jones & Brad Dorfman, Cadbury Shareholders Approve Kraft 
Takeover, REUTERS, Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/02/us-
cadbury-kraft-idUSTRE61124D20100202.   
24 See Foreign Takeovers in Britain: Small Island for Sale, ECONOMIST, May 25, 
2010, http://www.economist.com/node/15769586.  
25 Id.  
26 See infra text accompanying notes 27-30.  
27 David Teather, Mandelson Admits Foreign Ownership of Firms Disadvantages 
UK, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 25, 2009, 
 http://www.guardian.com.uk/business/2009/sep/25/mandelson-british-industry-
unions.   
28 See Eaglesham & Saigol, supra note 8.  
29 See Debt-Heavy Kraft Could Put 30,000 Cadbury Jobs at Risk, Warns Unite, 
UNITE THE UNION, Jan. 13, 2010, 
http://archive.unitetheunion.org/news__events/archived_news_releases/2010_arc
hived_press_releases/debt-heavy_kraft_could_put_3-1.aspx .  
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government.30  Surely the Takeover Panel was acutely aware of the 
mounting political pressure throughout the United Kingdom. 
In contrast to the dragged out takeover battle that ensued 
between Kraft and Cadbury, it took less than a year and a half for 
The Code Committee of the Takeover Panel to consider, propose, 
and adopt amendments to the United Kingdom’s Takeover Code.31  
In fact, a mere five weeks after the Kraft and Cadbury deal was 
completed, The Code Committee announced its intention to solicit 
input from the United Kingdom business community to review 
specific aspects of the Takeover Code.32  The Committee cited the 
Kraft takeover of Cadbury and the public reaction to the deal as the 
impetus for its action.33 After this consultation period expired,34 The 
Code Committee reviewed responses from numerous respondents. 
The Committee then roughly outlined amendments it felt compelled 
to undertake in an October 21, 2010, report.35  By March 2011, The 
Committee had proposed amendments to the Takeover Code,36 
which it adopted with little change in late July 2011.37  These 
amendments took effect September 19, 2011.38 
                                                 
30 Clegg Attacks Brown Over RBS Funding for Cadbury Bid, BBC, Jan. 20, 
2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8470776.stm. 
  
31 The Code Committee officially announced and adopted the 
amendments in July 2011, but it was another two months before the amendments 
came into effect on Sept. 19, 2011. 
32 Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 1.  
33 Id. 
34 The consultation period ran from June 1, 2010 to July 27, 2010. 
35 THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS CODE COMMITTEE, 
REVIEW OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS, PCP 
2010/2, 1–2, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/2010-22.pdf [hereinafter Panel Report]. 
36 THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS CODE COMMITTEE, 
REVIEW OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS: 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE TAKEOVER CODE, PCP 2011/1, 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/PCP201101.pdf [hereinafter Proposed Amendments].  
37 See THE CODE COMMITTEE OF THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND 
MERGERS, 2011, AMENDMENTS FOLLOWING THE CODE COMMITTEE’S REVIEW OF 
THE REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS, Instrument 2011/2, 1, 
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 B.  The Operation of the Takeover Code and the Takeover Panel 
The Takeover Panel was originally created in 1968 to oversee 
takeover regulation in the United Kingdom.39  The Takeover Panel is 
charged with issuing and administering the Takeover Code.40  The 
United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006 codified and broadened the 
rule-making powers of the Takeover Panel.41  Interestingly, when The 
Code Committee first started soliciting input for the recent 
amendments to The Code, the introduction paragraph of the 
Takeover Code stated that its purpose was to ensure the fair 
treatment of shareholders generally.42 However, when The Code 
Committee published its Consultation Paper that began the initial 
solicitations of input, the introduction had changed. The Committee 
specifically wrote that The Code is designed principally to ensure that 
shareholders in an offeree43 company . . . are treated fairly.”44  As 
such, the Consultation Paper may have been the first indication that 
political pressures were forcing The Panel to consider strengthening 
target company shareholder protection.45 
The Takeover Panel and the Takeover Code are not 
concerned with the financial and commercial merits of takeovers.46  
                                                 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/Instrument-
2011-2.pdf [hereinafter Amendment Instrument]. 
38 Id.  
39 Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 1-2.  The Takeover Panel governs 
publically listed companies on the U.K. stock exchanges that have their registered 
offices in the U.K.  See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, ¶ 3(a) at A3. 
40 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, ¶ 1 at A1. 
41 Companies Act 2006, (c. 46), pt. 28 ch. 1. 
42 See Amendment Instrument, supra note 37, at app. 1. (amending Introduction 
¶ 2(a) from “The Code is designed principally to ensure that shareholders are 
treated fairly . . .” to “. . . to ensure that shareholders in an offeree company are treated 
fairly . . .”). 
43 The Takeover Panel uses the terms “Offeree” and “Offeror” to 
designate targets and acquirers.  This comment will typically use the American 
designations of “target” and “acquirer” or “bidder,” but will also use the formal 
British terms of The Panel at times, especially when quoting or directly referring to 
the Takeover Code or papers from The Panel. 
44 Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 2.  
45 See generally Davidoff, supra note 9. 
46 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction ¶ 2(a) at A1; Consultation Paper at 
2, 5.  
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The Panel has never taken a view on the advantages or disadvantages 
of takeovers to the companies participating in them.47  Instead, The 
Panel and The Code exist to establish a framework to regulate the 
conduct of companies involved in a particular transaction.48 The final 
decision on the merits of an offer, however, is left to the 
shareholders.49 
In light of these principles, a central pillar of the Takeover 
Code, and an excellent example of its purpose of ensuring fair 
treatment of shareholders, is the Board Neutrality Rule.50  The Board 
Neutrality Rule prevents the board of directors of a target company 
from taking any action that may frustrate or deny the shareholders 
the opportunity to decide on the merits of an offer themselves.51  
This is in stark contrast to the defensive tactics, such as poison pills,52 
that Delaware courts have long endorsed.53  As seen in the Cadbury 
takeover, the best defense a target board can legally employ is to ask 
the shareholders to vote against the bid.54 Cadbury’s board, for 
example, could only show improved financial data in an attempt to 
convince its shareholders that their long-term prospects of remaining 
shareholders of Cadbury were better than their short-term prospects 
(i.e. selling their shares to “short-term” investors or Kraft).55  
Alternatively, Cadbury’s board could attempt to increase the fair 
                                                 
47 Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 5. 
48 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction ¶ 2(a) at A1. 
49 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction ¶ 2(a) at A1-A2.  
50 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 21.1(a) at I13 (applying during the 
course of an offer or when an offer is reasonably believed to be imminent). 
51 Id.  
52 SAMUEL S. THOMPSON, JR., BUSINESS PLANNING FOR MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS: CORPORATE, SECURITIES, TAX, ANTITRUST, INTERNATIONAL, AND 
RELATED ASPECTS 155-56 (3d ed. 2008) (“The basic objectives of the [poison pill] 
are to deter abusive takeover tactics by making them unacceptably expensive to the 
raider [i.e. a hostile bidder] and to encourage prospective acquirers to negotiate 
with the board of directors of the target rather than to attempt a hostile takeover.”). 
53 See e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 
1985). 
54 See Wearden, supra note 21.  
55 See Id.  
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value of Cadbury’s shares—by making the company more 
profitable—beyond what Kraft would be willing to pay.56 
The Takeover Code presumes it is protecting shareholders 
from board entrenchment57 by requiring neutrality of the board of 
directors of target companies.58  Nevertheless, after receiving 
numerous responses to its Consultation Paper, The Code Committee 
concluded that hostile bidders had gained a tactical advantage over 
targets because of “short-term” investors.59  The irony of dissuading 
board defensive maneuvers, only to have “short-term” investors 
provide the shareholder support that a bidder may need to complete 
their hostile takeover, seems to have been a tipping point for The 
Panel.  In response, The Panel enacted several major amendments, 
discussed below, to help tilt the balance of power back to a more 
reasonable level for the target company shareholders.60 
II.  THE 2011 AMENDMENTS TO THE TAKEOVER CODE 
To restore the level of protection originally afforded to target 
company shareholders, The Code Committee sought to correct some 
perceived disadvantages to those shareholders that had developed in 
the system.61  The first problem that The Committee addressed was 
the problem of the “virtual bid.”62  The “virtual bid” is a term of art 
given to the time period after an announcement of a potential bid has 
been made, but before a firm offer is made.63  This time period has 
many effects.  Significantly, it can lead to a change in the composition 
of the shareholders when some shareholders sell to merger 
arbitrageurs64 (i.e. “short-term” investors).65  Other problems The 
                                                 
56 See Id.  
57 For an explanation of board entrenchment see infra Part III.A. 
58 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Note 5 on Rule 21.1 at I15.  
59 Panel Report, supra note 35, at 3; see also supra note 8. 
60 See infra Part I.  
61 See generally Consultation Paper, supra note 4.  
62 Panel Report, supra note 35, at 4.  
63 See id. (explaining that the offer period is the period after there is public 
knowledge of the potential bid.  This can arise from an official announcement or if 
information is accidently leaked). 
64 Id.  
65 See supra text accompanying notes 8, 24-25. 
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Code Committee identified include: the acquiring company 
effectively having the ability to negotiate directly with the target 
shareholders and bypass the board without ever having to make a 
firm offer;66 the bidding company obtaining the protections of the 
Board Neutrality Rule against the target board simply by announcing 
their intent to make an offer;67 a target’s board of directors being 
reluctant to ask The Panel for a “Put Up or Shut Up”68 deadline for 
the fear of appearing self-serving;69 and, the inclusion of inducement 
fees (i.e. break fees70) becoming standard practice in many recent 
deals possibly precluding competing offers.71  The Code Committee 
attempts to address all of these problems through the amendments, 
which will account for the following four major changes to the 
operation of the United Kingdom’s Takeover Code. 
 A.  The Announcing All Bidders Requirement 
The 2011 Amendments to the Takeover Code will affect how 
bidding companies approach target companies.72 The new 
Announcing All Bidders requirement, operating in concert with the 
mandatory “Put Up or Shut Up” deadline,73 will likely have the 
greatest impact on the approach.  Rule 2.4(a) of the Takeover Code 
has been completely rewritten to require a target company to identify 
any potential bidder with which the target has been in negotiations74 
as soon as an offer period commences.75  Furthermore, Rule 2.2 now 
                                                 
66 Panel Report, supra note 35, at 4. 
67 Id.  
68 See generally Put Up or Shut Up, FIN. TIMES LEXICON, (Feb. 02, 2012, 
3:09 PM) http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=put-up-or-shut-up (“The ‘put up or 
shut up’ Takeover Panel rule is designed to stop predators besieging companies for 
an indefinite period of time. It requires a potential bidder either to make an offer to 
shareholders or walk away for a period of six months”).  
69 Panel Report, supra note 35, at 4-5.  
70 See Break Fee infra note 111.  
71 Panel Report, supra note 35, at 5. 
72 See Client Briefing, Clifford Chance, supra note 7, at 16.  
73 Infra Part II.B. 
74 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.4(a) at D5; Amendment Instrument, 
supra note 37, at app. 8. 
75 See Amendment Instrument, supra note 37, at app. 8; see also id. at app. 3 
(“An offer period will commence when the first announcement is made of an offer 
or possible offer for a company”). 
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requires that the target company make an announcement in any of 
three situations: first, when the board of the target company receives 
notification of a firm intention to make an offer;76 second, when 
following an approach from, or on behalf of, a bidding company the 
target company becomes the subject of rumors, speculation or if 
there is an untoward movement in the target company’s share price;77 
or third, when a potential bidder has considered an offer but has not 
approached the board of the target company yet, and the target 
becomes the subject of rumor or speculation, or there is an untoward 
movement in the target company’s share price and there are 
reasonable grounds to conclude that the bidder’s potential actions 
have led to the situation.78  In other words, when it is known or 
rumored that a potential bid may affect securities’ prices, the target 
company is required to make a public announcement of all known 
potential bidders.  This amendment will likely heighten the secrecy 
with which bidding companies will plan their approach because the 
mandatory “Put Up or Shut Up” deadline amendments, discussed 
below, will tie in with this mandatory identification of the All 
Potential Bidders Amendment.79 
 B.  The Mandatory Twenty-Eight Day “Put Up or Shut Up”  
      Deadline 
Amended rules to the Takeover Code 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 
together govern the function of the colloquially dubbed “Put Up or 
Shut Up” deadline.80  Rule 2.6(a) expressly grants only a limited 
twenty-eight day window from when a potential bidder is first 
                                                 
76 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.2 at D2-D5; Amendment Instrument, 
supra note 37, at app. 5-6.   
77 Takeover Code, supra note3, Rule 2.2 at D2-D5; Amendment Instrument, 
supra note 37, at app. 5-6.  
78 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.2 at D2-D5; Amendment Instrument, 
supra note 37, at app. 5-6.  
79 See Client Briefing, Clifford Chance, supra note 7, at 16; Orrick, 
Herrington & Sutcliffe, Private Equity Global Insights, Proposed Changes to the UK 
Takeover Code (April, 2011) http://www.orrick.com/Events-and-
Publications/Documents/3569.htm.   
80 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.6 at D9-D10; Amendment 
Instrument, supra note 37, at app. 12-14; Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.8 at D12-
D14; Amendment Instrument, supra note 37, at app. 16-18. 
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publically identified and announced until that potential acquirer must: 
1) announce a firm intention to make an offer in accordance with 
Rule 2.7;81 or 2) announce that it does not intend to make an offer. 
The latter situation then triggers Rule 2.8.82  Rule 2.8 bars, for six 
months, any company that has announced that it will not make an 
offer to a target from a number of activities, including: announcing 
an offer or possible offer for the same target;83 acquiring any interest 
in shares of the previous target or any irrevocable commitment for 
those shares amounting to an aggregate of thirty-percent of the 
voting rights of the target company;84 making any statement that may 
raise or confirm the possibility that the bidder may make an offer to 
the target company;85 or take any steps in connection with a possible 
offer for the target.86  In other words, Rule 2.6 starts the twenty-eight 
day countdown, at which point the potential bidder must comply 
with Rule 2.7 and make a firm offer (the “Put Up” part), or walk 
away for six months under Rule 2.8 (the “Shut Up” part).87 
Rule 2.6 and its automatic invocation of Rule 2.8 will put time 
constraints on bidders that were rarely seen before the amendments.88  
This change reflects The Panel’s attempt to remedy the 
aforementioned problems resulting from the “virtual bid.”89  Now 
that the twenty-eight day deadline begins automatically upon an 
                                                 
81 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.7(a) at D11-D12 (requiring an 
offeror company to follow through on its firm intention to make an offer unless 
another company makes a higher offer or some other limited exceptions occur). 
82 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.6(a) at D9. 
83 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.8(a) at D12-13. 
84 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.8(b)-(c) at D12-D13. 
85 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.8(d) at D12-D13.  
86 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.8(e) at D12-D13. 
87 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rules 2.6-2.8 at D9-D13.  
88 See Put Up or Shut Up, supra note 68 (explaining that before the 
amendments a 28 day Put Up or Shut Up deadline was imposed by The Panel only 
after the target board asked for, and was granted one by The Panel, when they were 
besieged without a firm offer having been made). 
89 THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS CODE COMMITTEE, 
REVIEW OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS: 
RESPONSE STATEMENT BY THE CODE COMMITTEE OF THE PANEL FOLLOWING 
THE CONSULTATION ON PCP 2011/1, RS 2011/1 at 7, 12 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/RS201101.pdf [hereinafter Response Statement]. 
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announcement that starts an offer period, bidding companies will 
want to keep their investigations into, or preparations for, an offer 
secret for as long as possible.90  Bidding companies will likely shroud 
their actions in secrecy to avoid having only twenty-eight days to 
“Put Up or Shut Up” when they are not advanced enough in their 
preparations to make an offer within that period.91 
About two-thirds of respondents to the Consultation Paper 
were actually opposed to the coupling of the all bidders identification 
requirement and the mandatory “Put Up or Shut Up” deadline for 
various reasons.92  The primary reason is because the mandatory “Put 
Up or Shut Up” deadline may reduce competition for the acquisition 
of target companies and thus possibly deny target shareholders the 
benefit of other competing offers.93  Also, it may cause more 
advanced potential bidders to “flush out” less advanced potential 
bidders by leaking information that will require an announcement 
and an identification of all potential bidders.94  The amendments may 
otherwise create an “uneven playing field” where bidders that are 
more advanced in their preparations will have a large advantage over 
those not as advanced in their preparations.95  The Panel decided to 
enact the amendments with little change despite having more 
opposition than support.96 
                                                 
90 This is now due to the requirement that all bidders be named in an 
announcement that opens an offer period from amended Rules 2.2 and 2.4(a). 
91 See Client Briefing, Clifford Chance, supra note 7, at 11, 16; Orrick, 
Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79.  
92 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 8.  
93 Id.  
94 Id.  
95 Id. (showing that although listed as separate concerns, those 
respondents who were opposed to the mandatory identification of all potential 
bidders requirement were generally concerned about the “uneven playing field” that 
could arise after an announcement that starts an offer period regardless of whether 
it begins in the natural course of offer negotiations or because a well-advanced 
bidding company is attempting to “flush out” the less well-advanced potential 
bidders). 
96 See id. at 9-11. Furthermore The Committee deemed that it would be 
inappropriate to allow the Offeree company’s board to decide when they wanted to 
keep a potential bidder’s identity secret because that would lead to potential bidders 
requiring, as a pre-condition, a confidentiality agreement to keep their identity 
concealed in almost every deal.  Id.  
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The Panel decided that it would review how the amendments 
affected the M&A market one year after their implementation.97  The 
one-year review was published in November of 2012.98 Although the 
findings were generally positive, the report also stated that much of 
the effects of the amendments remain to be seen.99  Multiple large 
law firms predicted, just after The Panel announced that the 
amendments would be adopted, that the identification of all potential 
bidders requirement, and the mandatory twenty-eight day “Put Up or 
Shut Up” deadline, would require bidders to use the utmost secrecy 
when preparing a bid.100  Bidders would need to be much more 
advanced in their preparations before making an approach to a target 
company board of directors than a bidding company would be under 
the pre-amendments Code.101  The Committee kept the narrow 
exception that a target board could request an extension of the “Put 
Up or Shut Up” deadline for some or all potential bidders in a 
takeover.102  This exception will provide some relief for potential 
bidders negotiating a friendly acquisition with the target company’s 
board of directors.103  Hostile bidders, on the other hand, will need to 
be wary of how they protect information regarding a potential 
approach to a target.104  It is this heightened wariness that led some 
commentators to conclude that the amendments will deter potential 
bidders from ever making an offer in the first place and thereby harm 
                                                 
97 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 5.  
98 Discussed infra Part III.  
99 See generally THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS CODE 
COMMITTEE, REVIEW OF THE 2011 AMENDMENTS TO THE TAKEOVER CODE, 
2012/8,  
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2012-8.pdf 
[hereinafter One Year Review].  
100 Iain Wright, Publications, The UK Takeover Code: Significant Changes 
Come Into Effect, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS (Sept. 22, 2011), 
https://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publication.detail/publicati
onID/1f22a35e-c340-4de3-9703-2954b8020a98. See Client Briefing, Clifford 
Chance, supra note 7, at 16; Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79. 
101 See Wright, supra note 100; Client Briefing, Clifford Chance, supra note 
7, at 11, 16; Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79.  
102 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.6(c) at D9. 
103 Wright, supra note 100, at 3. 
104 See Wright, supra note 100, at 2. 
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target shareholders by suppressing bid competition.105  The divisive 
response of commentators, both before and after The Panel adopted 
the amendments, shows that these two major amendments aimed at 
correcting the “virtual bid” period remain the most controversial of 
the amendments.106 
 C.  The Prohibition of Deal Protection Measures 
The Panel’s sweeping decision to prohibit deal protection 
measures, except in limited circumstances,107 puts the United 
Kingdom at odds with most other developed M&A markets.108  As 
part of the amendments, The Code Committee entirely rewrote Rule 
21.2.109  New Rule 21.2(a) prohibits the target company, or any 
person acting in concert with the target company, from entering into 
any offer related arrangements with a bidder.110  Furthermore, Rule 
21.2(b) makes it clear that this prohibition includes inducement 
fees111 of any amount.112  This is a significant change to U.K. M&A 
practice where inducement fees of one-percent had become standard 
                                                 
105 See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 8; Patrone, supra note 5, at 77-
78.  
106 See Wright, supra note 100, at 2. 
107 The exceptions where the amendments still allow inducement fees are: 
with a friendly or more preferred competing bid to a hostile bid (a “white knight”) 
up to one-percent of the first “white knight” offer only payable if the hostile 
competing bid is successful; if the target is in financial distress; or with a preferred 
bidder up to one-percent of the bid in the event that the target has commenced a 
formal auction sale. See Client Briefing, Clifford Chance, supra note 7, at 8, 12 
(stating that most markets allow deal protection measures).  
108 Id. (stating that most markets allow deal protection measures). 
109 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 37.  
110 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 21.2(a) at I16; Amendment Instrument, 
supra note 37, at app. 32. 
111 See generally Megan Murphy, Takeover Panel Set to Ban Break Fees, FIN. 
TIMEs, Mar. 21, 2011, at 18; Break Fee, THE FREE DICTIONARY 
http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Break+Fee (“In mergers and 
acquisitions, a fee the target pays to the acquirer in case a deal fails before 
completion. Theoretically, this is done to reimburse the acquirer for due diligence 
expenses, but, in practice, it is often used to attempt to restore good relations 
between the two companies”). 
112 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 21.2(b) at I16; Amendment Instrument, 
supra note 37, at app. 32. 
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in almost all acquisitions.113 By comparison, the Delaware Chancery 
Courts have allowed inducement fees of three or three-and-a-half 
percent.114  Although commentators agree that this sweeping ban will 
alter what had become common practice, this modification was not 
contested as much as the “virtual bid” correction amendments.115 
The Panel’s Response Statement to their Consultation Paper 
notes that only around one-third of respondents were opposed to the 
amendments’ prohibition of inducement fees.116  Concerned 
respondents suggested that prohibiting inducement fees would deter 
potential bidders from making offers117 because the cost of preparing 
and negotiating an offer may be prohibitive without some assurance 
that the target will not leave a bidder at the altar.118  Similar to the 
major concern with the “virtual bid” corrective amendments, the 
major concern with the ban on inducement fees is that shareholders 
may be harmed by not having the chance to decide on the merits of 
all potential offers.119  In other words, some commentators are 
concerned that the inducement fee ban will deter potential bidders, 
reduce bid competition, and implicitly devalue the best offers that 
could have been made to a target company.120 
The Code Committee, however, concluded that this argument 
cuts both ways, and that inducement fees possibly deter competing 
bidders from making a topping offer.121  Competing bidders would be 
deterred because they would have to offer at an extra high premium 
                                                 
113 See Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79. 
114 See e.g., McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 505 (Del. Ch. 
2000) (3.5% break fee are not unreasonable); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d 
691 (Del. Ch. 2001) (3% break fee and matching rights are not unreasonable). 
115 See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 38 (“Around two-thirds of the 
respondents who commented on the proposed general prohibition of offer-related 
arrangements supported it or took a neutral stance”). 
116 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 38. 
117 Id.  
118 See Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79 (stating that costs 
incurred in pre-offer activities such as due diligence and financing fees could be too 
much of a burden for some potential offerors if there is no compensation for those 
wasted costs if their bid is trumped). 
119 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 38 (emphasis added). 
120 Id.  
121 Id. at 39. 
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to make the deal worthwhile for the target company’s shareholders to 
pay the inducement fee and accept the competing bid.122  With the 
support of a majority of respondents, The Code Committee 
implemented the amendment banning inducement fees because The 
Panel believed that inducement fees had become so standard in 
M&A transactions in the United Kingdom that targets were typically 
not afforded a chance to negotiate over these fees.123  Consequently, 
law firms predict that the inducement fee ban will have the biggest 
impact on private equity firms, because private equity firms will 
typically be in a more constrained financial position and will not want 
to risk losing the money put into preparing a bid if their offer is 
trumped by a competing offer.124  Strategic bidders125 will also be 
concerned about the up-front costs of an offer after these 
amendments, but the effects of the ban on inducement fees will likely 
not be as drastic as with private equity firms.126 
 D.  The Enhanced Disclosure Requirements 
The final major change to the Takeover Code, the imposition 
of enhanced disclosure requirements, consists of a series of small 
changes aimed at increasing transparency during an acquisition.127  
The most important new disclosures required by the Takeover Code 
amendments are the revelation of advisor’s fees,128 bid financing129 
and company financial information,130 and of the bidding company’s 
intention with regard to the target company and the target company 
                                                 
122 Id. 
123 See Wright, supra note 100, at 4. 
124 See Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79. 
125 A Strategic Bidder is a company that is attempting to takeover another 
company for the strategic purpose of enhancing its own value.  For example, Kraft 
taking over Cadbury to improve its market share in the confections market.   
126 See Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79. 
127 See generally Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rules 23.2, 23.3, & 24 at J1-J16.  
128 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.16 at J15-J16; Amendment 
Instrument, supra note 37, at 45-46.  
129 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.3(f) at J7; Amendment Instrument, 
supra note 37, at 41.  
130 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.3(a), (c) at J4, J5; Amendment 
Instrument, supra note 37, at 37-39. 
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employees.131  This section will briefly look at each of these major 
disclosure requirements. 
1. Disclosure of Advisor’s Fees 
The idea behind disclosing advisory fees is that although the 
fees may only make up a small percentage of the total transaction, an 
advisory fee is still usually a significant amount of money, sometimes 
rising as high as nine digits.132  With advisory fees being such a 
significant amount of money, The Panel concluded that these fee 
arrangements are material contracts to an offer.133  As such, the 
shareholders deserve to know how the directors are spending 
company money in relation to that offer, and disclosure of those fees 
might reveal incentives for advisors attempting to persuade their 
clients to a particular course of action.134 
2. Disclosure of Financial Information and Financing Information 
Before the amendments were implemented, disclosure of 
financial information and information relating to the financing of an 
offer was only required in securities exchange offers.135  The 
amendments now require disclosure of this information in all offers, 
including cash-out mergers.136  A vast majority of respondents 
supported this disclosure requirement, even though there would be 
some small additional cost to bidders and targets in assembling this 
information for dissemination, because it benefits shareholders far 
beyond that added cost.137 
                                                 
131 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.2 at J3; Amendment Instrument, supra 
note 37, at 37.  
132 Liam Vaughan, M&A: Costs Overlooked in the Heat of the Moment, FIN. 
NEWS, Jan. 3, 2011, http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2011-01-03/m-and-a-
costs (explaining that investment banks can earn about one to one and one half 
percent on deals over $1 Billion, commercial banks can earn considerably more for 
financing an M&A deal, and legal fees can be as high as $10 Million). 
133 Proposed Amendments, supra note 37, at 58. 
134 Id. 
135 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 67.  
136 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.3(a)-(e) at J4-J7; Amendment 
Instrument, supra note 37, at 37-40. 
137 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 68.  
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 3.  Disclosure of Future Intentions 
  
The major new disclosure requirement that appears to be the 
most reactionary to the Kraft-Cadbury takeover is the requirement to 
disclose intentions138 regarding the target company and its 
employees.139  Many British citizens were upset that Kraft announced 
that it would close Cadbury’s Bristol factory, signaling the loss of 400 
jobs, shortly after it promised to keep it open and spare all Cadbury 
jobs in the United Kingdom.140  The amended Rule 24.2 requires that 
successful bidding companies make known, among other things, their 
intentions with regards to future employment of personnel and 
management, and their strategic plans for the acquired company.141  
If the successful bidder has no intention to make any changes, the 
companies must disclose that as well.142  The respondents to the 
Consultation Paper agreed wholeheartedly with this change.143  The 
Code Committee conceded, though, that some hostile bidders might 
not have undertaken enough due diligence to really know the exact 
future plans of the company.144  In such cases, The Committee still 
expects that the bidding company should disclose, to the full extent 
possible, its business rationale for acquiring the target.145 
The 2011 amendments to the United Kingdom’s City Code 
on Mergers and Takeovers will certainly have an impact on the M&A 
market and on M&A practice.146  The question now becomes 
whether these amendments effectively protect target company 
                                                 
138 For example, The Code Committee now wants an acquiring company 
to state if after the merger or takeover it will make any job cuts or close any offices 
or factories. See Sarah Gadd, The Revised UK Takeover Code: Employment Considerations, 
13 THE WORKING WORLD (Lantham & Watkins), Nov. 2011, 
http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/working-world-november-2011. 
139 See id. 
140 See e.g., Cadbury’s Bristol Plant to Close by 2011, BBC NEWS, Feb. 9, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8507066.stm.  
141 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.2 at J3; Amendment Instrument, supra 
note 37, at 36-37.   
142 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.2 at J3; Amendment Instrument, supra 
note 37, at 36-37.  (Id.) 
143 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 80. 
144 Id.  
145 Id. 
146 See Davidoff, supra note 9.  
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shareholders from the recent perceived tactical advantage achieved by 
bidding companies?  And furthermore, do the amendments reach too 
far or might they not reach far enough? 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2011 TAKEOVER AMENDMENTS 
As the collective owners of a corporation shareholders stand 
to gain or lose on their investment as the result of a merger or 
acquisition.147  In public corporations, a large majority of 
shareholders individually have only a miniscule vote and cannot 
affect the policies of the corporation by voting their shares without 
the cooperation of many other shareholders.148 In Delaware a 
corporate board of directors is able to utilize a poison pill to block 
their shareholders from selling their shares in a tender offer.149  The 
United Kingdom, however, has developed a vastly different approach 
than the Delaware courts to protect shareholder interests in these 
potential multi-billion pound (or dollar) transactions.150  The United 
Kingdom takeover regulations have always upheld board neutrality in 
a takeover situation, and The Code Committee did not compromise 
that tenet with the 2011 amendments.151 However, some have argued 
that abandoning the Board Neutrality Rule for more Delaware-like 
defensive maneuvers would have better protected shareholders.152  
                                                 
147 See generally 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 630 (2011). 
148 For example, as of the end of September 2011, ExxonMobil’s largest 
shareholder was an institutional investor, The Vanguard Group, Inc. with 4.16% of 
the vote, contrasting with their largest direct shareholder Rex Tillerson, who has 
about 0.03% of the total vote.  Exxon Mobil Corporation (XOM): Major Holders, 
YAHOO! FIN. (Jan. 5, 2011 3:55 PM) 
 http://finance.yahoo.com/q/mh?s=xom+Major+Holders.  
149 A poison pill, or shareholder’s rights plan, makes the shares so 
unattractive to the potential acquirer that an offer will never actually be made to 
shareholders, even if they desire the offer, without the board of directors first 
redeeming the poison pill.  See e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 
1348-49 (Del. 1985). 
150 See e.g., Han-Wei Liu, The Non-Frustration Rule of The U.K. City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers and Related Agency Problems: What are the Implications for the E.C. 
Takeover Directive?, 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. ONLINE 5, 8-9 (2011), 
http://www.cjel.net/online/17_2-liu/ (illustrating briefly the difference in possible 
board of director action under U.S. and U.K. takeover regulation regimes). 
151 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 21.1(a) at I13. 
152 See Patrone, supra note 5, at 85.  
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This dichotomy between United Kingdom and United States 
takeover regulation begs the question: do these takeover regulation 
regimes protect shareholders equally and adequately?  This part will 
look at economic studies of defensive devices and how they affect 
shareholder value, and will also explore how “short-term” investors 
affect established long-term shareholders. 
 A.  Economic Studies of the Impact of Defensive Maneuvers 
Studying the economic effect of defensive maneuvers on 
shareholders in takeover situations requires using data with numerous 
variables.153 Different studies, focusing on different variables, have 
thus led to opposing conclusions.154  The reality of the depth and 
breadth of data and variables results in no one study that definitively 
declares that shareholders benefit or suffer a loss when defensive 
measures are utilized by a target company’s board of directors.155 Yet 
prominent Harvard M&A economist Lucian Bebchuk and some of 
his understudies have exposed a trend that the entrenchment of a 
board of directors156 negatively affects shareholder value.157  This is 
particularly relevant to the 2011 United Kingdom Takeover Code 
amendments because The Code Committee never questioned the 
importance of the Board Neutrality Rule,158 which should continue to 
prevent the possibility of board entrenchment. 
                                                 
153 See Michael D. Frakes, Classified Boards and Firm Value, 32 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 113, 115 (2007). 
154 John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile 
Takeovers, and Why? – The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 97 
GEO. L. J. 1727, 1732 (2007).  
155 See Frakes, supra note 153, at 114-15. 
156 Board entrenchment refers to the phenomenon of a corporation’s 
board of directors taking possibly self-serving action to maintain their positions as 
directors of the company.  In the United States, when a board appears to be 
entrenching itself against shareholders’ wishes, a breach of fiduciary duty question 
will likely arise.  See generally Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. 
Ch. 1988). 
157 See generally Frakes, supra note 153, at 114-15; Lucian A. Bebchuk, et 
al., The Powerful Anti-Takeover Force of Staggered Boards, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002).  
158 See generally Consultation Paper, supra note 4 (declaring The Committee’s 
intention to make changes to The Code but never entertaining an amendment to 
the Board Neutrality Rule).  But see Patrone, supra note 5 (arguing that repealing the 
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The Board Neutrality Rule in the United Kingdom prevents 
much data about board entrenchment in the United Kingdom’s 
companies from being accumulated.159  However, exploring the 
effects of board entrenchment in United States companies resonates 
with The Code Committee’s support of the Board Neutrality Rule 
because the negative correlation of board entrenchment to 
shareholder value supports The Committee’s decision to continually 
maintain board neutrality.160  In 2002, Professor Bebchuk  and 
colleagues conducted an in-depth study of Delaware companies with 
both poison pills and staggered boards161 that showed that the 
combination of these defensive measures makes it almost impossible 
for a bidding company to acquire a target company without consent 
from the board of the target company.162 
The empirical evidence from Professor Bebchuk’s study 
suggests that staggered boards, combined with a poison pill, provide 
the most robust takeover defense in Delaware corporate law.163  
Furthermore, the research and statistical analysis shows that this 
robust takeover defense164 does, in fact, lead to board 
                                                 
Board Neutrality Rule would better protect target shareholders instead of 
protecting target companies). 
159 See Nicholas F. Carline & Pradeep K. Yadav, Decoupling the Motives for 
Takeover Resistance, and the Implications for Stockholders, Managers and Bidders 3-4 (August 
2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The University of Oklahoma), 
http://www.ou.edu/content/dam/price/Finance/CFS/paper/pdf/SeminarPaper_
Carline.pdf.  
160 See Bebchuk, supra note 157, at 937.  
161 A staggered board of directors is a board that is split up into classes, 
and only one class is up for election at each annual shareholders meeting.  For 
example, a company with a nine-director staggered board, in three classes, would 
have only three directors up for election every year, with the winners of that 
election serving three-year terms before they would be up for another election.  
The staggered board thus prevents a change in control of a company’s shares from 
changing control of the board of directors until at least two annual shareholder 
meetings have passed, or in other words, at a minimum when just over one year has 
elapsed.  See Staggered Board, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 5, 2011, 12:35 PM),  
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/staggered-board.asp#axzz1iYTZNDa8.  
162 See Bebchuk, supra note 157, at 890. 
163 Id. at 950.  
164 In Delaware Corporate law the board of directors can unilaterally 
impose a poison pill if they can meet the Unocal enhanced business judgment test ex 
post in the Delaware courts.  See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 
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entrenchment.165  It also shows that board entrenchment negatively 
affects shareholder value by an average of about 11.6% on their final 
return on investment.166  This loss of wealth to the shareholders is 
most likely due to the high odds that the target company will remain 
independent.167  Shareholders will often be unable to dismantle a 
staggered board or force the board to redeem a poison pill.168  The 
shareholders are financially harmed by the resulting board 
entrenchment and their inability to cash in on an acquisition 
premium offered by the acquiring company for their shares.169  This 
is the exact type of effect that the Takeover Panel sought to avoid in 
the United Kingdom with the Board Neutrality Rule. 
Michael D. Frakes, a disciple of Bebchuk’s, further explored 
how staggered boards affect firm value using three different statistical 
analyses designed to correct for estimated co-variables.170  He also 
found a negative correlation between staggered boards and 
                                                 
946, 955 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 
1985). 
165 Bebchuk, supra note 157, at 913-14, 937 (providing an example of U.S. 
Surgical’s hostile bid for Circon in 1996, where Circon was able to thwart U.S. 
Surgical’s hostile takeover attempt with a poison pill and an effective staggered 
board, only to end up selling itself two years later for 17% less than the original 
bid). 
166 Id.  (“As a starting point we examine total shareholder returns, 
irrespective of bid outcome, for [Effective Staggered Board (ESB)] and non-ESB 
targets.  Shareholders in the ESB targets in our sample achieved 31.8% returns in 
the nine months after a hostile bid was announced, compared to 43.4% returns for 
the shareholders in non-ESB targets, representing an 11.6% difference.”). 
167 Id. at 950 (“We find that the increased odds of remaining independent 
are quite costly for target shareholders, without providing sufficient countervailing 
benefits in terms of higher acquisition premium.  We estimate than an ESB reduces 
the expected return of target shareholders in the nine months after a hostile bid is 
launched on the order of 8-10%.  The negative wealth effect associated with ESBs 
is particularly problematic from a policy perspective because the majority of 
staggered boards were established before the judicial developments that gave them 
their antitakeover potency.”). 
168 Id.  
169 Id.  
170 See generally Frakes, supra note 153 (Frakes creates in-depth statistical 
models and regression analyses to correct for variables and co-variables such as 
other anti-takeover measures, firm size, firm value among others).   
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shareholder value.171 The Frakes and Bebchuk studies suggest that 
there could be added costs to target shareholders from how board 
entrenchment may affect manager and director behavior, though the 
studies specifically did not explore this aspect of staggered boards.172  
This suggestion, although still not conclusively proven, provides a 
supplemental argument to the aforementioned return on investment 
concerns when a board of directors is allowed to unilaterally enact 
entrenching defensive measures. 
As previously stated, these studies are not conclusive and 
there are arguments that defensive measures actually increase 
shareholder value.173  However, the argument that defensive measures 
provide the board of directors a negotiating advantage to achieve 
higher premiums for the shareholders in a hostile or friendly 
takeover174 has largely been undermined by Harvard Professor of 
Law and Business Guhan Subramanian.175  His research suggests that 
the bargaining power hypothesis is only applicable in a narrow subset 
of acquisitions.176  Professor Subramanian argues that takeover 
                                                 
171 See Id. at 150-51 (meaning that the more robust the defensive 
mechanism employed by the board of director, the lower shareholder value would 
tend to be).   
172 See Frakes, supra note 153, at 114, 150; Bebchuk, supra note 157, at 939 
(suggesting that when managers and directors are protected by defensive measures, 
they may not act as efficiently as possible, or in the best interest of the 
shareholders, because the directors know they cannot be ousted by discontent 
shareholders). 
173 See Frakes, supra note 153 (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case Against 
Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U CHI. L. REV. 973, 1011 (2002) (explaining 
that some of the major arguments in favor of defensive measures by the board of 
directors are: defensive measures allow management to avoid distractions and focus 
on current operations; without defensive measures directors may focus excessively 
on short-term results to the detriment of long-term value; and most importantly, 
that defensive measures give management a bargaining power that allows them to 
maximize the premium paid to shareholders in a hostile takeover)). 
174 See generally Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover 
Defenses, 113 YALE L. J. 621, 629-30 (2003).  
175 See Subramanian, supra note 174, at 623. 
176 . Id. (“I demonstrate that the bargaining power hypothesis only applies 
unambiguously to negotiations in which there is a bilateral monopoly between 
buyer and seller, no incremental costs to making a hostile bid, symmetric 
information, and loyal sell-side agents.  These conditions suggest that the 
bargaining power hypothesis is only true in a subset of all deals, contrary to the 
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defenses do not help a target company’s shareholders nearly to the 
extent argued by the “bargaining power” proponents of defensive 
measures, even in friendly, negotiated acquisitions.177 
Although not dispositive, the above-mentioned legal 
economists provide strong evidence that supports promoting the 
neutrality of a target board of directors in a hostile takeover situation.  
There remains, however, the problem The Code Committee faced on 
how to address “short-term” investors in a takeover, while still 
requiring the target board of directors to remain neutral. 
 B.  Studies of the Effects of “Short-term” Investors 
Modern financial market practices can lead to a distortion of 
shareholder voting rights by decoupling those voting rights from an 
economic interest in the company.178  This often happens through the 
buying and selling of call options or put options on shares borrowed 
from brokers, or using other forms of derivatives.179  In mergers and 
acquisitions, voting disparity will arise in merger arbitrage,180 or 
                                                 
claim of some defense proponents that the hypothesis applies to all negotiated 
acquisitions.”).  
177 Id. at 684.  
178 See TR Investors, LLC v. Genger, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 153, 70-71 
(Del. Ch. July 23, 2010) (explaining how the voting rights and residual claims of 
shares can be separated and thereby result in situations where a stock holder might 
vote adversely to the interests of the company because their economic interests do 
not align with shareholders who have a long-term, residual claim vested in their 
shares) (citing Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. 
REV.775).  
179 For discussions on the intricacies of methods of decoupling share 
voting rights from share economic interests see Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, 
Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775. See also Henry T. C. Hu and Bernard 
Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006). 
180 Merger arbitrage is when an investor buys shares of the target 
company after the announcement of a merger or tender offer.  The investor hopes 
to profit on the premium paid by the acquirer to the target shareholders over the 
market price that the investor bought the shares after the announcement.  The 
major risk for this type of investment is if the companies fail to consummate the 
transaction, the shares will likely be worth less than what the investor paid to 
acquire them.  See Merger Arbitrage, FUNDAMENTALFINANCE (Jan. 16, 2012, 5:49 
PM),  
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alternatively, when a shareholder has a negative economic interest181 
arising when the investor short sells her shares.182 
In the modern M&A marketplace, the most influential short-
term investors are typically hedge or mutual funds.183  Institutional 
investors like mutual funds are, in practice, the only investors with 
the resources to attain voting rights sufficient to affect the outcome 
of a shareholder vote.184  There are recent examples of hedge funds 
being able to use their voting power to block or alter acquisitions 
from both the acquiring side and the target side.185  This institutional 
investor activism is not always detrimental to the established 
individual shareholders of these companies.186  However, the possible 
decoupling of the economic interests from the voting rights in a 
merger arbitrage situation poses serious complications with respect to 
the established shareholders.187  This section will attempt to 
                                                 
http://www.fundamentalfinance.com/mergers-acquisitions/merger-arbitrage.php.   
181 An investor might have a negative economic interest in a company 
when he or she makes a profit if the share price declines.  See Hu & Black, supra 
note 179, at 832-34. 
182 Short selling is when an investor borrows shares from their broker, 
and sells those shares immediately.  The investor is then required to “cover” those 
borrowed shares by buying identical securities and giving them back to the broker.  
The investor is attempting to profit by betting that the share price will fall between 
when they sell the borrowed shares and when they have to “cover” those shares.  A 
price drop will give the investor a profit of the difference in price of the initially 
sold shares and the bought back “covering” shares.  If the price rises within that 
time frame, however, the investor will realize a loss equal to that same difference.  
See Brigitte Yuille, Short Selling: What is Short Selling?, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 16, 
2012, 6:14 PM),  
http://www.investopedia.com/university/shortselling/shortselling1.asp#axzz1jf8S
8DOx.  
183 See Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 
59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1442 (2008).  
184 See supra note 148.  
185 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1034-36 (2007) 
(explaining, how Deutsche Borse was forced to abandon its bid for the London 
Stock Exchange because of its own dissatisfied hedge fund and mutual fund 
shareholders).   
186 Id. (explaining how Chiron institutional shareholders expressed 
dissatisfaction with Novartis’ bid for Chiron and eventually forced Novartis’ 
premium paid up from 23% to 32%).   
187 See infra Part III.B.1-2.  
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summarize the major concerns regarding the disconnect between 
voting rights and economic interests that have arisen over the last 
two decades and how those concerns pertain to mergers and tender 
offers.  The following sections will discuss a typical merger arbitrage 
situation, and the decoupling of votes and economic interests. 
1. Merger Arbitrage Situations 
It does not take a large inferential leap to realize that there 
can be situations where merger arbitrageurs may be able to obtain the 
votes to approve the sale of a target company, or to tender enough 
target company shares, to force a transaction that may not maximize 
value for established individual shareholders.188  A working paper by 
Georgetown finance professor Lee Pinkowitz used statistical analysis 
to highlight that companies with a large aggregate institutional 
shareholder block are more likely to be targets of takeovers, and that 
those takeovers are more likely to be successful.189  Pinkowitz’s 
analysis revealed that institutional investors are important to the 
takeover process because they either quickly tender their shares to the 
bidder, or quickly sell their shares on the open market to merger 
arbitrageurs.190  The study posits that the potential of these quick 
sales make the target stock more liquid, and thus more likely to make 
the acquisition successful.191 
  Likewise, Chancellor Chandler of the Delaware Chancery 
Court recently noted in the Air Products case that the threat of merger 
arbitrageurs tendering into an inadequate offer could be a legitimate 
threat under the first prong of a Unocal test,192 “if the offer is indeed 
                                                 
188 For a prime example see Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 
A.3d 48, 109 (Del. Ch. 2011) (explaining that merger arbitrageurs tendering into an 
inadequate offer may be a reasonable threat to a corporation). 
189 Lee F. Pinkowitz, Monitoring by Transient Investors?  Institutions and 
Corporate Control 21, 24 (unpublished manuscript) (on file at with Georgetown 
University, McDonough School of Business), 
http://faculty.msb.edu/lfp/Inst101800.pdf.   
190 Id. at 24.  
191 Id. at 28.  
192 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 946, 955 (Del. 
1985) (stating that for board defensive measures to fall under the protection of the 
business judgment rule that the board must: 1) demonstrate that they had 
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness 
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inadequate.”193  In this case, by the time the suit was filed, almost half 
of the target company shareholders were merger arbitrageurs,194 
which may demonstrate the prevalence and potential impact of 
arbitrageurs on takeovers.  While Air Products concedes that merger 
arbitrageurs help complete acquisitive transactions, Chancellor 
Chandler strongly derides the possible adverse impact of merger 
arbitrageurs on target company shareholders in a takeover.195  As 
Chancellor Chandler explained in one case: 
[T]he bad [arbitrageurs] and hedge funds who bought 
in, had obviously bought their shares from folks who 
were glad to take the profits that came with market 
prices generated by the Merger and Vector Capital’s 
hint of a higher price. These folks, one can surmise, 
had satisfied whatever long-term objective they had 
for their investment in Inter-Tel.196 
Merger arbitrageurs clearly have an impact on M&A 
transactions in general, but there remains skepticism as to how much 
arbitrageurs negatively affect shareholders of the target company.  
Individual established shareholders still must choose to sell their 
shares to the “short-term” investors in the first place, thereby 
satisfying their own investing goals. 
                                                 
existed and 2) that their defensive measure in response was reasonable in 
comparison to the threat posed). 
193 Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A. 3d 48, 109 (Del. Ch. 
2011) (explaining, however, that in this case there was no legitimate threat because 
the offer was, in fact, adequate). 
194 Id.  (“The argument is premised on the fact that a large percentage 
(almost half) of Airgas’s stockholders are merger arbitrageurs—many of whom 
bought into the stock when Air Products first announced its interest in acquiring 
Airgas, at a time when the stock was trading much lower than it is today—who 
would be willing to tender into an inadequate offer because they stand to make a 
significant return on their investment even if the offer grossly undervalues Airgas in 
a sale.”  In short, the risk is that a majority of Airgas’s stockholders will tender into 
Air Products’ offer despite its inadequate price tag, leaving the minority “coerced” 
into taking $70 as well). 
195 Id.  (“The defendants do not appear to have come to grips with the 
fact that the arbs bought their shares from long-term stockholders who viewed the 
increased market price generated by Air Products’ offer as a good time to sell”).   
196 Id. at 109 n. 413 (citing Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Delaware), Inc., 929 A.2d 
786, 815 (Del. Ch. 2007)).   
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   2. Problems with Decoupling Voting Rights and Economic Interests 
 
  Further compounding this institutional investor complex is 
how derivatives197 can decouple the economic interest from the 
voting rights of shares.  Two examples can help to illustrate this 
principle.  First, imagine a proposed acquisition where a target 
company institutional shareholder is strongly interested in 
consummating a proposed stock for stock merger, only the 
investment community and influential acquiring company 
shareholders think it is a bad deal and begin to convince the acquiring 
company to back away.  The institutional shareholder then buys 
almost 9.9% of the acquiring company stock, but immediately short 
sells198 another 9.9%.  This transaction gives the institutional 
shareholder the 9.9% vote from the first stock purchase, but 
completely removes any economic risk from that purchase because 
the short sale will totally offset any gain or loss from the voting stock.  
Therefore, the institutional shareholder has a block of shares to vote 
for the transaction against the wishes of most of the acquiring 
company shareholders, at no economic risk, and then benefits greatly 
from its target company stock after it is sold at an acquisition 
premium, to the acquiring company.199 
  A second example occurred in Hong Kong in early 2006 
where a deal, of which most minority target shareholders approved, 
was blocked by a hedge fund.200  The fund had borrowed target 
                                                 
197 Examples include, futures contracts, forward contracts, options and 
swaps.  See Derivative, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 18, 2011, 1:35 PM), 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/derivative.asp#axzz1jqBsyPgK.  
198 See supra note 182  
199 This entire example is heavily based on the Mylan Laboratories offer 
for King Pharmaceuticals, where Perry Hedge Fund acted much like the example 
institutional investor.  For an excellent review of this situation see Anish Monga, 
Note, Using Derivatives to Manipulate the Market for Corporate Control, 12 STAN. J. L. 
BUS. & FIN. 186, 196-97 (2006).  
200 See Hu & Black, supra note 179, at 834-35 (“Henderson Land offered 
to buy the 25% minority interest in Henderson Investment, a publicly held affiliate. 
Most minority shareholders favored the buyout, and Henderson Investment’s share 
price increased substantially. Under Hong Kong law, however, the buyout could be 
blocked by a negative vote of 10% of the “free floating” shares—in this case about 
2.5% of the outstanding shares. To everybody’s surprise, 2.7% of the shares were 
voted against the buyout. Henderson Investments shares fell 17% the day after the 
 2013 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2:2 
438 
company shares, and short sold them to make a profit off of the 
collapsed deal when the target share price declined sharply after the 
deal fell through.201  Other economic and voting decoupling 
complications can arise in various contexts, including other merger 
and acquisition situations.202  While many of the risks and pitfalls that 
are pervasive throughout merger arbitrage stand out and beg to be 
addressed by different takeover regimes, it remains unclear if target 
company shareholders suffer due to these merger arbitrageurs.  To 
summarize, the Board Neutrality Rule appears to well protect 
shareholders, while it remains far from conclusive that “short-term” 
investors do, or do not have a negative impact on shareholders. 
IV.  WHY THE TAKEOVER CODE AMENDMENTS WILL WORK 
The Code Committee may have gotten the 2011 Takeover 
Code amendments just right.  The staggering number of variables in 
any regulation means that only time will tell if The Committee did, in 
fact, hit a bull’s eye with these amendments, or if corrective changes 
will be necessary sooner rather than later.  This section will 
hypothesize that the amendments will accomplish the goal of leveling 
the playing field between targets and acquirers, all while continuing to 
robustly protect shareholders, and not overreaching to the detriment 
of other members of the M&A marketplace. 
The Code Committee and the Takeover Panel set out to fix 
the perceived imbalance of power in favor of acquiring companies 
over target companies, and more importantly, the perceived adverse 
effect of “short-term” investors.203  The amendments should help to 
rectify this imbalance in a number of ways.  First, the mandatory “Put 
                                                 
voting outcome was announced. It appears that . . . hedge funds borrowed 
Henderson Investment shares before the record date, voted against the buyout, and 
then sold those shares short, thus profiting from its private knowledge that the 
buyout would be defeated”).  
201 Id.  
202 See generally Martin & Partnoy, supra note 179, at 788-92.  
203 See supra Part I. 
 2013 Comment 2:2 
439 
Up or Shut Up” deadline should combat the “virtual bid” issues with 
hostile takeovers in the United Kingdom.204 
The mandatory “Put Up or Shut Up” deadline gives only a 
limited window of four weeks for a potential bidder to make a firm 
offer or walk away for six months.205  The amount of pressure to 
blindly sell the target company applied to a company by merger 
arbitrageurs should be partially alleviated by the limited window 
imposed by this deadline.206  If a company can no longer besiege a 
target,207 then this will decrease the likelihood that the composition of 
the shareholders will have changed significantly through arbitrageurs 
buying from established shareholders at small price increases.208  
Smaller voting blocks of merger arbitrageurs means that there would 
likely be more established target shareholders available to vote on the 
merits of the offer as they see fit.  Unlike in Air Products, where by the 
time the suit was filed almost half of the shareholders were 
arbitrageurs, the limited window and the Announcing All Bidders 
requirement should prevent large scale arbitrage from taking place in 
the takeover of United Kingdom public companies and should 
protect the established shareholders of the target companies in the 
original spirit of The Code.209  Although The Code forbids coercive 
offers,210 the besieging of a target company was in a way coercive by 
allowing arbitrageurs to erode target shareholder support.  The “Put 
Up or Shut Up” deadline should make great strides in rectifying the 
erosion that results from the uncertainty of a protracted “virtual bid” 
period; and the added secrecy and cost that may be placed on 
                                                 
204 See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.  
205 See supra Part I.A-B.  
206 These merger arbitrageurs will have likely bought target stock on the 
open market after a slight increase in price due to the looming potential offer.  
From that stock they would use their voting power to attempt to consummate the 
transaction, and realize a gain on the acquisition premium paid by the acquirer.   
207 Under the pre-amendment rules a company could besiege a target by 
announcing that it is thinking about making a bid, while never actually making a bid 
for months on end. 
208 See supra note 195; see also supra text accompanying note 25.  
209 See supra note 12.  
210 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 9.1 at F1-F13 (requiring a bid to 
all target shareholders if a bid is made for over 30% control, and requiring a best 
offer, that the best offer made to any shareholder is made to all shareholders). 
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acquiring companies is worth the benefits to the target 
shareholders.211 
The deal protection ban will likely have a small impact in 
protecting shareholders, but to what extent remains to be seen.  The 
possibility exists that the inducement fee ban will actually decrease 
the amount of acquiring companies that want to make an offer 
because they will fear spending money on the preparation only to 
lose out to a topping bidder.212  That may help the target company,213 
but it may hurt the target company shareholders.214  However The 
Code Committee left itself an out by requiring a review of the 
amendments in September 2012.215 The Committee’s one year review 
returned positive reviews of the amendments.216 The Committee 
admitted that it was difficult to assess if any potential offerors have 
been deterred by the amendments, however it does state that overall 
bid activity remained at a similar level the year after the amendments 
were enacted.217 The Committee also noted that the year after the 
amendments saw none of the major concerns of the critics of the 
amendments come to fruition.218  The general consensus of The 
Committee was that in the first year, the Amendments successfully 
curbed the problems of the “virtual bid” while not overly burdening 
bidding companies.219 
                                                 
211 See supra Part II.B.  
212 See supra Part II.B.  
213 It may help the target company to remain independent, and therefore 
the target company board to keep their jobs, because the target will not receive any 
bids at all.  Or, it could help the target by allowing it to court a white knight 
topping bid with a company that the board prefers, even if that company will not 
offer a maximum bid. 
214 It can hurt the shareholders, as Professor Bebchuk’s study showed, by 
diminishing the return to the shareholders because the target company remains 
independent.  See supra note 167. 
215 See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 5. 
216 See generally One Year Review, supra note 99. 
217 One Year Review, supra note 99, at 5.  
218 For example, the Review noted that no instances of more well-
prepared bidders “flushing out” less-prepared bidders were realized. Id. at 5-6.  The 
Review also stated that there was a significant reduction in an “offer period” being 
commenced due to an untoward movement in share prices instead of because of a 
firm offer. Id. at 6.   
219 See One Year Review, supra note 99, at 5-10. 
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As The Committee said in its Response Statement, 
inducement fees as they were used in practice before the 
amendments may just as well have hurt the target shareholders by 
precluding any topping bids by competing bidders.220  The 
Committee states in their One Year Review that they generally 
consider the ban on deal protection measures a success.221 By not 
making any earth shattering changes to the deal protections used in 
the United Kingdom,222 and by allowing room to change any 
detrimental effects of this ban, The Code Committee has provided a 
very balanced approach to attempting to protect target shareholders 
through the deal protection ban. 
The enhanced disclosure requirements should substantially 
help to provide target company shareholders with more crucial 
information about the acquiring company’s financial outlook, its 
intentions, and its stakeholders.  The acquiring company will also 
benefit from enhanced disclosures from the target company.223  
These enhanced disclosures were strongly supported in the Response 
Statement,224 and for good reason.  Enhanced disclosure and better 
information improves decision-making.  Furthermore, The 
Committee reviewed the disclosure requirements in their one year 
review and found that they improved transparency in offers.225 
An easy argument for an American commentator to make 
regarding the initial perceived imbalance favoring acquirers would be 
to simply advocate for a target company’s board to be able to use 
defensive measures like in Delaware.226  However, economic studies 
show a trend that those very defensive measures can lead to 
                                                 
220 See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 39.  
221 One Year Review, supra note 99, at 10-13. The Committee also noted, 
though, that some bidders and targets still included some agreements that the 
Committee Executive considered in violation of the amendments. Id. at 11.  
222 Banning the deal protection measures is still only a decrease of 1% in 
the size of the inducement fees.  See supra text accompanying note 113. 
223 See supra Part II.D.  
224 See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 68, 80.  
225 One Year Review, supra note 99, at 15-17. 
226 See Patrone, supra note 5 at 85.  
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significantly lower returns to the target shareholders.227  In light of 
these studies by prominent economists, it is hard to imagine that 
repealing the Board Neutrality Rule would not lead to occasional 
situations that harm shareholder investments significantly.  The 
Takeover Panel should be applauded for remaining so steadfastly in 
support of the Board Neutrality Rule as it embodies the shareholder 
protection that is one of the main goals of The Code.228  Target 
shareholders can rest assured that the board of directors will typically 
be serving the shareholders’ best interest and not their own.  The 
target shareholders also should assume that they will get close to the 
maximum merited premium on their shares, and thus the best return 
on investment they could possibly receive in a given takeover 
scenario. 
The economic studies generally support keeping the target 
board of directors neutral in a hostile takeover.  But, The Code 
Committee had to address the merger arbitrageurs and their influence 
on bids in a measured fashion.229  The Committee achieved this in 
intelligent fashion by enacting the deadline rules and ultimately 
rejecting a proposal for more stringent regulation of “short-term” 
investors.230  The Committee originally proposed, but later rejected, a 
rule that would bar all investors who acquired shares in the target 
after an announcement started a waiting period, from voting on the 
merger or from tendering their shares.231 
This proposal would have been too draconian of an approach 
to regulating “short-term” investors.  Law professors who have 
written about the problems of decoupled voting rights and economic 
interests in shares232 never mention an instance where merger 
arbitrageurs bought target company shares only to severely harm the 
                                                 
227 See supra Part III.A (an average of 11.6% lower returns for 
shareholders whose boards of directors were using entrenching defensive 
mechanisms).  
228 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, ¶ 2(a) at A1.  
229 See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 5.  
230 Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 20.  
231 Id.  
232 See generally Martin & Partnoy, supra note 179; Hu & Black supra note 
179.  
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target company through tendering into a totally inadequate offer.233  
Like Chancellor Chandler noted in Air Products, arbitrageurs have to 
buy their shares from long-term investors who must have felt content 
with the return on their investment.234  To take away that option 
would harm some target company long-term shareholders in 
contravention of the principles of The Code. 
If The Code Committee were to limit the voting rights for 
“short-term” investors, there would likely be a noticeable decrease in 
arbitrage activity.  This would mean fewer opportunities for 
established shareholders to sell their stock at the slight price increase 
that will result from the potential offer.235  Stripping some 
shareholders of the ability to gain from their investment to protect all 
of the shareholders does not align itself with The Code principles,236 
and The Code Committee made the right decision by ultimately 
rejecting this proposal. 
The Panel should not foreclose the proposed amendment to 
disenfranchise “short-term” investors in its entirety.  If, and only if, 
during its mandatory annual review of the 2011 amendments, The 
Panel decides that the amendments are not adequately correcting the 
imbalance of power in favor of bidders, The Panel should consider 
enacting this amendment on a limited basis.  Instead of eliminating the 
voting or acceptance rights of all investors who purchase target 
company stock after the announcement of a potential bid, The Panel 
should consider halving those “short-term” investors’ vote.  This 
could allow for more voting power to remain with established 
shareholders, without reducing the value of the shares purchased 
after the announcement of a potential offer to the same extent those 
                                                 
233 See supra Part III.B.2. 
234 See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 109 n. 413 
(citing Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Delaware), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 815 (Del. Ch. 2007)).  
235 For example, if Company A’s stock is trading at $20 per share, and 
Company B offers to buy all of the stock of Company A at $30 per share, there will 
be an immediate price increase upwards towards that $30 mark.  It will not reach 
$30 because there is the risk that the transaction will not happen, but the price 
increase does provide an immediate opportunity to profit from an investment by 
selling to a merger arbitrageur. 
236 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, Gen. Principles 1-6; 
Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, ¶ 2(a) at A1. 
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shares would be devalued under a scheme of total 
disenfranchisement. 
This potential variation on the proposed amendment could 
be further narrowed in scope by tying it to the Rule 8.3 disclosure 
requirements.237  Rule 8.3 requires that any person who is or becomes 
interested in 1% or more of the securities of any party to a 
transaction, either before the announcement or during the offer 
period, must disclose to the public their interest in any securities 
relevant to the transaction as well as the details of any short positions 
in any relevant securities to the transaction.238  If only those “short-
term” investors who have both over 1% interest and short positions 
in opposing, relevant securities were to have their voting power 
halved, then many of the problems associated with decoupling 
economic interest and voting rights could be improved without 
overly burdening established shareholders who want to sell their 
shares to “short-term” investors.  In other words, Rule 8.3 will make 
it known which shareholders hold significant interests on both sides 
of the transaction, and furthermore which have short positions which 
decouple their economic interests and voting interests.  Investors in 
these situations will almost always be arbitrageurs.  By halving the 
vote of those arbitrageurs with significant voting power, established 
shareholders will retain more power over the decision to accept the 
bid, but this will not entirely preclude those long-term investors who 
want to sell to arbitrageurs from doing so.  This could result in a 
“best of both worlds” situation that optimizes both established 
shareholder protections and the liquidity of a company’s stock. 
The Panel would have to undertake a consultation period and 
another study to determine the feasibility of such a narrowly tailored 
disenfranchisement amendment.  It may not be possible to keep track 
of, or distinguish, all of the shareholders who may be affected by this 
variation of the proposed amendment, and so this proposed 
amendment variation may ultimately be deemed impossible to 
implement.  However, The Panel should leave itself the option of 
                                                 
237 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 8.3 at E21.  
238 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 8.3(a)-(b) at E21; Takeover Code, supra 
note 3, Rule 8, note 5(a)(ii) at E27.  
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exploring this possible amendment if the current amendments fail to 
live up to their goals. 
In sum, the United Kingdom’s 2011 Takeover Code 
amendments were almost spot-on in their repairs of target 
shareholder protections in hostile takeovers.  The one year review has 
returned positive results.  The review supports the amendments and 
conclude, that at least within the first year, the amendments have 
protected target shareholders but not overreached to the point of 
chilling the M&A market. The amendments as they were enacted will 
continue protect target companies and target shareholders who are 
under siege from a hostile bidder.  The amendments will increase 
shareholder access to information and allow them to choose the best 
offer presented to them, or reject all offers, without being bear-
hugged into submission during the “virtual bid” period.  A potential 
incremental increase in shareholder protection may be able to be 
achieved by exploring the possibility of limiting, but not totally 
excluding, the voting rights of the few “short-term” investors who 
also have short positions in a security relevant to the transaction.  
Moreover, The Code Committee’s commitment to the Board 
Neutrality Rule appears to be the strongest protection for established 
target company shareholders that the Takeover Code can provide.239  
Lastly, The Code Committee was smart in not committing to an 
almost draconian measure that likely would have harmed target 
shareholders as much or more than it would have protected them.  
The measured response from The Panel may be remembered as a 
great stride forward in modern M&A practice.  Only time will tell. 
CONCLUSION 
The Kraft takeover of Cadbury flared tempers around the 
United Kingdom.  Although The Panel operated quickly, and in what 
could have been viewed as a reactionary manner, its response to the 
Kraft-Cadbury takeover will likely be remembered as a strong 
improvement in the United Kingdom’s takeover regulation.  The 
Announcing All Bidders requirement and the mandatory twenty-eight 
day “Put Up or Shut Up” deadline should do an excellent job of 
addressing the pre-amendment problems with the “virtual bid.”  The 
                                                 
239 See generally Part III.A.  
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inducement fee ban could allow target company shareholders more 
flexibility and freedom to entertain opposing or topping bids.  The 
enhanced disclosure requirements will increase information and aide 
in the decision making of the shareholders as well as the companies 
involved in a transaction.  These amendments are designed to tilt the 
balances of power back to a more equivalent position between 
acquiring companies and target companies in hostile takeovers.  
Furthermore, The Code Committee did not overreach when it 
adopted these amendments and thus the amendments will not act as 
too burdensome of a detriment to the mergers and acquisitions 
market.  Therefore, the 2011 Takeover Code amendments will likely 
be successful in achieving their goals and protecting target 
shareholders to an optimal extent. 
 
